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Abstract
In this thesis, we study the optimal reinsurance design problem and extend the classical
model in three different directions:
1. In the first framework, we add the additional assumption that the reinsurer can
default on its obligations. If the indemnity is beyond the reinsurer’s payment ability,
the reinsurer fails to pay for the exceeding part and this induces a default risk for the
insurer. In our model, the reinsurer is assumed to measure the risk of an insured loss
by Value-at-Risk regulation and prepares the same amount of money as the initial
reserve. As soon as the indemnity is larger than this value plus the premium, default
occurs. From the insurer’s point of view, two optimization problems are going to be
considered when the insurer: 1) maximizes his expectation of utility; 2) minimizes
the VaR of his retained loss.
2. In the second framework, the reinsurance buyer (insurer) adopts a convex risk mea-
sure ρ to control his total loss while the reinsurance seller (reinsurer) price the rein-
surance contract by Wang’s premium principle with distortion g. Without specifying
a particular convex risk measure ρ and distortion g, we obtain a general expression
for the optimal reinsurance contract that minimizes the insurer’s total risk exposure.
3. In the third framework, we study optimal reinsurance designs from the perspectives
of both an insurer and a reinsurer and take into account both an insurer’s aims and
a reinsurer’s goals in reinsurance contract designs. We develop optimal reinsurance
contracts that minimize the convex combination of the VaR risk measures of the
insurer’s loss and the reinsurer’s loss under two types of constraints, respectively.
The constraints describe the interest of both the insurer and the reinsurer. With the
first type of constraints, the insurer and the reinsurer each have their limit on the VaR
of their own loss. With the second type of constraints, the insurer has a limit on the
VaR of his loss while the reinsurer has a target on his profit from selling a reinsurance
contract. For both types of constraints, we derive the optimal reinsurance form for a
wide class of reinsurance policies and under the expected value reinsurance premium
principle.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Optimal (Re-)Insurance Problem
A reinsurance contract, bought by the insurer from the reinsurer to protect against the
insurer’s potential aggregate claim, is an important risk-sharing tool for the insurer and
became a popular research area in both academic research and industry use. The fast
increase in demand for reinsurance can be explained by changes in the insurance market.
Previously, insurance companies used to assume independence between risks. It led to
the belief that the aggregate reimbursement could be predicted by using the sample mean
as long as there are enough risks, and thus the insurer thought it could well control his
risk exposure and capital requirements. However, it became more common to see the
same risk scenarios influencing the issued policies, for example based on events such as
natural catastrophes, terrorism, and financial crises. Under these situations, the aggregate
reimbursement is hard to predict and the insurer may face extraordinary losses, which
might lead to the insurer’s bankruptcy. By signing a reinsurance contract the insurer
can transfer part of his risk to the reinsurer, who can diversify the large-scale risks. The
insurer can benefit from the reinsurance contract as a way of stabilizing the volatility of
its balance sheet and, at the same time, increasing its capacity to afford more business or
risk. Therefore, the reinsurance contract, which provides a mechanism for risk sharing and
diversification, becomes an effective risk management tool for the insurer.
Let us denote byX the underlying (aggregate) risk faced by the insurer. Conventionally,
X is assumed to be a non-negative random variable. Under a reinsurance contract, the
reinsurer agrees to pay indemnity I(X) to the insurer and requires a premium PI . The
premium principle is selected by the reinsurer and this will be discussed in more detail
1
in Section 1.3. Thus, when a loss X = x occurs, I(x) is the part ceded to the reinsurer
and the insurer will only need to cover the retained loss x − I(x). The function I(x)
is commonly described as compensation function, indemnification function, or ceded loss
function, while R(x) , x− I(x) is known as retained loss function. We shall denoted by I
the pool of all available reinsurance contracts. The total loss faced by the insurer with a
reinsurance contract now becomes X− I(X) +PI . If we denote by W0 the initial wealth of
the insurer, after receiving indemnity from the reinsurer, the insurer’s terminal wealth is
W0−X+ I(X)−PI . Essentially, the insurer may want to choose a reinsurance contract to
maximize his expected utility of terminal wealth corresponding to a utility function v(·),
namely,
max
I
E [v (W0 −X + I(X)− PI)] ; (1.1)
or to have the smallest potential risk under a particular risk measure ρ, namely,
min
I
ρ (X − I(X)− PI) . (1.2)
Optimization problems (1.1) and(1.2) can be conducted among a pool of reinsurance con-
tracts. Before giving more detailed explanations about the optimal reinsurance problem,
it is necessary to define a “feasible” reinsurance contract.
In the design of the reinsurance contract, moral hazard is an important issue that needs
to be avoided. Essentially, the reinsurer needs to minimize the audit cost and wants to
avoid paying more reimbursement to the insurer because of the manipulation of the actual
loss by the insurer. Since the reinsurance is a risk sharing mechanism between the insurer
and the reinsurer, an essential principle is “the higher the risk occurs, the more loss for
both risk-sharing parties”, otherwise, there exists moral hazard. If the ceded loss function
I(x) is not a non-increasing function, say there exists x < y such that I(x) > I(y), even if
the loss reaches the level y, the insurer may partially hide this actual loss and only report
loss x to the reinsurer to receive a higher compensation from the reinsurer. The adverse but
similar situation is when the retained loss function R(x) is not a non-decreasing function,
because the insurer could then pay less to the policyholder by inflating the claim to the
reinsurer. As a result, the reinsurance market commonly accepts the reinsurance contract,
which has both non-decreasing and continuous ceded and retained loss functions on the
support of the loss X. Denote by X¯ the essential supremum of the random variable X, i.e.
X¯ = ess supX = inf {a ∈ R : P (X > a) = 0} ,
and X¯ ∈ R+ ∪{+∞} could be a finite or infinite value. In the remainder of this thesis, we
will call an insurance/reinsurance contract I as “feasible” with respect to X if I satisfies
the following conditions:
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1. I :
[
0, X¯
] \ {∞} → [0, X¯] \ {∞} such that I(0) = 0 and I is non-decreasing;
2. |I(y)− I(x)| ≤ |y − x|, for any non-negative x and y.
The second condition is also known as 1-Lipschitz continuous condition or “slow grow-
ing” property. It is easy to check that the ceded loss function is feasible, i.e. I ∈ I, is
equivalent to that the retained loss function is feasible, i.e. R ∈ I. Throughout this thesis,
we denote by I the set of all feasible insurance/reinsurance contracts with respect to the
given loss X and all optimization will be conducted over I. For any I ∈ I, I is continuous
and non-decreasing, thus I is differentiable almost everywhere. We denote by I ′ the right
derivative of I. That is,
I ′(x) , lim
y↓x
I(y)− I(x)
y − x , for any x ≥ 0.
Clearly, for any I ∈ I, its right derivative I ′ is a right continuous function satisfies
I ′(x) ∈ [0, 1], and I(x) =
∫ x
0
I ′(t) dt for all x ≥ 0.
The reinsurance model could be classified into the “insurer-reinsurer-oriented” model
and “insurer-oriented” models. In the one-period “insurer-oriented” model, [Arrow, 1963]
and [Arrow, 1971] provided the fundamental work on the optimal insurance design problem.
Arrow has shown that the stop-loss insurance treaty is the optimal solution to the following
maximization problem:
max
I∈I
E [v (W0 −X + I(X)− p)] , (1.3)
such thatPI = E[I(X)] = p.
This is a particular case of Problem (1.1) when the premium is calculated by the expected
premium principle and fixed equal to p. The utility function v(·) is commonly assumed to
be an increasing concave function and this represents the risk-averse bearing of the insured
who is seeking risk sharing. When the initial wealth is non-random, say W0 = w0 for some
constant w0, by using u(x) , −v(w0 − x − p) + v(w0 − p), Problem (1.3) is equivalent to
the following minimization problem
min
I∈I
E[u(X − I(X))],
where u(·) is a non-negative, increasing and convex function. As a special case of Problem
(1.3), the variance minimization model, considered by [Bowers et al., 1997], [Kaas et al., 2001]
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and [Gerber, 1979], is another widely used insurance model. In this model, the insured
wants to minimize the variance of his retained loss:
min
I∈I
V ar(X − I(X)).
If the premium is still determined by the expected value of the ceded loss, the stop-loss
insurance treaty is the optimal choice for the insured. In these fundamental models, the
concave utility describes the insurer’s risk-averse bearing which may be induced by the
view that the insured is not able to diversify risk, and thus is seeking for ceding risk to
another market participant; while the expected premium reflects the fact that the insurer
is risk-neutral and he could diversify the risk.
Along with the reinsurance market’s development, the fundamental model considered by
Arrow has been extended in many directions subject to different objective functions/criteria
or premium principle, or with a relaxation of constraints on feasible insurances, or with
some additional constraints. [Deprez and Gerber, 1985] replaced the expected premium
by the convex and Gateaux differentiable premium principle and released the budget con-
straint on the premium and obtained a sufficient and necessary condition for the optimal
insurance contract. [Wang, 1996] and [Wang et al., 1997] proposed a list of natural axioms,
which suggests that a “sound” premium price should be a Choquet integral of the indemnity
which is convex but not Gateaux differentiable. As an application, [Young, 1999] extended
the work of [Deprez and Gerber, 1985] to Wang’s premium principle which will be intro-
duced in Section 1.3. Under the variance minimization model, [Gajek and Zagrodny, 2000]
used the standard deviation premium principle and assumed that the insurance treaty is
acceptable to the insured as long as its premium does not exceed an upper budget con-
straint; while [Kusuoka, 2001] adopted the mean-variance principle for the premium and
derived an explicit form for the optimal reinsurance contract. Kaluszka also considered the
same premium principle under the utility maximization models and explored the optimal
solution corresponding to a specific utility function, see [Kaluszka, 2004]. [Kaluszka, 2005]
generalized his previous result to an even more general framework: convex risk measure
with convex premium principle.
More recently, the optimal reinsurance decision problem has been revisited under dif-
ferent risk measures. [Cai and Tan, 2007] introduced the general risk measures Value-
at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) into the reinsurance’s model
and sought for the optimal stop-loss contracts and optimal quota-share contracts under
various premium principles. [Cai et al., 2008] also considered the extension of the pre-
vious works when all reinsurances with non-decreasing convex indemnities are regarded
as feasible. [Cheung, 2010] extended their results under Wang’s premium principle and
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[Cheung et al., 2014] resolved the optimal reinsurance problem under more general convex
risk measure subject to the expected premium principle.
In all the aforementioned theoretical studies, however, only the structure of the opti-
mal reinsurance with a single reinsurer is studied. In practice, reinsurance is an effective
risk-sharing tool between the insurer and the reinsurer and it is common that a few reinsur-
ers, say N reinsurers, with heterogeneous preferences could participate in one reinsurance
treaty. The insurer may pay less cost for ceding an amount of loss by formulating a
competitive reinsurance portfolio. It should be noted that, diversifying between different
reinsurers is never optimal for the insured when all reinsurers are risk neutral, i.e. for
i = 1, . . . , N , insurer i adopts actuarial price principle (1 + θi)E[Ii(X)] with risk loading
θi ≥ 0 to price an indemnity Ii. It is because the premium is increasing linearly and the
insurer can always get the cheapest reinsurance from the reinsurer with the smallest risk
loading and use it against the total indemnity I =
∑N
i=1 Ii. However, when reinsurers are
risk averse, to cover the same amount of additional unit of X, the higher the level of X
the more the marginal premium asked by an reinsurer. Even if, for example, Reinsurer 1
provides cheaper insurance than Reinsurer 2 when X is small, his rate of marginal premium
will increase and become higher than that of Reinsurer 2 eventually, therefore it is optimal
for the insurer to buy insurance from Reinsurer 2 against the high-level portion of X. The
detailed argument for this can be found in Proposition 4.2 of [Malamud et al., 2012]
• If all reinsurers are risk neutral, then only the reinsurer with the smallest discount
factor will participate in a trade;
• If reinsurers are risk averse and X¯ is sufficiently large, then all reinsurers will partic-
ipate in a trade.
To the best of our knowledge though, [Malamud et al., 2012] firstly analysis the optimal
risk sharing problem in the presence of more than two agents, or equivalently, optimal
insurance design with multiple insurers. In their model, insured and all insurers are in-
tertemporal expected utility maximizer with different von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
and discount factors. Thus, their results on the optimal insurance design can be viewed
as an extension of [Raviv, 1979]. A more recent work about optimal reinsurance problems
with multiple reinsurers is given by [?]. They take VaR and CVaR risk measures as criteria
and seek to reduce the risk exposure of an insurer under the assumption that one rein-
surer adopts the expected value principle while the second reinsurer’s premium principle
belongs to a general class with three basic axioms: distribution invariance, risk loading and
preserving stop-loss order. The premium principle for the second reinsurer is very flexi-
ble in the sense that it contains eight of eleven commonly used premium principles listed
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in [Wang et al., 1997]. They conclude that over both the VaR and CVaR risk measures
criteria, an optimal reinsurance arrangement for an insurer is to cede two adjacent layers
(I1(X), I2(X)) defined as follows:
I1(x) , (x− d1)+ − (x− d2)+ and I2(x) , (x− d2)+ − (x− d3)+,
for 0 ≤ d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d3, and Ii is distributed to Reinsurer i.
Another interesting extension of the classical optimal reinsurance model is adding the
counterparty risk as a background risk. Counterparty risk, also called credit risk or default
risk, recently became a popular topic in the optimal reinsurance design problem. When
the reinsurance buyer has a big loss, the reinsurance seller may only be able to pay part
of the promised insurance indemnity, instead of the entire amount. It implies a default
risk for the reinsurance buyer. [Cummins and Danzon, 1997] and [Cummins et al., 2002]
discussed the importance of insolvency risk in insurance markets. More recently, the impact
of counterparty risk on the optimal sharing transfers has captured more attention, see
[Biffis and Millossovich, 2012], [Bernard and Ludkovski, 2012] and [Asimit et al., 2013].
In the “insurer-reinsurer-oriented” model, it is similar to a game-theoretic problem that
reflects both insurer and reinsurer’s interest. As the two parties of a reinsurance contract,
an insurer and a reinsurer have conflicting interests. An optimal form of reinsurance from
one party’s point of view may be not acceptable to the other party as pointed out by
[Borch, 1960]. To illustrate this conflict, consider one example when both the insurer and
the reinsurer use VaR to measure their own risk. From the insurer’s perspective, the insurer
prefers to buy a reinsurance contract that is a solution to the optimization problem
min
I∈I
VaRα (X − I(X) + PI) . (1.4)
However, from the reinsurer’s point of view, the reinsurer likes to sell a reinsurance contract
that is a solution to the optimization problem
min
I∈I
VaRβ (I(X)− PI) , (1.5)
where α and β are the VaR risk levels of the insurer and the reinsurer, respectively. Optimal
solutions to Problems (1.4) and (1.5) are different. Indeed, when the reinsurance premium
PI is determined by the expected value principle, namely PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] with a
positive risk loading factor θ > 0, [Cheung et al., 2014] proved that the optimal reinsurance
form for Problem (1.4) is
I∗i (x) = (x− VaR 1
1+θ
(X))+ − (x− VaRα(X))+.
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Then, using the solution to Problem (1.4), it is easy to obtain that the optimal reinsurance
form for Problem (1.5) or for the reinsurer is
I∗r (x) = x− (x− VaR 1
1+θ
(X))+ + (x− VaRβ(X))+.
Obviously, I∗i 6= I∗r almost everywhere, and thus in Problems (1.4) and (1.5), the optimal
reinsurance form for one party is not optimal for the other. Indeed, the optimal contract
minimizing the VaR of one party’s loss may lead to an unacceptable large value for the
VaR of the other party’s loss.
Hence, a very interesting question is to take into consideration both an insurer’s objec-
tives and a reinsurer’s goals in optimal reinsurance design so that an optimal reinsurance
form is acceptable to both parties. There are two general ways to consider both an insurer’s
objectives and a reinsurer’s goals in an optimal reinsurance design. One way is to minimize
or maximize an objective function that considers both an insurer’s aims and a reinsurer’s
goals, and the other way is to minimize or maximize an objective function from one party’s
point of view under some constraints on the other party’s goals and on the party’s own ob-
jectives. [Borch, 1960] first addressed this issue by discussing the quota-share and stop-loss
reinsurance contracts and deriving the optimal retention of these contracts under the op-
timization criterion of maximizing the product of the expected utility functions of the two
parties’ terminal wealth. Recently, [Hu¨rlimann, 2011] has readdressed this issue by study-
ing the combined quota-share and stop-loss contracts and obtaining the optimal retention
of these contracts under the optimization criterion of minimizing the sum of the variances
of the losses of the insurer and the reinsurer and several other related optimization crite-
ria. [Cai et al., 2013] proposed the optimization criteria of maximizing the joint survival
probability and the joint profitable probability of the two parties and derived sufficient
conditions for a reinsurance contract to be optimal in a wide class of reinsurance policies
and under a general reinsurance premium principle. Using the results of [Cai et al., 2013]
, [Fang and Qu, 2014] derived the optimal retentions of a combined quota-share and stop-
loss reinsurance under the criterion of maximizing the joint survival probability of the two
parties under the expected value reinsurance premium principle.
In this thesis, we are going to design the optimal reinsurance contract in several more
general frameworks. In Chapter 2, we add the assumption that the reinsurer may fail
to fulfill his liability when the incurred loss exceeds his maximal payment ability. We
will investigate this default impact on the form of the optimal reinsurance. With the
presence of default risk, in most cases, the optimal reinsurance has a limited stop form
but requires a lower deductible or an extra deductible in the middle. In Chapter 3, we
adopt the convex law-invariant risk measure and Wang’s premium principle which will be
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introduced in Section 1.2 and Section 1.3 respectively. Both risk measure or premium
principle are represented in a general form rather than a particular expression. We will
discuss the general form of the optimal reinsurance contract within this framework and the
general solution is consistent with the existing result when the risk measure or the premium
principle is specifically identified. In Chapter 4, we minimize the convex combination of
the VaR risk measures of the insurer’s loss and the reinsurer’s loss subject to two sets of
the insurer’s and the reinsurer’s constraints. Each set of constraints includes restrictions,
according to risk management concern or profit concern, from both the insurer and the
reinsurer. Therefore, the optimal reinsurance can be acceptable by both parties. In all of
these three optimal reinsurance models, the choices of the risk measure and the premium
principle influence the form of the optimal reinsurance policy. In the next two sections of
this chapter, we are going to introduce risk measures and premium principles and some
important results in the existing literature.
1.2 Risk Measure
In risk management, quantifying the risk of a financial position is a key task that gives
rise to extensive discussions both from a theoretical and a practical point of view. In a
financial market, let Ω denote the set of all possible scenarios, and the future value of a
financial position can be described by a random variable X defined on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P). A real value is assigned to each financial position to represent its risk level. Such
functionals are called risk measures.
Definition 1.2.1 A measure of risk ρ is a mapping from a set of risk random variables
X into the real value line.
A risk measure ρ could be an arbitrary functional on X which is the set of all random
variables X on (Ω,F ,P). However, in practice, a risk measure is expected to satisfy
certain conditions. In the sequel, we use the positive part of X to represent the loss and
the negative part of X to represent the gain.
Definition 1.2.2 A risk measure ρ : X → R is called a monetary risk measure if ρ satisfies
the following conditions for all X, Y ∈ X .
1. Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y , then ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
2. Translation invariance: For any m ∈ R, ρ(X +m) = ρ(X) +m.
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For a monetary risk measure ρ, the number ρ(X) can be used as a capital requirement,
that is as the minimal extra cash which should be added to the financial position X to
make it acceptable. Thus, a monetary measure of risk ρ induces the acceptance set.
Definition 1.2.3 The acceptance set associated to a risk measure ρ is the set denoted by
Aρ and defined by
Aρ , {X ∈ X : ρ(X) ≤ 0} .
Conversely, one can make a list, denoted byA, of all acceptable financial positions according
to an investor’s own preference and define a risk measure ρA associated with A.
Definition 1.2.4 The risk measure associated to an acceptance set A is defined by
ρA(X) , inf {m : X −m ∈ A} .
The discussion about the acceptance set and desirable properties of a risk measure was
initiated in the coherent case by [Artzner et al., 1999].
As one of the most popular measures of risk, Value-at-Risk (VaR) has achieved the
highest status of being written into industry regulation.
Definition 1.2.5 The Value-at-Risk (VaR) of random variable X at level α is defined as
the lower α-quantile of X
VaRα(X) , inf {x ≥ 0 : SX(x) ≤ α} ,
where SX is the survival function of X.
Value-at-Risk is a monetary risk measure, however, it is heavily criticized for not being
subadditive and does not take into account the severity of an incurred damage event. As a
response to these deficiencies, the notion of coherent risk measures was firstly introduced in
[Artzner et al., 1997] and further developed in [Artzner et al., 1999]. The authors discussed
methods of measurement of (market and non-market) risks and proposed a set of four
desirable properties.
Definition 1.2.6 If the set Ω of all possible scenarios is finite. A risk measure ρ : X → R
is called a coherent risk measure if the following axioms are satisfied: for any X, Y ∈ X :
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1. Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y , then ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
2. Translation invariance: For any m ∈ R, ρ(X +m) = ρ(X) +m.
3. Subadditivity: ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
4. Positive homogeneity: For any λ ≥ 0, ρ(λX) = λρ(X).
Clearly, a coherent risk measure is a monetary measure satisfying subadditivity and positive
homogeneity.
Proposition 1.2.1 A risk measure ρ is coherent if and only if there exists a family P of
probability measures on the set of states of nature, such that
ρ(X) = sup {EP[−X] : P ∈ P} . (1.6)
Proposition 1.2.1, which was provided in [Artzner et al., 1999], gave a general representa-
tion for all coherent risk measures in terms of generalized scenarios; and the same result,
in a different context, has been also obtained in [Huber, 1981]. Using this representation
result, a specific coherent measure – worst conditional expectation (WCE) – was suggested
and WCE is shown to be, under some assumptions, the least expensive among coherent
risk measures. It is accepted by regulators since it is more conservative than the VaR
measurement.
Definition 1.2.7 (Worst Conditional Expectation at level α)
WCEα(X) , sup {E [X|A] : P(A) > α} .
This notion is closely related to the Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE), which is defined
as follows, but does not coincide with WCE in general.
Definition 1.2.8 (Conditional Tail Expectation at level α)
CTEα(X) , E [X|X > V aRα(X)] .
WCE is in fact coherent but useful only in a theoretical setting since it requires the
knowledge of the whole underlying probability space, while CTE lends itself naturally to
practical applications but it is not coherent.
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Since then, many scholars have made various important contributions along this direc-
tion. The definition of coherent risk measure was extended by [Delbaen, 2000] to arbitrary
probability spaces, which were assumed to be finite probability spaces in [Artzner et al., 1999].
In Definition 1.2.6, [Artzner et al., 1999] use X = L∞ (Ω,F ,P), which is the set of all
bounded random variables on a finite atom-less probability space (Ω,F ,P). [Delbaen, 2000]
suggested that, when defining the coherent risk measure on the space of all real valued ran-
dom variables, the value of a coherent risk measure may by +∞ and when this happens, it
means that the risk is very bad and is unacceptable for the economic agent, or something
like a risk that cannot be insured. Meanwhile, on a separable metric space Ω which may
not be finite, a coherent risk measure ρ has representation (1.6) is equivalent to the Fatou
property: i.e.
ρ(X) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
ρ(Xn), wheneve sup
n
‖Xn‖∞ <∞ and Xn p−→ X,
where
p−→ denotes convergence in probability.
As a typical example of coherent risk measure, Expected Shortfall (ES), also known as
Average Value-at-Risk (AVaR), makes up for several drawbacks that VaR has and serves
as an important risk measure in insurance and credit risk management.
Definition 1.2.9 (Expected Shortfall/Average Value-at-Risk at level α)
AVaRα(X) ,
1
α
∫ α
0
VaRξ(X) dξ.
AVaR was explored in [Acerbi and Tasche, 2002], in which the authors presented four char-
acterizations : 1) as integral of all the quantiles below the corresponding level; 2) as limit
in a tail strong law of large numbers; 3) as minimum of a certain function; 4) as maximum
of WCEs when the underlying probability space varies. In this way, they showed that
AVaR is a coherent risk measure and easy to compute and to estimate and therefore is
complementary and even in some aspects superior to the other notions.
The notion of convex risk measures was introduced in [Follmer and Schied, 2002] as a
generalization of coherent risk measures.
Definition 1.2.10 A risk measure ρ : L∞ (Ω,F ,P) → R is called a convex risk measure
if the following axioms are satisfied for any X, Y ∈ L∞ (Ω,F ,P):
1. Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y , then ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
11
2. Translation invariance: For any m ∈ R, ρ(X +m) = ρ(X) +m.
3. Convexity: ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ) for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
Since in many situations the risk of a position might increase in a nonlinear way with the
size of the position, they suggested to relax the conditions of positive homogeneity and
of subadditivity and to require, instead of these two properties, the convexity property,
which is a weaker condition. They also provide a corresponding extension of the repre-
sentation theorem in terms of probability measures on the underlying space of scenarios.
This representation theorem works for a general probability space and the space of all
bounded random variables. A risk measure satisfies the law-invariant property if it assigns
the same value to two risky positions having a common distribution. If one imposes the
law-invariant property as an additional axiom, the representation result was obtained by
[Kusuoka, 2001] in the coherent case, and by [Feirrwlli and Rosazza Gianin, 2005] in the
convex case. In [Jouini et al., 2006], the authors have shown that a law-invariant convex
risk measure ρ satisfies the Fatou property. Moreover, the authors gave the following useful
representation result for law-invariant convex risk measures:
Lemma 1.2.2 Suppose (Ω,F ,P) is an atomless probability space. Denote P ([0, 1]) to be
the set of all Borel probability measures on [0, 1]. For a function ρ : L∞ (Ω,F ,P)→ R, the
following are equivalent:
1) ρ is a law invariant convex risk measure.
2) There is a function β : P ([0, 1]) → [0,∞] which is law invariant, lower semi-
continuous and convex such that
ρ(Y ) = sup
µ∈P([0,1])
(∫ 1
0
AVaRα(Y )µ(dα)− β(µ)
)
,
where AVaRα is given by Definition 1.2.9.
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1.3 Premium Principle
A premium principle is a rule for assigning a premium to an insurance risk under a partic-
ular indemnity. It could also be viewed as a risk measure that measures the ceded loss for
the reinsurer and thus the choice of the reinsurance premium principle essentially reflects
the reinsurer’s preferences and hedging strategy. There is a lot of discussion on the axioms
that should be satisfied by a premium principle in order to make sure the premium is
fair enough to the market. The following gives a list of some reasonable properties of a
premium principle P , where P : X → [0,∞] is a real-valued functional on the set of all
risk random variables.
P1 Independence: P (X) depends only on the cumulative distribution function of X.
P2 Risk loading: P (X) ≥ E[X].
P3 No unjustified risk loading: If a risk X is identically equal to a constant c ≥ 0 almost
everywhere, then P (X) = c.
P4 No rip-off: P (X) ≤ ess supX for all risk X.
P5 Translation invariance: P (X + a) = P (X) + a for all X and all a ≥ 0.
P6 Scale invariance: P (bX) = bP (X) for all X and all b ≥ 0.
P7 Additivity: P (X + Y ) = P (X) + P (Y ) for all X and Y .
P8 Subadditivity: P (X + Y ) ≤ P (X) + P (Y ) for all X and Y .
P9 Supperadditivity: P (X + Y ) ≥ P (X) + P (Y ) for all X and Y .
P10 Independent additivity: P (X+Y ) = P (X)+P (Y ) for all X and Y are independent.
P11 Comonotonic additivity: P (X+Y ) = P (X)+P (Y ) for all X and Y are comonotonic.
P12 Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y with probability 1, then P (X) ≤ P (Y ).
P13 Continuity: lim
a→0+
P (max{X − a, 0}) = P (X), and lim
a→∞
P (min{X, a}) = P (X).
A reasonable premium principle also needs to preserve the ordering between two random
losses. Here, we provide two common definitions of ordering between two risk variables X
and Y :
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Definition 1.3.1 (First stochastic dominance ordering “ST”)
A random variable X is smaller than another random variable Y in the first stochastic
dominance ordering, denoted by X ST Y if
E[ψ(X)] ≤ E[ψ(Y )], for any non-decreasing function ψ,
provided the expectation exists.
Definition 1.3.2 (Stop-loss function) A stop-loss function ψ with deductible d > 0 has
the form: ψ(x) = (x− d)+.
Definition 1.3.3 (Stop-loss ordering “SL”)
X SL Y, if E[ψ(X)] ≤ E[ψ(Y )] for any stop-loss function ψ.
P14 Preserves first stochastic dominance ordering: If X ST Y , then P (X) ≤ P (Y ).
P15 Preserves stop-loss ordering: If X SL Y , then P (X) ≤ P (Y ).
When the insurer accepts many independent risks, the sample mean and the theoretical
mean for insurance indemnities become closer and the aggregate reimbursement can be
predicted by using the law of large number. Therefore, premiums can be determined by
using the expected value plus a positive risk loading, which is used to cover all expense
as well as a profit return. For example, the Expected Value Premium Principle is defined
as P (X) = (1 + θ)E[X], where θ > 0 is the risk loading. The Expected Value Premium
Principle satisfies all properties listed above except P4 “No rip-off”.
There are some other ways to determine a premium principle. An actuary can first list
properties that he wants the premium principle to satisfy and then find an appropriate
one. Or, he can adopt a particular economic theory and then determine the resulting
premium principle. A widely used list of axioms for a premium principle in a competitive
market, where the insurance prices are determined by the collective efforts of all buyers
and sellers, was proposed by [Wang et al., 1997]. They suggested that an appropriate
insurance premium principle should satisfy properties P1, P11, P12 and P15 and this kind
of premium principle is called as Wang’s premium principle. An important concept in
Wang’s premium principle is that of “distortion function” which is defined as follows:
Definition 1.3.4 (Distortion) Let P be a probability measure on a σ-algebra Ω. For an
increasing function g on [0, 1] with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1, the function g ◦ P is called a
distorted probability and the function g is called a distortion function.
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[Wang et al., 1997] showed that, under some assumptions, if the market premium func-
tional P : X → [0,∞] satisfies these four properties, then there is a unique distortion
function g such that
P (X) = P (1)
∫
X d(g ◦ P) = P (1)
∫ ∞
0
g ◦ SX(t)dt.
In particular, if P (1) = 1, then P has a Choquet integral representation:
P (X) =
∫ ∞
0
g ◦ SX(t)dt,
If, furthermore, g is concave, then P preserves the stop-loss ordering. Finally, this result is
essentially the extension of Yaari’s Representation Theorem [Yaari, 1987] to all unbounded
random variables.
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Chapter 2
Counterparty Default Risk with
VaR-Regulated Initial Reserve
In this chapter, we consider the impact of the default risk on the optimal reinsurance
design. In most studies on optimal reinsurance, one assumes that a reinsurer will pay
the promised loss I(X) regardless of its solvency or equivalently, one ignores the potential
default by a reinsurer. Indeed, default risk can be reduced if a reinsurer has a sufficiently
large initial capital or reserve. However, default might occur even if the initial capital of a
reinsurer is very large. In a reinsurance contract I, a reinsurer may fail to pay the promised
amount I(X) or a reinsurer may default due to different reasons. One of the main reasons
could be that the promised amount I(X) exceeds the reinsurer’s solvency. The larger is
the initial reserve of a reinsurer, the smaller is the likelihood that default will occur. This
is why the initial capital of a seller (reinsurer) of a reinsurance contract should meet some
requirements by regulation to reduce default risk.
In this chapter, we propose a reinsurance model with regulatory initial capital and
default risk. We assume that the initial capital or reserve of a seller (reinsurer) of a
reinsurance contract I is determined through regulation by the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of
its promised indemnity I(X), and denote the initial capital of the reinsurer by ωI =
VaRα(I(X)), where VaRα(Z) = inf{z : Pr{Z > z} ≤ α} is the VaR of a random variable
Z and 0 < α < 1 is called the risk level. Usually, α is a small value such as α = 0.01 or 0.05.
We assume that the reinsurer charges a reinsurance premium PI based on the promised
indemnity I(X). The insurer is aware of the potential default by the reinsurer but the
worst case for the insurer is that the reinsurer only pays ωI +PI if I(X) > ωI +PI . Thus,
when the insurer is seeking for optimal reinsurance strategies and taking account of the
potential default by the reinsurer, the insurer assumes the worst indemnity I(X)∧(ωI+PI)
16
from the reinsurer. Indeed, when ωI = VaRα(I(X)), we know Pr(I(X) > ωI + PI) ≤ α or
the probability of default by the reinsurer is not greater than the value α, which could be
an acceptable risk level for the insurer. Hence, under the proposed reinsurance model, the
total retained risk or cost of the insurer is X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI) + PI and the insurer’s
terminal wealth is w0 −X + I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI) − PI , where w0 is the initial capital of the
insurer.
To avoid tedious discussions and arguments, in this chapter, we assume that the sur-
vival function SX(x) of the underlying loss random variable X is continuous and strictly
decreasing on (0,∞) with 0 < SX(0) ≤ 1. The survival function SX(x) has a possible jump
at point zero which means it is possible that no claim raised from the policyholder to the
insurer. This assumption has also been used in [Cheung, 2010]. Furthermore, we assume
that PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)], i.e., the reinsurance premium is determined by the expected
value principle, where θ > 0.
As discussed in the introduction, utility maximization and risk measure minimization
are two main optimization problems in optimal reinsurance design. In this chapter, we
consider these two problems separately under the default assumption. We firstly investigate
the optimal reinsurance contract when the insurer wants to maximize his utility of the
terminal wealth. Secondly, we consider the risk measure minimization problem when the
insurer uses VaR as well. All proofs are given in Section 2.4. Results in this chapter can
also be found in [Cai et al., 2014].
2.1 Utility Maximization
In this section, we assume that the insurer wants to determine an optimal reinsurance
strategy I∗ that maximizes the expected utility of its terminal wealth of w0 −X + I(X)∧
(ωI + PI) − PI under an increasing concave utility function v. That is, we study the
following optimization problem:
max
I∈I
E [v (w0 −X + I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI)− PI)] (2.1)
such that PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] = p,
where 0 < p ≤ (1+θ)E(X) is a given reinsurance premium budget for the insurer. This opti-
mal reinsurance problem can be viewed as the extension of the classical optimal reinsurance
problem without default risk, which was first studied by [Arrow, 1963] and [Borch, 1960].
As illustrated later in the chapter, as α→ 0, Problem (2.1) is reduced to the classical opti-
mal reinsurance problem without default risk studied by [Arrow, 1963] and [Borch, 1960].
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We can also recover the solutions of [Arrow, 1963] and [Borch, 1960] from our solution to
Problem (2.1).
First, we point out that by taking u(x) = −v(w0 − p− x), Problem (2.1) is equivalent
to the following minimization problem:
min
I∈I
E
[
u
(
X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI)
)]
(2.2)
such that PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] = p,
where u is an increasing convex function. Throughout this section, we assume E|u(k)(X)| <
∞ for k = 0, 1, 2, and all expectation exists and integration and differentiation are ex-
changeable by assuming sufficient regularity conditions.
Second, we notice that for any I ∈ I, the function I(x) is continuous on [0,∞). In
addition, for any 0 ≤ x < y, if I(y) = I(x) + y − x, then I(t) = t − (x − I(x)) on the
interval [x, y].
For any fixed premium budget 0 < p ≤ (1 + θ)E[X], we denote the set of all feasible
contracts with the given reinsurance premium p by
Ip = {I ∈ I : PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] = p} .
Note that if p = (1 + θ)E[X], then Ip = {I(x) ≡ x}, which contains only one reinsurance
contract I(x) ≡ x, and thus Problem (2.2) reduces to the trivial case. Hence, throughout
this section, we assume p ∈ (0, (1 + θ)E[X]). Then Problem (2.2) can be written as
min
I∈Ip
E
[
u
(
X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI)
)]
= min
I∈Ip
H(I), (2.3)
where
H(I) , E
[
u
(
X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI)
)]
.
To solve the infinite-dimensional optimization Problem (2.3), we first show that for any
given reinsurance contract I ∈ Ip, there exists a contract kI ∈ Ip such that H(kI) ≤ H(I)
and kI is determined by four variables. Thus, we can reduce the infinite-dimensional
optimization Problem (2.3) to a finite-dimensional optimization problem. To do so, we
recall the definition of convex order.
Definition 2.1.1 Random variable X is said to be smaller than random variable Y in
convex order, denoted as X 4cx Y , if E[u(X)] ≤ E[u(Y )] for any convex function u(·) such
that the expectations exist.
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Since u(·) is a convex function, for each I, we want to construct a contract kI ∈ Ip
satisfying k˜I(X) 4cx I˜(X). The following lemma was given by [Ohlin, 1969] and it provides
a useful criterion for the convex order.
Lemma 2.1.1 Let X be a random variable, h1 and h2 be increasing functions such that
E [h1(X)] ≤ E [h2(X)]. If there exists x0 ∈ R ∪ {+∞} such that h1(x) ≥ h2(x) for all
x < x0 and h1(x) ≤ h2(x) for all x > x0, then h1(X) 4cx h2(X).
Throughout this paper, we adopt the following notation
(a)+ , max {a, 0} , a ∧ b , min {a, b} , and a ∨ b , max {a, b} .
The following lemma shows that for any given reinsurance contract I ∈ Ip, there exists a
contract kI ∈ Ip such that H(kI) ≤ H(I).
Theorem 2.1.2 Denote a = VaRα(X). For any I ∈ Ip, there exists kI ∈ Ip such that
H(kI) ≤ H(I) and kI has the form
kI(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− (d1 + I(a)))+ + (x− d2)+ − (x− (d2 + p))+ + (x− d3)+ (2.4)
for some (d1, d2, d3) ∈ R3+ satisfies 0 ≤ d1 ≤ d1 + I(a) ≤ a ≤ d2 < d2 + p ≤ d3 ≤ ∞.
Remark 2.1.1 We point out that for any I ∈ I, I is continuous and non-decreasing.
Thus, ωI = VaRα(I(X)) = I(VaRα(X)) = I(a). As α → 0 or a → ∞, we have I(a) →
I(∞) and hence I ∧ (ωI + PI) = I. In other words, as α→ 0 or a→∞, Problem (2.2) is
reduced to the following classical problem without the default risk:
min
I∈I
E [u (X − I(X))] (2.5)
such that PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] = p.
The optimal solution to Problem (2.5), given in [Arrow, 1963] and [Borch, 1960], is a
stop-loss reinsurance I∗0 (x) = (x − d∗)+, where d∗ is uniquely determined by the premium
condition. This classical result can also be recovered from Lemma 2.1.2. Indeed, as a→∞,
the ceded loss function kI in (2.4) is reduced to the form
kI(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − I(∞))+,
for some 0 ≤ d1 ≤ ∞ determined by the premium condition (1 + θ)E[kI(X)] = p. If
I(∞) = ∞, then kI(x) = (x − d∗)+. If I(∞) < ∞, it is easy to see that d1 < d∗ and
x−(x−d∗)+ crosses x−kI(x) at most once from above on [0,∞). Thus, by Lemma 2.1.1, we
have X − (X − d∗)+ 4cx X − kI(X). Thus, E [u (X − (X − d∗)+)] ≤ E [u (X − kI(X))] for
any kI with I(∞) <∞. Therefore, in either I(∞) =∞ or I(∞) <∞, X− (X−d∗)+ 4cx
X − kI(X) 4cx X − I(X). Thus, (x− d∗)+ is the optimal solution to Problem (2.5).
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In the rest of this chapter, we assume 0 < α < SX(0) and thus 0 < a <∞. Otherwise,
the initial reserve is ωI = VaRα(X) = 0 which has no meaning in the practice. Theorem
2.1.2 reduces the infinite dimension of Problem (2.3) to a finite dimension problem. To see
that, we denote
Ip,0 , {I ∈ Ip and I having the expression (2.4)} .
Then, thanks to Theorem 2.1.2, we see that Problem (2.3) is equivalent to the following
minimization problem
min
I∈Ip,0
E
[
u
(
X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI)
)]
= min
I∈Ip,0
H(I). (2.6)
It is still not easy to solve Problem (2.6) since it involves the four variables d1, d2, d3
and I(a). To solve Problem (2.6), we first need to discuss the properties of the set Ip,0.
For any given ξ ∈ [0, a], define contract I0,ξ ∈ I as
I0,ξ(x) = (x− a+ ξ)+ − (x− a)+ (2.7)
and denote the reinsurance premium based on I0,ξ by p0,ξ, that is
p0,ξ = (1 + θ)E [I0,ξ(X)] = (1 + θ)
∫ a
a−ξ
SX(x)dx. (2.8)
Furthermore, define contract IM,ξ ∈ I as
IM,ξ(x) = x− (x− ξ)+ + (x− a)+ (2.9)
and denote the reinsurance premium based on IM,ξ by pM,ξ, that is
pM,ξ = (1 + θ)E [IM,ξ(X)] = (1 + θ)
(∫ ξ
0
+
∫ ∞
a
)
SX(x)dx. (2.10)
Denote
ξ0 = inf {ξ ∈ [0, a] : pM,ξ ≥ p} , (2.11)
ξM = sup {ξ ∈ [0, a] : p0,ξ ≤ p} . (2.12)
Conventionally, ξ0 = 0 if the set {ξ ∈ [0, a] : pM,ξ ≥ p} is empty; ξM = a if the set
{ξ ∈ [0, a] : p0,ξ ≤ p} is empty. Note that p is assumed to satisfy 0 < p < (1 + θ)E[X], that
is p0,0 = 0 < p < (1 + θ)E[X] = pM,a. Obviously, both p0,ξ and pM,ξ are continuous and
increasing in ξ ∈ [0, a]. Therefore, pM,ξ0 = pM,0 > p if pM,0 > p, and pM,ξ0 = p if pM,0 ≤ p;
meanwhile, p0,ξM = p0,a < p if p0,a < p and p0,ξM = p if p0,a ≥ p.
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Lemma 2.1.3 For any ξ ∈ [0, a], the following three conditions are equivalent:
(1) {I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ} 6= ∅,
(2) p0,ξ ≤ p ≤ pM,ξ,
(3) ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ].
Moreover, the set Ip,0 can be written as the union of disjoint non-empty sets, namely
Ip,0 =
⋃
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
{I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ} .
It will be proved in Theorem 2.1.6 that Problem (2.6) is equivalent to the following
two-step minimization problem:
min
0≤ξ≤a
{
min
I∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξ
H(I)
}
= min
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
{
min
I∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξ
H(I)
}
= min
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
H(I∗ξ ), (2.13)
where I∗ξ = arg minI∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξH(I) for any given ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ].
To derive the expression of the minimizer I∗ξ of (2.13), we define contract I1,ξ(x) ∈ I as
I1,ξ(x) = (x− a+ ξ)+ − (x− a− p)+ (2.14)
and denote the reinsurance premium based on I1,ξ by p1,ξ, that is
p1,ξ = (1 + θ)E [I1,ξ(X)] = (1 + θ)
∫ a+p
a−ξ
SX(x)dx. (2.15)
Furthermore, we define contract I2,ξ(x) ∈ I as
I2,ξ(x) = x− (x− ξ)+ + (x− a)+ − (x− a− p)+ (2.16)
and denote the reinsurance premium based on I2,ξ by p2,ξ, that is
p2,ξ = (1 + θ)E [I2,ξ(X)] = (1 + θ)
(∫ ξ
0
+
∫ a+p
a
)
SX(x)dx. (2.17)
In addition, throughout this paper, we denote
ξ1 =
{
sup {ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ] : p2,ξ < p} , if p2,ξ0 < p,
ξ0, if p2,ξ0 ≥ p, (2.18)
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and
ξ2 =
{
inf {ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ] : p1,ξ > p} , if p1,ξM > p,
ξM , if p1,ξM ≤ p. (2.19)
It is not hard to check by the definitions of ξ1 and ξ2, that ξ0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ ξ2 ≤ ξM and that
at least one of the three inequalities is strict.
Lemma 2.1.4 The set [ξ0, ξM ] has only the following three possible partitions: (1) if ξ0 =
ξ1, then ξ0 = ξ1 = ξ2 = 0 < ξM and [ξ0, ξM ] = [0, ξM ] ; (2) if ξ2 = ξM , then ξ0 < ξ1 = ξ2 =
ξM = a and [ξ0, ξM ] = [ξ0, a] ; and (3) if ξ0 < ξ1 and ξ2 < ξM , then ξ0 < ξ1 < ξ2 < ξM
and [ξ0, ξM ] = [ξ0, ξ1] ∪ [ξ1, ξ2] ∪ [ξ2, ξM ].
Now, in the following lemma, for any given ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ], we solve the inner minimization
problem minI∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξH(I) of (2.13).
Lemma 2.1.5 For a given ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ], denote I∗ξ as the optimal solution to the minimiza-
tion problem minI∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξH(I). Then, I
∗
ξ can be summarized as follows:
1. If ξ0 ≤ ξ ≤ ξ1 and ξ0 < ξ1, then
I∗ξ (x) = x− (x− ξ)+ + (x− a)+ − (x− a− p)+ + (x− d3,ξ)+,
where d3,ξ is determined by (1 + θ)E
[
I∗ξ (X)
]
= p.
2. If ξ1 ≤ ξ ≤ ξ2 and ξ1 < ξ2, then
I∗ξ (x) = (x− d1,ξ)+ − (x− d1,ξ − ξ)+ + (x− a)+ − (x− a− p)+,
where d1,ξ is determined by (1 + θ)E
[
I∗ξ (X)
]
= p.
3. If ξ2 ≤ ξ ≤ ξM and ξ2 < ξM , then
I∗ξ (x) = (x− a+ ξ)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d2,ξ)+ − (x− d2,ξ − p)+,
where d2,ξ is determined by (1 + θ)E
[
I∗ξ (X)
]
= p.
Remark 2.1.2 It is possible that in some particular cases, one or two cases in Lemma
2.1.5 is invalid. However, it won’t affect the completion of Lemma 2.1.5. For example, if
ξ0 = ξ1, by definition it induces ξ0 = ξ1 = ξ2 = 0 and [ξ0, ξM ] = [0, ξM ], where ξM > 0.
Even when Cases 1 and 2 are invalid, the last case already covers the whole range [ξ0, ξM ] =
[ξ2, ξM ] = [0, ξM ].
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For any ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ], define
h(ξ) , H(I∗ξ ). (2.20)
Lemma 2.1.5 implies that
min
I∈Ip,0,I(a)=ξ
H(I) = H(I∗ξ ) = h(ξ).
The next theorem, which is the main result of this section, gives the optimal solution
to Problem (2.3). Since p = 0 induces a trivial case that the only feasible reinsurance
contract is zero contract, i.e. I ≡ 0, in order to avoid a redundant argument, we exclude
this case in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.1.6 Assume 0 < p < (1 + θ)E[X]. Then Problem (2.3) is equivalent to
Problem (2.13) and the optimal solution to Problem 2.3, denoted by I∗, is summarized as
follows:
1. If ξ1 = a, the optimal solution is
I∗(x) = x− (x− a− p)+ + (x− d3,a)+,
where d3,a is determined by (1 + θ)E [I∗(X)] = p.
2. If ξ1 < a and h
′(ξM) ≤ 0, then ξM = a and the optimal solution is
I∗(x) = x− (x− a)+ + (x− d2,a)+ − (x− d2,a − p)+,
where d2,a is determined by (1 + θ)E [I∗(X)] = p.
3. If ξ1 < a and h
′(ξM) > 0 where h(·) is defined by (2.20), there exists ξ∗ ∈ [ξ2, ξM ]
such that h′(ξ∗) = 0, and the optimal solution is
I∗(x) = (x− a+ ξ∗)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d2,ξ∗)+ − (x− d2,ξ∗ − p)+,
where d2,ξ∗ is determined by (1 + θ)E [I∗(X)] = p.
Remark 2.1.3 All these three cases can be written into a unified formula
I∗(x) = (x− d∗1)− (x− a)+ + (x− d∗2)+ − (x− d∗2 − p)+ + (x− d∗3)+, (2.21)
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where
(d∗1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3) =

(0, a, d3,a), if ξ1 = a;
(0, d2,a,+∞). if ξ1 ≤ a and h′(ξM) ≤ 0,
(a− ξ∗, d2,ξ∗ ,+∞), if ξ1 < a and h′(ξM) > 0.
Even though there are three variables d∗1, d
∗
2 and d
∗
3 in the unified formula (2.21), in each
particular case stated in Theorem 2.1.6, two of them will reduce to constants and the other
one is determined by the premium condition.
Remark 2.1.4 We point out that for a feasible contract I ∈ Ip, if I(x) ≤ ωI+PI = I(a)+p
for all x ≥ 0, then the contract is a default risk-free contact, i.e., the insurer will not face
default risk with this contract.
In (1) of Theorem 2.1.6, which corresponds to the case where ξ1 = a, if p2,a = p,
where p2,ξ is defined in (2.17), then d3,a = ∞ and the optimal contract I∗ is reduced to
I∗(x) = x − (x − a − p)+ = I∗(x) ∧ (I∗(a) + p) ≤ I∗(a) + p, namely the optimal contract
is a default risk-free contract. However, if p2,a < p, then there does not exist a default
risk-free contract in Ip. Indeed, suppose that I ∈ Ip is a default risk-free contract, then
I(x) ≤ I2,ξ(x) for all x ≥ 0, where I2,ξ is defined by (2.16) and ξ = I(a). Since ξ1 = a, by
the definition of ξ1 given in (2.18), we have PI ≤ p2,ξ < p. Thus, I /∈ Ip.
In (2) and (3) of Theorem 2.1.6, which correspond to the case where ξ1 < a, it is
obvious that the optimal solution I∗ in both cases satisfies I∗(x) ≤ I∗(a) + p, namely the
insurer will not face default risk with the two optimal contracts.
In summary, Theorem 2.1.6 suggests that, in order to lower default risk, an insurer
should choose a contract without default risk as long as this kind of contract is available.
This leads to limits for indemnities on the tails of the optimal contracts.
In addition, it has been mentioned that I∗0 = (x − d∗)+ is the optimal solution to the
classical Problem (2.5) in the absence of default risk. Note that I∗0 ∈ Ip. It is easy to check
that in all three cases of Theorem 2.1.6, the optimal contract I∗ of Theorem 2.1.6 satisfies
ωI∗ = I
∗(a) > ωI∗0 = I
∗
0 (a) = (a− d∗)+, which means that the reinsurer will set up a higher
initial reserve if the insurer chooses the optimal contract I∗ of Theorem 2.1.6 than if the
insurer chooses I∗0 . In this way, the insurer can reduce the default risk.
Remark 2.1.5 In the classical model when no default risk is considered, the optimal solu-
tion is a stop-loss contract I(x) = (x−d)+ where d is determined by the premium condition
(1 + θ)E[I(X)] = p. However, Theorem 2.1.6 suggests that, in order to lower the default
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risk, the insurer should choose a contract which won’t lead to the default, i.e. I = I˜, as
long as this kind of contract is available (case 2 and case 3 in Theorem 2.1.6). This leads
to a limit for the indemnity on the tail in the optimal contract.
In case 2 and case 3 of Theorem 2.1.6, instead of one deductible at the beginning in
the classical model, the optimal contract has two deductibles: one is at the beginning and
the other one is in the middle. This could be viewed as a compromise between the default
risk and the premium budget. By shifting a part of the deductible to the right, the optimal
contract, which still satisfies the premium condition, requires the reinsurer to set up a
higher initial reserve, which reduces the default risk for the insurer.
In case 1 of Theorem 2.1.6, since no contract satisfying I = I˜ is available based on the
given premium p, the optimal contract should shift the entire deductible to the right of the
default point I(a) + p in order to have a full coverage before it.
2.2 Value-at-Risk Minimization
In this section, we consider the case when the insurer uses VaR at level β to measure its
own risk. The optimal reinsurance problem becomes
min
I∈I
VaRβ (X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI) + PI) = min
I∈I
V (I), (2.22)
where ωI , VaRα(I(X)), PI , (1 + θ)E[I(X)] and
V (I) , VaRβ (X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI) + PI) .
It should be pointed out that the premium in Problem (2.22) is not fixed which is the case
in Problem (2.3). Problem (2.22) reduces to a trivial problem if PI is fixed.
For each I ∈ I, the maximal payment ωI + PI is a constant. Denote a , VaRα(X),
b , VaRβ(X) and
xI , sup {x ≤ 0 : I(x) < ωI + PI} ≤ ∞.
If xI =∞, then x−I˜(x) = x−I(x) = R(x) is a non-decreasing function on the non-negative
real line. If xI <∞, then I(xI) = ωI + PI and
x− I˜(x) =
{
R(x), for 0 ≤ x ≤ xI ;
x− (ωI + PI), for xI < x <∞.
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It is easy to see x − I˜(x) is continuous on the non-negative real line and non-decreasing
on [0, xI ] and [xI ,∞) respectively. Thus x− I˜(x) is non-decreasing on [0,∞). Indeed, for
any x ≤ xI < y, we have
x− I˜(x) = R(x) ≤ R(x− I) = xI − I˜(xI) = xI − (ωI + PI)
≤ y − (ωI + PI) = y − I˜(y).
Due to the translation invariance and preservation under continuous and non-decreasing
function properties of V aR, the objective function V (I) can be further simplified as follows:
V (I) = VaRβ (X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI)) + PI = b− I(b) ∧ (I(a) + PI) + PI .
Similarly as in the utility function case, for each feasible reinsurance contract, we are going
to construct a better one. The next lemma says that it is possible to find a modification
with a particular form for each feasible reinsurance contract.
Lemma 2.2.1 For any I ∈ I, there exists reinsurance contract mI ∈ I that satisfies
V (I) ≤ V (mI) and mI has the form
mI(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− a ∧ b)+ + (x− d2)+ − (x− a ∨ b)+ (2.23)
for some (d1, d2) ∈ R2+ satisfying 0 ≤ d1 ≤ a ∧ b ≤ d2 ≤ a ∨ b.
Thanks to Lemma 2.2.1, the candidate set of optimal reinsurance contracts can be
restricted to all contracts with the particular form given by expression (2.23). Denote
Iα,β , {I ∈ I : I has the expression (2.23) } .
Then Iα,β is a finite-dimensional subset of I. The optimal solution of the problem
min
I∈Iα,β
VaRβ (X − I(X) ∧ (ωI + PI) + PI) (2.24)
is also the optimal solution of Problem (2.22). To solve Problem (2.24), we rewrite it as a
two-step minimization problem. There is a one-to-one mapping between [0, a∧b]×[a∧b, a∨b]
and Iα,β through expression (2.23). For any pair (d1, d2) ∈ [0, a ∧ b]× [a ∧ b, a ∨ b], define
the function v(d1, d2) , V (I) where I ∈ Iα,β is associated with d1 and d2. Then
min
I∈Iα,β
V (I) = min
(d1,d2)∈[0,a∧b]×[a∧b,a∨b]
v(d1, d2).
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For any fixed d1 ∈ [0, a ∧ b], if the function v(d1, ·) is continuous on the closed interval
[a ∧ b, a ∨ b], then there exists d∗2(d1) ∈ [a ∧ b, a ∨ b] such that
min
d2∈[a∧b,a∨b]
v(d1, d2) = v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)). (2.25)
If, moreover, v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) is continuous in d1 on [0, a ∧ b], then there exists d∗1 ∈ [0, a ∧ b]
such that
min
d1∈[0,a∧b]
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) = v(d
∗
1, d
∗
2(d
∗
1)). (2.26)
For an arbitrary (d1, d2) ∈ [0, a ∧ b]× [a ∧ b, a ∨ b],
v(d1, d2) ≥ min
d2∈[a∧b,a∨b]
v(d1, d2) = v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) ≥ min
d1∈[0,a∧b]
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) = v(d
∗
1, d
∗
2(d
∗
1)).
Thus,
min
(d1,d2)∈[0,a∧b]×[a∧b,a∨b]
v(d1, d2) ≥ v(d∗1, d∗2(d∗1)).
On the other hand, (d∗1, d
∗
2(d
∗
1)) ∈ [0, a ∧ b]× [a ∧ b, a ∨ b] implies
min
(d1,d2)∈[0,a∧b]×[a∧b,a∨b]
v(d1, d2) ≤ v(d∗1, d∗2(d∗1)).
Therefore,
min
(d1,d2)∈[0,a∧b]×[a∧b,a∨b]
v(d1, d2) = v(d
∗
1, d
∗
2(d
∗
1)) = min
d1∈[0,a∧b]
{
min
d2∈[a∧b,a∨b]
v(d1, d2)
}
,
which is a two-step minimization problem.
Theorem 2.2.2 Denote I∗ to be the optimal solution to Problem (2.22).
1. If α ≤ β, then
I∗(x) = (x− b ∧ VaR 1
1+θ
(X))+ − (x− b)+ .
2. If α ≥ β and α ≤ 1
1+θ
, there exists d∗ ∈ R satisfying
(1 + θ)
∫ b
d∗
SX(x)dx = b− a. (2.27)
Then
I∗(x) = (x−max{0, d∗ ∧ VaR 1
1+θ
(X)})+ − (x− b)+ .
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Remark 2.2.1 When α ≤ β, i.e. the reinsurer is more conservative than the insurer, the
optimal contract is the same as the result in the classical model without default risk. Since
the insurer only measures his total loss, based on V aR, at a lower level β, the initial reserve
ωI = VaRα(X) set up by the reinsurer is high enough to ensure that the default risk has
no impact to the optimal contract.
On the contrary, if the insurer is more conservative (α > β), in order to reduce the
default risk, the insurer should require a lower deductible to force the reinsurer to set up a
higher initial reserve. Moreover, from Equation 2.27, the larger the difference between the
insurer and the reinsurer’s risk tolerability, the smaller the deductible should be chosen by
the insurer. For the case α > 1/(1 + θ), the optimal solution I∗ has no closed form and
the case is not interesting since in practice, α is a small value and usually α < 1/(1 + θ)
holds.
2.3 Examples
In this section, numerical examples are provided for two optimization problems discussed
in Section 2.1 and 2.2. Suppose X and Y are two random risks. Assume X ∼ Exp(µ) and
Y ∼ Pareto(λ, γ), i.e. SX(x) = e−x/µ for any x ≥ 0 and SY (y) =
(
λ
y+λ
)γ
for any y ≥ 0.
All numerical results are given under the setting θ = 0.1, µ = 100, λ = 200 and γ = 3,
i.e. X and Y has the same mean µ = λ
γ−1 = 200.
Example 2.3.1 (Utility-based Maximization)
Take the utility function u(x) = x2. Consider exponential risk X with survival distribution
SX(x) = e
−x/µ for any x ≥ 0. For a fixed premium value p ∈ [0, (1 + θ)µ], denote ξ∗X,p to
be the zero root of the following function, if it exists:
h′(ξ) = 2SX(a− ξ) (d2,ξ − a)− 2
(∫ d2,ξ
a
+
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
)
SX(x)dx
= 2αeξ/µ (d2,ξ − a)− 2µ
(
α− e−d2,ξ/µ + e−(d2,ξ+p)/µ) ,
where
d2,ξ = −µ
[
ln
(
p
µ(1 + θ)
− α (eξ/µ − 1))− ln (1− e−p/µ)] (2.28)
According to Theorem 2.1.6, the optimal contract satisfies the following conditions.
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1. Suppose p satisfies αe−p/µ + p
µ(1+θ)
≥ 1, then ξ1 = a and the optimal solution is
I∗(x) = x− (x− a− p)+ + (x− d3,a)+,
where
d3,a = −µ ln
(
p
µ(1 + θ)
+ αe−p/µ − 1
)
≥ a+ p. (2.29)
2. Suppose p satisfies αe−p/µ + p
µ(1+θ)
< 1, which implies the existence of ξ∗X,p, and
ξ∗X,p ≥ a, then ξ1 < a and h′(ξM) ≤ 0. It implies the optimal solution is
I∗(x) = x− (x− a)+ + (x− d2,a)+ − (x− d2,a − p)+,
where d2,a is given by (2.28) when ξ = a.
3. Suppose p satisfies αe−p/µ + p
µ(1+θ)
< 1, which implies the existence of ξ∗X,p, and
ξ∗X,p < a, then ξ1 < a and h
′(ξM) > 0. It implies the optimal solution is
I∗(x) = (x− a+ ξ∗X,p)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d2,ξ∗X,p)+ − (x− d2,ξ∗X,p − p)+,
where d2,ξ∗X,p is given by (2.28) when ξ = ξ
∗
X,p.
Using the unified formula given by (2.21), we get
I∗(x) = (x− d∗1)− (x− a)+ + (x− d∗2)+ − (x− d∗2 − p)+ + (x− d∗3)+,
and the numerical results for (d∗1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3) when α = 0.01 (i.e. VaRα(X) = 460.517) and
α = 0.05 (i.e. VaRα(X) = 299.573) are summarized in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 respectively.
Consider a Pareto risk Y with survival distribution SY (y) =
(
λ
y+λ
)γ
, for any x ≥ 0.
For a fixed premium value p ∈ [0, (1 + θ) λ
γ−1 ], denote ξ
∗
Y,p be the zero root of the following
function, if it exists,
h′(ξ) = 2SY (a− ξ) (d2,ξ − a)− 2
(∫ d2,ξ
a
+
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
)
SY (y)dy
= 2 (d2,ξ − a)
(
λ
a− ξ + λ
)γ
− 2λ
γ − 1
(
α
γ−1
γ −
(
λ
d2,ξ + λ
) γ−1
γ
+
(
λ
d2,ξ + λ+ p
) γ−1
γ
)
,
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Table 2.1: Exponential Risk X & α = 0.01
p d∗1 d
∗
2 d
∗
3
80 31.225 461.168 ∞
99.2 9.921 460.940 ∞
105.88 3.456 460.806 ∞
108.1 1.396 460.809 ∞
109.631 0 460.811 ∞
109.8 0 460.517 649.089
Table 2.2: Exponential Risk X & α = 0.05
p d∗1 d
∗
2 d
∗
3
80 28.691 302.681 ∞
99.2 8.229 301.653 ∞
105.88 1.971 301.407 ∞
108.1 0 301.332 ∞
109.631 0 299.573 431.620
109.8 0 299.573 420.917
where d2,ξ satisfies
p = (1 + θ)
(∫ a
a−ξ
+
∫ d2,ξ+p
d2,ξ
)(
λ
y + λ
)γ
dy. (2.30)
According to Theorem 2.1.6, the optimal contract has the form
1. Suppose p satisfies 1 −
(
λ
a+p+λ
)γ−1
≤ p(γ−1)
λ(1+θ)
, then ξ1 = a. It implies the optimal
solution is
I∗(x) = x− (x− a− p)+ + (x− d3,a)+,
where
d3,a = −λ+
[
p(γ − 1)
λγ(1 + θ)
− λ−γ+1 + (a+ p+ λ)−γ+1
]− 1
γ−1
≥ a+ p.
2. Suppose p satisfies 1−
(
λ
a+p+λ
)γ−1
> p(γ−1)
λ(1+θ)
, which implies the existence of ξ∗Y,p, and
if ξ∗Y,p ≥ a, then ξ1 < a and h′(ξM) ≥ 0. It implies the optimal solution is
I∗(x) = x− (x− a)+ + (x− d2,a)+ − (x− d2,a − p)+,
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where d2,a is given by (2.30) when ξ = a.
3. Suppose p satisfies 1−
(
λ
a+p+λ
)γ−1
> p(γ−1)
λ(1+θ)
, which implies the existence of ξ∗Y,p, and
ξ∗Y,p < a, then ξ1 < a and h
′(ξM) > 0. It implies the optimal solution is
I∗(x) = (x− a+ ξ∗Y,p)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d2,ξ∗Y,p)+ − (x− d2,ξ∗Y,p − p)+,
where d2,ξ∗Y,p is given by (2.30) when ξ = ξ
∗
Y,p.
We summarize all these three cases in the unified formula (2.21) and obtain
I∗(x) = (x− d∗1)− (x− a)+ + (x− d∗2)+ − (x− d∗2 − p)+ + (x− d∗3)+.
The numerical results for (d∗1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3) when α = 0.01 (i.e. VaRα(Y ) = 728.318) and α = 0.05
(i.e. VaRα(Y ) = 342.884) are summarized in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 respectively.
Table 2.3: Pareto Risk Y & α = 0.01
p d∗1 d
∗
2 d
∗
3
80 28.405 734.196 ∞
99.2 6.305 732.488 ∞
105.88 0 732.1067 ∞
108.1 0 728.318 1215.4
109.631 0 728.3 888.275
109.8 0 728.3 864.518
Table 2.4: Pareto Risk Y & α = 0.05
p d∗1 d
∗
2 d
∗
3
80 19.2 356.748 ∞
99.2 0 352.764 ∞
105.88 0 342.9 633.469
108.1 0 342.884 520.208
109.631 0 342.884 464.486
109.8 0 342.884 459.096
Remark 2.3.1 Comparisons between Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 or between Table 2.3 and
Table 2.4 suggest that when the risk level is fixed, a higher premium leads to a larger
31
optimal contract. When the premium is fixed, if the risk level is lower (or a larger α), the
maximal payment ability of the reinsurer is weaker and it leads to a smaller d1, i.e. the
optimal contract should have a smaller deductible in order to have a larger coverage before
the default.
Comparison between Table 2.1 and Table 2.3 or between Table 2.2 and Table 2.4 suggest
that when both premium and risk level α are same, Pareto random loss Y who has a relative
heavy tail has a larger coverage than Exponential random loss X.
Remark 2.3.2 (Extreme Cases) We use exponential risk X as an illustration. The
same argument can be done for Y . The expression (2.29) implies, as p ↑ (1 + ρ)µ, we have
d3,a ↓ a+ p = 570.517 and thus in the extreme case when p = (1 + ρ)µ the optimal contract
is I∗(x) = x, for all x ≥ 0, i.e. I∗ is the full reinsurance. This is consistent with the fact
that I∗(x) = x is the only feasible contract when p = (1 + ρ)µ. In another extreme case,
as p ↓ 0, we have αe−p/µ + p
µ(1+θ)
↓ 0 and ξM ↓ 0. Thus, for small enough premium value
p, the optimal contract is
I∗(x) = (x− a+ ξ∗X,p)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d2,ξ∗X,p)+ − (x− d2,ξ∗X,p − p)+,
where d2,ξ∗X,p is given by (2.28) when ξ = ξ
∗
X,p. Thus, I
∗(x) ↓ 0 for all x ≥ 0 as p ↓ 0. It
is consistent with the fact that the only feasible contract is the zero reinsurance contract
when the premium budget is zero.
Example 2.3.2 (V aR-based Minimization)
Denote I∗X and I
∗
Y as the optimal reinsurance contracts for X and Y respectively. According
to Theorem 2.2.2,
I∗X(x) = (x− dX)+ − (x− VaRβ(X))+ and I∗Y (y) = (y − dY )+ − (y − VaRβ(Y ))+,
where
1. if α ≤ β,
dX = VaR 1
1+θ
(X) ∧ VaRβ(X) and dY = VaR 1
1+θ
(Y ) ∧ VaRβ(Y );
2. if β ≤ α ≤ 1
1+θ
,
dX = max
{
0, d∗X ∧ VaR 1
1+θ
(X)
}
and dY = max
{
0, d∗Y ∧ VaR 1
1+θ
(Y )
}
,
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and d∗X and d
∗
Y solve the following equations respectively
−µ ln β − (−µ lnα) = (1 + θ)
∫ −µ lnβ
d∗X
e−µxdx,
λ
(
β−1/γ − 1)− λ (α−1/γ − 1) = (1 + θ)∫ λ(β−1/γ−1)
d∗Y
(
λ
y + λ
)γ
dy.
Table 2.5 gives the numerical results for dX and dY .
Table 2.5: Deductible Values
(α, β) dX VaRβ(X) dY VaRβ(Y )
(0.0100, 0.050) 9.5310 299.5732 6.4560 342.8835
(0.0100, 0.028) 9.5310 357.5551 6.4560 458.6338
(0.0185, 0.015) 9.5310 419.9705 6.4560 610.9603
(0.050, 0.0100) 0 460.5170 0 728.3178
(0.028, 0.0100) 5.5494 460.5170 0 728.3178
(0.028, 0.0185) 9.5310 398.9985 4.4483 556.2048
(0.015, 0.0185) 9.5310 398.9985 6.4560 556.2048
Remark 2.3.3 From Table 2.5, random loss Y with Pareto distribution, who has a heavy
tail, always has a lower deductible than the random loss X with exponential distribution,
who has a light tail. This comparison is consistent with the classical result when no default
risk is involved.
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2.4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1.2. Let I be an arbitrary reinsurance contract from Ip. Denote
ξ , I(a) and
xI , sup {x ≥ 0 : I(x) < ξ + p} ∈ (a,∞].
Since I is non-decreasing and continuous on [0,∞), one has ωI = VaRα(I(X)) = I(VaRα(X)) =
ξ. Therefore, after the consideration of reinsurer’s default risk, the insurer has the real
reinsurance contract
I˜(x) = I(x) ∧ (ξ + p), for x ≥ 0.
Note that
H(I) =E
[
u
(
X − I˜(X)
)]
=E [u (X − I(X)) |0 ≤ X < a]P(0 ≤ X < a)
+ E [u (X − I(X)) |a ≤ X < xI ]P(a ≤ X < xI)
+ E [u (X − ξ − p)]P(X ≥ xI).
Firstly, we are going to construct kI on interval [0, a), [a, xI) and [xI ,∞) separately.
1) For 0 ≤ x < a, define kd(x) , max {(x− d)+, ξ}, with respect to each d ∈ [0, a− ξ].
When d = 0, we have k0(x) = x ∨ ξ and thus k0(x) ≥ I(x) on the interval [0, a)
and E[k0(X)|0 ≤ X < a] ≥ E[I(X)|0 ≤ X < a]. When d = a − ξ, we have
ka−ξ(x) = (x − a + ξ)+ and thus ka−ξ(x) ≤ I(x) on [0, a) and E[ka−ξ(X)|0 ≤ X <
a] ≤ E[I(X)|0 ≤ X < a]. It is obvious that E[kd(X)|0 ≤ X < a] is continuous in d.
Therefore, there exists d1 ∈ [0, a− ξ] such that E[kd1(X)|0 ≤ X < a] = E[I(X)|0 ≤
X < a]. Define kI(x) = kd1(x) on the interval [0, a].
2) For a ≤ x < xI , define kI(x) , max {ξ + (x− d2)+, ξ + p}, where d2 ∈ [a, xI ] is
such that E [I(X)|a ≤ X < xI ] = E [kI(X)|a ≤ X < xI ]. The existence of d2 can be
shown by the similar argument in 1).
3) When xI < ∞, for x ≥ xI , define kI(x) , ξ + p + (x − d3)+, where d3 ≥ xI is such
that E [I(X)|X ≥ xI ] = E [kI(X)|X ≥ xI ] and the existence of d3 can be shown by
the similar argument in 1). When xI = ∞, intervals [0, a) and [a, xI) already cover
the whole non-negative real line.
34
It is easy to see by the construction of kI that
E [kI(X)] = E [u (kI(X)) |0 ≤ X < a]P(0 ≤ X < a)
+E [u (kI(X)) |a ≤ X < xI ]P(a ≤ X < xI)
+E [u (kI(x))]P(X ≥ xI)
= E [I(X)] = p,
and thus kI ∈ Ip. It remains to show that H(kI) ≤ H(I). Define a random variable X1
with distribution function F1(x) =
FX(x)
FX(a)
, for 0 ≤ x < a. Then for any Borel measurable
function b(·), one has
E [b(X)|0 ≤ X < a] =
∫ a
0
b(x)
FX(a)
dFX(x) =
∫ a
0
b(x)dF1(x) = E [b(X1)] .
Note that, on the interval [0, a), functions I(x) can cross kI(x) from above at most once,
say c1 ∈ [0, a). Thus,
x− kI(x) ≥ x− I(x) for x < c1;
and x− kI(x) ≤ x− I(x) for x ≥ c1.
Together with E [I(X1)] = E [kI(X1)] and x− kI(x) and x− I(x) are both continuous and
non-decreasing functions, Lemma 2.1.1 implies X1 − kI(X1) ≤cx X1 − I(X1). Therefore,
for any convex function u,
E [u (X − I(X)) |0 ≤ X < a] = E [u (X1 − I(X1))]
≥ E [u (X1 − kI (X1))] = E [u (X − kI (X)) |0 ≤ X < a] .
By using the same argument, it is easy to see that
E [u (X − I(X)) |a ≤ X < xI ] ≥ E [u (X − kI(X)) |a ≤ X < xI ] , and
E [u (X − I(X)) |X ≥ xI ] ≥ E [u (X − kI(X)) |X ≥ xI ] .
Therefore, on the whole support of random loss X, we can conclude that H(kI) ≤ H(I).
Proof of Lemma 2.1.3.
“(1) ⇔ (2) ” Suppose {I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ} 6= ∅. For any I ∈ {I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ}, it
is easy to see that the following inequalities hold: I0,ξ(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ IM,ξ(x) for all x ≥ 0.
It implies that PI0,ξ ≤ PI ≤ PIM,ξ , that is p0,ξ ≤ p ≤ pM,ξ. Conversely, suppose ξ ∈ [0, a]
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satisfies the inequality p0,ξ ≤ p ≤ pM,ξ. The premium of any I ∈ I satisfies expression
(2.4) and I(a) = ξ can be written as a continuous function of (d1, d2, d3) as follows:
PI = P (d1, d2, d3) = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] = (1 + θ)
(∫ d1+ξ
d1
+
∫ d2+p
d2
+
∫ ∞
d3
)
SX(x)dx,
where 0 ≤ d1 ≤ d1 + I(a) ≤ a ≤ d2 ≤ d2 + p ≤ d3 ≤ ∞. Note that when (d1, d2, d3) =
(a− ξ,∞,∞), we have P (a− ξ,∞,∞) = PI0,ξ = p0,ξ, and when (d1, d2, d3) = (0, a, a+ p),
we have P (0, a, a + p) = PIM,ξ = pM,ξ. Since the function P (d1, d2, d3) is continuous
in (d1, d2, d3), it goes through all values of the interval [p0,ξ, pM,ξ] and thus there exists
(d1,ξ, d2,ξ, d3,ξ) such that P (d1,ξ, d2,ξ, d3,ξ) = p. Therefore, the contract I which has the
expression (2.4) with (d1, d2, d3, I(a)) = (d1,ξ, d2,ξ, d3,ξ, ξ) satisfies PI = p, and it implies
that I ∈ {I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ} 6= ∅.
“(2)⇔ (3) ” The equivalence of (2) and (3) is given by the definitions (2.11) and (2.12).
Any two contracts I1 and I2 in Ip,0 are viewed as the same if they are equal almost ev-
erywhere with repsect to Lebesgue’s measure. Suppose I1(a) 6= I2(a), since both contracts
are continuous at point a, there exists δ > 0 such that I1(x) 6= I2(x) on the open interval
(a− δ, a+ δ) and thus I1 and I2 are not the same. As a consequence, for ξ1 6= ξ2,
{I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ1}
⋂
{I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ2} = ∅.
It has been proved that {I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ} = ∅ for any ξ ∈ [0, a] \ [ξ0, ξM ], thus,
Ip,0 =
⋃
0≤ξ≤a
{I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ} =
⋃
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
{I ∈ Ip,0 : I(a) = ξ} ,
namely, Ip,0 can be written as the union of disjoint non-empty sets.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.4. It is easy to see that for any ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ], we have I0,ξ(x) ≤
I1,ξ(x) ≤ I2,ξ(x) ≤ IM,ξ(x) for all x ≥ 0. Therefore, p0,ξ ≤ p1,ξ ≤ p2,ξ ≤ pM,ξ. Note that, p
is assumed to satisfies 0 < p < (1 + θ)E[X]. Since all proofs are similar, we only prove the
case (1) and the other two cases are omitted.
(1) Suppose ξ0 = ξ1. First, we are going to show that ξ0 = 0. Suppose not, namely ξ0 >
0. By the definition (2.11) of ξ0, we have pM,0 < p. Note that pM,a = (1 + θ)E[X] ≥ p by
our assumption. Obviously, pM,ξ is continuous and increasing in ξ ∈ [0, a], thus, pM,ξ0 = p.
By (2.17) and (2.10), we have that pM,ξ−p2,ξ = (1+θ)
∫∞
a+p
SX(x)dx > 0 for any ξ ∈ [0, a],
and in particular, p2,ξ0 < pM,ξ0 = p. It is easy to see that p2,ξ is continuous and increasing in
ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ]. Thus, there exists δ > 0 such that p2,ξ < p for any ξ ∈ (ξ0, ξ0 + δ). According
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to the definition (2.18), we get that ξ1 > ξ0 which contradicts with the assumption that
ξ0 = ξ1. Therefore, ξ0 = 0 = ξ1 and moreover pM,0 > p2,0 ≥ p. Second, we show that
ξ2 = 0. From (2.15) and (2.17), we have p1,0 = (1 + θ)
∫ a+p
a
SX(x)dx = p2,0 ≥ p. That is,
for any ξ > 0, we have p1,ξ ≥ p1,0 ≥ 0, and then, ξ2 = 0 by its definition (2.19). Finally, we
need to show that 0 < ξM . Indeed, p0,0 = 0 < p. Since p0,ξ is continuous and increasing in
ξ ∈ [0, a], there exists δ1 > 0 such that p0,ξ < p for any ξ ∈ [0, δ1). Therefore, by definition
(2.12), we get 0 < ξM .
Proof of Lemma 2.1.5. For any I ∈ Ip,0, i.e. I has expression (2.4) for some
(d1, d2, d3, ξ), the corresponding realized indemnity is
I˜(x) , I(x) ∧ (wI + PI) = (x− d1)+ − (x− (d1 + ξ))+ + (x− d2)+ − (x− (d2 + p))+.
Note that I˜(x) = I(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ d2 + p. Thus, the objective function is
H(I) = E
[
u
(
X − I˜(X)
)]
=
∫ ∞
0
u(x− I˜(x))dFX(x) (2.31)
=
∫ ∞
0
SX(x)u
′(x− I˜(x))
(
1− I˜ ′(x)
)
dx
= u(0) +
(∫ d1
0
+
∫ d2
d1+ξ
)
SX(x)u
′ (x− I(x)) dx
+
∫ ∞
d2+p
SX(x)u
′ (x− ξ − p) dx.
where u(0) is a constant and E
[
u
(
X − I˜(X)
)]
is assumed to be exist and thus the inte-
gration on the right hand side of the second equality is finite. Note that, for any I ∈ Ip,0,
the value H(I) does not depend on d3. Indeed, the coefficient d3 is only used to adjust the
expectation of I to match the expectation condition
(1 + θ)E [I(X)] = (1 + θ)
(∫ d1+ξ
d1
+
∫ d2+p
d2
+
∫ ∞
d3
)
SX(x)dx = p. (2.32)
Now, we are going to optimize H(I) using the expression (2.31) and the restriction (2.32)
and to find the minimizers of di, denoted by di,ξ, i = 1, 2, 3.
(1) Suppose ξ0 ≤ ξ ≤ ξ1 (if ξ0 < ξ1) or equivalently p2,ξ ≤ p ≤ pM,ξ. There exists
a ≤ d3,ξ ≤ ∞ such that
I∗ξ (x) = x− (x− a+ ξ)+ + (x− a)+ − (x− a− p)+ + (x− d3,ξ)+
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satisfies the premium condition (1 + θ)E[I∗ξ (X)] = p. Thus, I∗ξ has form (2.4) with
(d1, d2, d3) = (0, a, d3,ξ). Moreover, I
∗
ξ is the optimal solution because for any I ∈ Ip,0
satisfying I(a) = ξ, one has I˜∗ξ (x) ≥ I˜(x) for all x ≥ 0.
Suppose ξ1 ≤ ξ ≤ ξM (if ξ1 < ξM) or equivalently p0,ξ ≤ p ≤ p2,ξ. In this case, there
exist d1 and d2 such that
I(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − ξ)+ + (x− d2)+ − (x− d2 − p)+ (2.33)
satisfies the premium condition (1 + θ)E [I(X)] = p. Note that expression (2.4) is reduced
to expression (2.33) when d3 =∞. We claim that the minimizer I∗ξ should have the form
(2.33). This claim can be proved using the following arguments.
For any I ∈ Ip,0 with d3 < ∞, if there exists d˜2 ≥ a such that I1(x) = (x− d1)+ −
(x− d1 − ξ)+ + (x− d˜2)+ − (x− d˜2 − p)+ ∈ Ip,0, then the following equation
0 = E[I1(X)]− E[I(X)] =
∫ d2+p
d2
[
SX(x+ d˜2 − d2)− SX(x)
]
dx−
∫ ∞
d3
SX(x)dx,
implies that d˜2 < d2 and thus I˜1(x) − I˜(x) = I1(x) ∧ (I1(a) + p) − I(x) ∧ (I(a) + p) ≥ 0
for all x ≥ 0. If such d˜2 does not exist, then there exists 0 ≤ d˜1 ≤ d1 such that I1(x) =
(x− d˜1)+−(x− d˜1−ξ)+ +(x−a)+−(x−a−p)+ ∈ Ip,0 and thus I˜1(x) ≥ I˜(x) for all x ≥ 0.
In short, we can find another contract I1 of the form (2.33) in Ip,0 such that I˜1(x) ≥ I˜(x)
for all x ≥ 0 and thus H(I1) ≤ H(I). Therefore, the insurer should choose the reinsurance
contract satisfying the form (2.33) or I = I˜.
For any contract I ∈ I of the form (2.33), the premium condition(∫ d1+ξ
d1
+
∫ d2+p
d2
)
SX(x)dx =
p
1 + θ
implies that d2 can be written as an implicit function of d1, i.e. d2 = d2(d1). It is not hard
to see d2(d1) is a non-increasing function of d1 and its derivative satisfies
SX(d1 + ξ)− SX(d1) + (SX(d2 + p)− SX(d2)) d′2(d1) = 0.
The objective function given by expression (2.31) now depends on d1 only and thus denote
it as a one variable function Hξ(d1). Taking the derivative with respect to d1, we have
d
dd1
Hξ(d1) = u
′(d1) (SX(d1)− SX(d1 + ξ)) + u′(d2 − ξ) (SX(d2)− SX(d2 + P )) d′2(d1)
= (u′(d1)− u′(d2 − ξ)) (SX(d1)− SX(d1 + ξ))
≤ 0.
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Therefore, one should choose d1 as large as possible to have the smallest expectation of the
utility.
(2.1) When ξ1 ≤ ξ ≤ ξ2 (if ξ1 < ξ2) or equivalently p1,ξ ≤ p ≤ p2,ξ, the largest possible
value for d1 is d1,ξ which satisfies d2(d1,ξ) = a and the corresponding optimal solution is
I∗ξ (x) = (x− d1,ξ)+ − (x− d1,ξ − ξ)+ + (x− a)+ − (x− a− p)+.
Then I∗ξ is of the form (2.4) with (d1, d2, d3) = (d1,ξ, a,∞) where d1,ξ is determined by the
expectation condition (1 + θ)E
[
I∗ξ (X)
]
= p.
(2.1) When ξ2 ≤ ξ ≤ ξM (if ξ2 < ξM) or equivalently p0,ξ ≤ p ≤ p1,ξ, the largest possible
value for d1 is a− ξ and the corresponding optimal solution is
I∗ξ (x) = (x− a+ ξ)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d2,ξ)+ − (x− d2,ξ − p)+,
where d2,ξ = d2(a− ξ), namely I∗ξ has form (2.4) with (d1, d2, d3) = (a− ξ, d2,ξ, ∞).
Proof of Theorem 2.1.6. Define function h(ξ) on [ξ0, ξM ] as follows:
h(ξ) , min
I∈Ip, I(a)=ξ
E[u(X − I(X) ∧ (ξ + p))] = E[u(X − I∗ξ (X) ∧ (ξ + p))].
From the results of Lemma 2.1.5, we discuss the following cases.
1. When ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξ1] (if ξ0 < ξ1), one has d3,ξ is an increasing function of ξ and
h(ξ) =
∫ a
ξ
SX(x)u
′(x− ξ)dx+
∫ ∞
a+p
SX(x)u
′(x− ξ − p)dx.
Clearly,
h′(ξ) = −
∫ a
ξ
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ)dx− SX(ξ)u′(0)−
∫ ∞
a+p
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ − p)dx ≤ 0,
because u(·) is an increasing convex function with u′(x) ≥ 0 and u′′(x) ≥ 0.
2. When ξ ∈ [ξ1, ξ2] (if ξ1 < ξ2), we have
h(ξ) =
∫ d1,ξ
0
SX(x)u
′(x)dx+
∫ a
d1,ξ+ξ
SX(x)u
′(x− ξ)dx+
∫ ∞
a+p
SX(x)u
′(x− ξ − p)dx.
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The premium condition implies that d1,ξ can be written as an implicit function of ξ
using the equation
(1 + θ)
(∫ d1,ξ+ξ
d1,ξ
+
∫ a+p
a
)
SX(x)dx = p.
By taking the derivative with respect to ξ on both sides of the equation, we get
d
dξ
d1,ξ =
SX (d1,ξ + ξ)
SX(d1,ξ)− SX(d1,ξ + ξ) ≥ 0.
It leads to
h′(ξ) = SX(d1,ξ)u′(d1,ξ)
d
dξ
d1,ξ − SX(d1,ξ + ξ)u′(d1,ξ)
(
1 +
d
dξ
d1,ξ
)
−
∫ a
d1,ξ+ξ
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ)dx−
∫ ∞
a+p
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ − p)dx
= −
∫ a
d1,ξ+ξ
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ)dx−
∫ ∞
a+p
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ − p)dx
≤ 0.
3. When ξ ∈ [ξ2, ξM ] (if ξ2 < ξM),, we have
h(ξ) =
∫ a−ξ
0
SX(x)u
′(x)dx+
∫ d2,ξ
a
SX(x)u
′(x− ξ)dx+
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
SX(x)u
′(x− ξ − p)dx.
Premium condition implies that d2,ξ can be written as an implicit function of ξ by
the equation
(1 + θ)
(∫ a
a−ξ
+
∫ d2,ξ+p
d2,ξ
)
SX(x)dx = p.
Take the derivative with respect to ξ on both sides of the equation,
d
dξ
d2,ξ =
SX (a− ξ)
SX(d2,ξ)− SX(d2,ξ + p) ≥ 1.
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It leads to
h′(ξ) = − SX(a− ξ)u′(a− ξ)
+ SX(d2,ξ)u
′(d2,ξ − ξ) d
dξ
d2,ξ −
∫ d2,ξ
a
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ)dx
− SX(d2,ξ + p)u′(d2,ξ − ξ) d
dξ
d2,ξ −
∫ ∞
d2,ξ
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ − p)dx
=SX(a− ξ) (u′(d2,ξ − ξ)− u′(a− ξ))
−
∫ d2,ξ
a
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ)dx−
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ − p)dx.
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The second derivative of h is
h′′(ξ) = fX(a− ξ) (u′(d2,ξ − ξ)− u′(a− ξ))
+ SX(a− ξ)
(
u′′(d2,ξ − ξ)
(
d
dξ
d2,ξ − 1
)
+ u′′(a− ξ)
)
−
[
SX(d2,ξ)u
′′(d2,ξ − ξ) d
dξ
d2,ξ +
∫ d2,ξ
a
SX(x)u
′′′(x− ξ)(−1)dx
]
−
[
−SX(d2,ξ + p)u′′(d2,ξ − ξ) d
dξ
d2,ξ +
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
SX(x)u
′′′(x− ξ − p)(−1)dx
]
= fX(a− ξ) (u′(d2,ξ − ξ)− u′(a− ξ)) + SX(a− ξ) [u′′(a− ξ)− u′′(d2,ξ − ξ)]
+ [SX(a− ξ)− SX(d2,ξ) + SX(d2,ξ + p)]u′′(d2,ξ − ξ) d
dξ
d2,ξ
+
∫ d2,ξ
a
SX(x)u
′′′(x− ξ)dx+
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
SX(x)u
′′′(x− ξ − p)dx
= fX(a− ξ) (u′(d2,ξ − ξ)− u′(a− ξ)) + SX(a− ξ) [u′′(a− ξ)− u′′(d2,ξ − ξ)]
+ [SX(a− ξ)− SX(d2,ξ) + SX(d2,ξ + p)]u′′(d2,ξ − ξ) d
dξ
d2,ξ
+ SX(d2,ξ)u
′′(d2,ξ − ξ)− SX(a)u′′(a− ξ) +
∫ d2,ξ
a
u′′(x− ξ)fX(x)dx
− SX(d2,ξ + p)u′′(d2,ξ − ξ) +
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
u′′(x− ξ − p)fX(x)dx
= fX(a− ξ) (u′(d2,ξ − ξ)− u′(a− ξ))
+ [SX(a− ξ)− SX(d2,ξ) + SX(d2,ξ + p)]u′′(d2,ξ − ξ) d
dξ
d2,ξ
+
∫ d2,ξ
a
u′′(x− ξ)fX(x)dx+
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
u′′(x− ξ − p)fX(x)dx
+ u′′(a− ξ)(SX(a− ξ)− SX(a))
− u′′(d2,ξ − ξ) [SX(a− ξ)− SX(d2,ξ) + SX(d2,ξ + p)]
= fX(a− ξ) (u′(d2,ξ − ξ)− u′(a− ξ)) + u′′(a− ξ)(SX(a− ξ)− SX(a))
+ u′′(d2,ξ − ξ) [SX(a− ξ)− SX(d2,ξ) + SX(d2,ξ + p)]
(
d
dξ
d2,ξ − 1
)
+
∫ d2,ξ
a
u′′(x− ξ)fX(x)dx+
∫ ∞
d2,ξ+p
u′′(x− ξ − p)fX(x)dx
≥ 0,
42
where all integrations are finite because the existence assumption of all expectations
and h′′(ξ) ≥ 0 is due to convexity of u(·), non-increasing property of survival function
SX(·), d2,ξ ≥ a ≥ a− ξ and dd ξd2,ξ − 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, h′ in non-decreasing in ξ. It is
easy to see from the definition of d2,ξ that when ξ = ξ2, we have d2,ξ2 = a and thus
h′(ξ2) = −
∫ ∞
a+p
SX(x)u
′′(x− ξ − p)dx < 0.
Denote
ξ∗ , sup {ξ ∈ [ξ2, ξM ] : h′(ξ) < 0} .
If h′(ξM) ≤ 0, then h′ is always non-positive for any ξ ∈ [ξ2, ξM ], i.e. ξ∗ = ξM ; if
h′(ξM) > 0, then ξ∗ < ξM and h′(ξ∗) = 0.
In summary, on the non-negative real line, h(ξ) is continuous and h′(ξ) ≤ 0 for ξ ∈ [ξ0, ξ∗]
and h′(ξ) ≥ 0 for ξ ∈ [ξ∗, ξM ]. Therefore, h(ξ) achieves it minimal value at ξ∗ and the
reinsurance contracts I∗ξ∗ summarized in the theorem is the optimal solutions of the two-
step minimization problem (2.13), i.e.
min
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
{
min
I∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξ
H(I)
}
= H(I∗ξ∗).
Since ξ∗ ∈ [ξ0, ξM ], the corresponding contract I∗ξ∗ is in Ip,0. Thus,
H(I∗ξ∗) ≥ min
I∈Ip,0
H(I),
and furthermore
min
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
{
min
I∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξ
H(I)
}
≥ min
I∈Ip,0
H(I). (2.34)
On the other hand, for an arbitrary k ∈ Ip,0,
H(k) ≥ min
I∈Ip,0, I(a)=k(a)
H(I) ≥ min
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
{
min
I∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξ
H(I)
}
.
Going through all contracts in Ip,0, we have
min
k∈Ip,0
H(k) ≥ min
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
{
min
I∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξ
H(I)
}
. (2.35)
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Combining inequalities (2.34) and (2.35), we conclude that
min
I∈Ip,0
H(I) = min
ξ0≤ξ≤ξM
{
min
I∈Ip,0, I(a)=ξ
H(I)
}
,
and I∗ξ∗ is also the optimal solution to Problem (2.6).
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1. For a feasible reinsurance contract I ∈ I, choosing two
particular points d1 = a∧ b− I(a∧ b) and d2 = a∨ b− (I(a∨ b)− I(a∧ b)) and substituting
them into expression (2.23), then it is not hard to see mI(a) = I(a), mI(b) = I(b) and
mI(x) ≤ I(x) for all x ≥ 0. Moreover, PmI ≤ PI . Denote ξa , I(a) = mI(a) and
ξb , I(b) = mI(b). Then, V (I) = b−ξb∧(ξa+PI)+PI and V (mI) = b−ξb∧(ξa+PmI )+PmI .
(1) Suppose α ≥ β (or equivalently b ≥ a). In this case, ξb ≤ ξa ≤ ξa + PI ∧ PmI . It
implies that
V (I)− V (mI) = (b− ξb + PI)− (b− ξb + PmI ) = PI − PmI ≥ 0.
(2) Suppose α ≥ β (or equivalently b ≥ a). In this case, ξa ≤ ξb and
V (I)− V (mI) = (b− ξb ∧ (ξa + PI) + PI)− (b− ξb ∧ (ξa + PmI ) + PmI )
= ξb ∧ (ξa + PmI )− ξb ∧ (ξa + PI) + PI − PmI .
Furthermore, if ξb ≤ ξa + PmI , we have ξb ≤ ξa + PmI ≤ ξa + PI and thus
V (I)− V (mI) = ξb − ξb + PI − PmI ≥ 0.
If ξa + PmI < ξb ≤ ξa + PI , then
V (I)− V (mI) = ξa + PmI − ξb + PI − PmI = PI + ξa − ξb ≥ 0.
If ξa + PI < ξb, we have ξa + PmI ≤ ξa + PI < ξb and thus
V (I)− V (mI) = (ξa + PmI )− (ξa + PI) + PI − PmI = 0.
In short, when α ≥ β, we have V (I)− V (mI) ≥ 0.
Combining these two cases, we get the result as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.2. For each d1 ∈ [0, a ∧ b], define vd1(d2) = v(d1, d2) as the
function of d2 ∈ [a ∨ b, ∞).
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(1) Suppose α ≤ β (or equivalently b ≤ a). In this case, for any fixed d1 ∈ [0, b],and for
any d2 ∈ [b, a] and I given by (2.23), we have
vd1(d2) , v(d1, d2) = v(I) = b− (b− d1) + PI = d1 + (1 + θ)
(∫ b
d1
+
∫ a
d2
)
SX(x)dx,
Clearly, the first derivative of vd1(d2) satisfies
v′d1(d2) =
∂
∂d2
v(d1, d2) = − (1 + θ)SX(d2) < 0.
Thus, for any d1 ∈ [0, b], d∗2(d1) = a is the minimizer to the minimization problem
min
d2∈[b,a]
v(d1, d2) of (2.25). Hence,
min
d1∈[0,b]
min
d2∈[b,a]
v(d1, d2) = min
d1∈[0,b]
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) = min
d1∈[0,b]
v(d1, a). (2.36)
Next, we consider the function
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) = v(d1, a) = d1 + (1 + θ)
∫ b
d1
SX(x)dx.
Obviously, the function v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) is continuous in d1 and its first derivative is
d
dd1
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) =
1− (1 + θ)SX(d1). Since
d1 ≤ VaR 1
1+θ
(X)⇔ SX(d1) ≥ 1
1 + θ
,
thus, d∗1 = VaR 1
1+θ
(X) ∧ b is the minimizer to the minimization problem min
d1∈[0,b]
v(d1, a)
of (2.36). It follows that the optimal contract I∗ has the form (2.23) with d1 = d∗1 and
d2 = d
∗
2 (d
∗
1) = a. Namely, we have
I∗(x) = (x− VaR 1
1+θ
(X) ∧ b)+ − (x− b)+.
(2) Suppose α ≥ β (or equivalently b ≥ a) and α ≤ 1
1+θ
. In this case, for any fix
d1 ∈ [0, a], for any d2 ∈ [a, b],
vd1(d2) = v(d1, d2) = V (mI) = b− (a− d1 + b− d2) ∧ (a− d1 + PI) + PI
=
{ −a+ d1 + d2 + PI , if b ≤ PI + d2;
−a+ d1 + b, if b > PI + d2.
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Moreover, define Gd1(d2) as
Gd1(d2) , PI − (b− d2) = (1 + θ)
(∫ a
d1
+
∫ b
d2
)
SX(x)dx− b+ d2.
In order to determine the sign of Gd1(d2), we need to consider its monotonicity on [a, b].
It is not hard to see G′d1(d2) = 1 − (1 + θ)SX(d2) ≥ 0 for any d2 ∈ [a, b] because α ≤ 11+θ
or a ≥ VaR 1
1+θ
(X). Thus, Gd1 is a continuous and non-decreasing function of d2 on [a, b].
If Gd1(a) ≥ 0, then Gd1 ≥ 0 on the interval [a, b]. If Gd1(a) ≤ 0, there exists c(d1) ∈ [a, b]
such that Gd1(d2) ≤ 0 for any d2 ∈ [a, c(d1)] and Gd1(d2) ≥ 0 for any d2 ∈ [c(d1), b]. Thus,
to determine the optimal solution I∗, we need to consider the following three cases.
Case 1. Suppose (1 + θ)
∫ b
0
SX(x)dx− b+ a ≤ 0.
In this case, Gd1(a) ≤ 0 for any d1 ∈ [0, a]. Thus,
vd1(d2) =
{ −a+ d1 + b, for a ≤ d2 ≤ c(d1);
−a+ d1 + d2 + PI , for c(d1) ≤ d2 ≤ b;
with non-negative first derivative
v′d1(d2) =
{
0, for a ≤ d2 ≤ c(d1);
1− (1 + θ)SX(d2), for c(d1) ≤ d2 ≤ b.
Thus d∗2(d1) = a and then v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) = v(d1, a) = −a + d1 + b is a continuous function
of d1. It implies that
min
(d1,d2)∈[0,a]×[a,b]
v(d1, d2) = min
d1∈[0,a]
{
min
d2∈[a,b]
v(d1, d2)
}
min
d1∈[0,a]
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1))
= min
d1∈[0,a]
−a+ d1 + b = b− a,
namely, the optimal pair is (d∗1, d
∗
2) = (0, a). The corresponding optimal contract is I
∗(x) =
x− (x− b)+
Case 2. Suppose (1 + θ)
∫ b
a
SX(x)dx − b + a ≥ 0. In this case, Gd1(a) ≥ 0 for any
d1 ∈ [0, a]. Thus vd1(d2) = −a + d1 + d2 + PI , with non-positive first derivative v′d1(d2) =
1 − (1 + θ)SX(d2). It implies that d∗2(d1) = a for any d1 ∈ [0, a]. Now, v(d1, d∗2(d1)) =
v(d1, a) = d1 + PI is a continuous function of d1, then
min
(d1,d2)∈[0,a]×[a,b]
v(d1, d2) = min
d1∈[0,a]
{
min
d2∈[a,b]
v(d1, d2)
}
= min
d1∈[0,a]
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)).
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Note that d
d d1
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) = 1 − (1 + θ)SX(d1) ≤ 0 is equivalent to d1 ≤ VaR 1
1+θ
(X) and
that VaR 1
1+θ
(X) ≤ a by assumption. Thus, the optimal pair is (d∗1, d∗2) = (VaR 1
1+θ
(X), a)
and the corresponding optimal contract is I∗(x) = (x− VaR 1
1+θ
(X))
+ − (x− b)+.
Case 3. Suppose (1 + θ)
∫ b
a
SX(x)dx − b + a ≤ 0 ≤ (1 + θ)
∫ b
0
SX(x)dx − b + a. In
this case, there exists d0 ∈ [0, a] satisfying Gd1(a) = (1 + θ)
∫ b
d1
SX(x)dx − b + a ≥ 0 for
0 ≤ d1 ≤ d0 and Gd1(a) ≤ 0 for d0 ≤ d1 ≤ a. For d1 ∈ [0, d0], i.e. Gd1(a) ≥ 0, one has
vd1(d
∗
2(d1)) = d1 + PI by the same argument as in Case 2. For d1 ∈ [d0, a], i.e. Gd1(a) ≤ 0
one has vd1(d
∗
2(d1)) = −a+ d1 + b by the same argument as in Case 1. Thus, on the whole
interval [0, a], vd1(d
∗
2(d1)) = d1 + PI ∨ (b− a) is continuous of d1 and its first derivative is
d
dd1
vd1(d
∗
2(d1)) =
{
1− (1 + θ)SX(d1), for 0 ≤ d1 ≤ d0;
1, for d0 ≤ d1 ≤ a.
It implies that
min
(d1,d2)∈[0,a]×[a,b]
v(d1, d2) = min
d1∈[0,a]
{
min
d2∈[a,b]
v(d1, d2)
}
= min
d1∈[0,a]
v(d1, d
∗
2(d1)) = v(d
∗
1, d
∗
2(d
∗
1)),
where d∗1 = VaR 1
1+θ
(X) ∧ d0. The corresponding optimal solution is I∗(x) = (x − d∗1)+ −
(x− b)+.
Combining these three cases, the optimal solution of Problem (2.22) can be summarized
into a unified formula which is a limited stop-loss reinsurance contract given as follows:
I∗(x) = (x−max{0, d∗ ∧ VaR 1
1+θ
(X)})+ − (x− b)+ ,
where d∗ ∈ R is the solution of the equation (1 + θ) ∫ b
d∗ SX(x)dx = b− a.
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Chapter 3
Convex Risk Measure and Wang’s
Premium Principle
In this chapter, we consider a general framework of the optimal reinsurance design problem
from the perspective of the insurer. In a reinsurance market, there are often more than one
available reinsurer with different pricing schemes. By ceding its loss X to n competitive
reinsurers, the insurance company may pay a smaller premium. It is natural to consider the
optimal reinsurance model with multiple reinsurers who may have different risk attitudes.
In the case when the insurer shares the loss X with n reinsurers, by ceding Ii(X) to
Reinsurer i, i = 1, . . . , n, the retained loss for the insurer is R(X) = X − I(X) where
I(X) =
∑n
i=1 Ii(X) is the total ceded loss. The total premium for the insurer is PI =∑n
i=1 Pi,Ii where Pi,Ii is the premium for the contract Ii, i = 1, . . . , n. Since the underlying
loss X is splitting into n + 1 components, Ii(X) for i = 1, . . . , n and R(X), each ceded
loss function Ii, i = 1, . . . , n and retained loss function R should be feasible. In other
words, a group of reinsurance contracts (I1, . . . , In) is called “feasible” if R ∈ I and Ii ∈ I,
i = 1, . . . , n. We shall denote
In = {(I1, . . . , In) : Ii ∈ I for i = 1, . . . , n, and R ∈ I} (3.1)
to be the set of all feasible groups (I1, . . . , In).
As counterparties in one reinsurance contract I, the insurer and the reinsurers adopt
risk measure principles based on their own risk attitudes which are generally not the same.
In our work, we assume the insurer uses a convex risk measure ρ given by Definition 1.2.10
while the i-th reinsurer uses Wang’s premium principle with a distortion function gi(·) given
by Definition 1.3.4. Instead of assigning a particular risk measure, here by only assuming
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a convex risk measure and Wang’s premium principle, we use a very general framework
based on families of risk measures.
Throughout this chapter, we denote as L∞ (Ω,F ,P) the set of all bounded random
variables on an atom-less probability space (Ω,F ,P). We assume the insurer faces a non-
negative insurable risk X ∈ L∞ (Ω,F ,P), and the survival function SX(x) of X is assumed
to be continuous and strictly decreasing on [0, X¯]. Therefore, the essential supremum of
X is a finite value, i.e.
X¯ = ess supX = inf {a ∈ R : P (X > a) = 0} <∞,
and the support of X is the closed interval [0, X¯]. With respect to X, the set of all feasible
reinsurance contracts, which is denoted by I, contains all non-decreasing and 1-Lipschitz
continuous functions defined on [0, X¯].
In the present work, we consider the optimization problem from the insurer’s point of
view. Mathematically speaking, the problem can be formulated as follows:
min
(I1,...,In)∈In
ρ
(
X −
n∑
i=1
Ii(X) +
n∑
i=1
Pi,Ii
)
, (3.2)
where ρ is a convex risk measure chosen by the insurer, while for each i = 1, . . . , n,
Pi,Ii =
∫ ∞
0
gi ◦ SIi(X)(t)dt,
follows Wang’s premium principle with respect to the distortion function gi.
3.1 Reinsurance Model with Single Reinsurer
In the first place, we consider the classical single reinsurer model, that is, the insurer
purchasing a reinsurance strategy, denoted by the function I(x), from the reinsurer by
paying the premium PI which follows the Wang’s premium principle. The insurer’s retained
loss becomes R(x) , x − I(x), and we are looking for the optimal strategy I ∈ I for the
insurer such that the insurer’s total loss, which is R(X) + PI , is minimized under a law-
invariant convex risk measure ρ. Mathematically speaking, we are considering the following
problem:
min
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) (3.3)
such that PI =
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SI(X)(t)dt,
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where g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is assumed to be a strictly concave, twice differentiable and non-
decreasing distortion function.
In Problem (3.3), both the risk measure and the premium should be viewed as gen-
eralized expressions and represent a family. Reinsurers with different risk bearings will
choose different distortions g and this will lead to different premium values for the same
reinsurance contract I. Similarly, insurers take different risk measures ρ based on their
own preference. A lot of research has been done when one of them is restricted to a par-
ticular choice while the other one is given by the generalized expression. For example,
[Chi and Tan, 2013] considered the coherent risk measure AVaR and solved the following
problem
min
I∈I
AVaRα(X − I(X) + PI)
such that PI =
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SI(X)(t)dt.
[Cheung et al., 2014] chose the expectation pricing principle, i.e. g(x) = x which leads to
the problem
min
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI)
such that PI = E[I(X)].
In our formulation, without further assumption, we do not assume a particular risk mea-
sure/premium principle has been chosen by the insurer/reinsurer. We would like to provide
a general formula for the optimal reinsurance contract to Problem (3.3) that can be applied
to any particular law-invariant convex measure and Wang’s premium. To solve Problem
(3.3), we are going to use the equivalent expression of a law-invariant convex risk measure
introduced in Lemma 1.2.2, namely,
ρ(X) = sup
µ∈P([0,1])
{∫ 1
0
AVaRα(X)µ(dα)− β(µ)
}
, (3.4)
where β : P ([0, 1])→ [0,∞] is a law invariant, lower semi-continuous and convex function.
For an arbitrary selected law-invariant convex risk measure ρ, the existence of the
optimal solution to Problem (3.3) is not guaranteed. Therefore, at this moment, we consider
the infimum value of ρ (X − I(X) + PI) among the set I, that is
inf
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) . (3.5)
After that, we will show the equivalence between Problem (3.3) and Problem (3.5).
50
Lemma 3.1.1 Problem (3.5) has the following minimax expression:
inf
I∈I
sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(I, µ), (3.6)
where the function f : I × P ([0, 1])→ R is defined via
f(I, µ) ,
∫ 1
0
AVaRα(X − I(X))µ(dα) +
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SI(X)(t) dt− β(µ). (3.7)
Lemma 3.1.1 translates Problem (3.5) to the minimax problem (3.6), which can be
solved with the help of the following useful minimax theorem given by [Fan, 1953] and
references therein.
Theorem 3.1.2 (Minimax Theorem) Let Ξ1 be a non-empty compact convex Hausdorff
topological vector space, and Ξ2 be a non-empty convex set. Let f be a real-valued function
defined on Ξ1 × Ξ2 such that
1) ξ1 7→ f(ξ1, ξ2) is convex and lower-semicontinuous on Ξ1 for each ξ2 ∈ Ξ2;
2) ξ2 7→ f(ξ1, ξ2) is concave on Ξ2 for each ξ1 ∈ Ξ1.
Then
inf
ξ1∈Ξ1
sup
ξ2∈Ξ2
f(ξ1, ξ2) = sup
ξ2∈Ξ2
inf
ξ1∈Ξ1
f(ξ1, ξ2). (3.8)
Remark 3.1.1 If the equation (3.8) holds, the value in (3.8) is called the saddle-value in
the minimax problem. A pair (ξ∗1 , ξ
∗
2) ∈ Ξ1 × Ξ2 is called a saddle-point of f with respect
to Ξ1 × Ξ2, if it satisfies
inf
ξ1∈Ξ1
f(ξ1, ξ
∗
2) = sup
ξ2∈Ξ2
f(ξ∗1 , ξ2).
For an arbitrary real-valued function f defined on the space Ξ1 × Ξ2, the equation (3.8)
may not hold, although it is always true, as is easily seen, that
inf
ξ1∈Ξ1
sup
ξ2∈Ξ2
f(ξ1, ξ2) ≥ sup
ξ2∈Ξ2
inf
ξ1∈Ξ1
f(ξ1, ξ2). (3.9)
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The existence of a saddle-point implies the existence of the saddle value. Indeed, the equa-
tion (3.8) is implied by (3.9) together with the following observation
inf
ξ1∈Ξ1
sup
ξ2∈Ξ2
f(ξ1, ξ2) ≤ sup
ξ2∈Ξ2
f(ξ∗1 , ξ2) = inf
ξ1∈Ξ1
f(ξ1, ξ
∗
2) ≤ sup
ξ2∈Ξ2
inf
ξ1∈Ξ1
f(ξ1, ξ2).
However, in contrary, the existence of a saddle-value is not a sufficient condition for the
existence of a saddle-point.
The Minimax Theorem 3.1.2 will be used in the proof of the following theorem. For each
µ ∈ P ([0, 1]), define the following notation:
1. φµ , hµ ∧ g ;
2. Gµ , {t ≥ 0 : g ◦ SX(t) < hµ ◦ SX(t)} ;
3. Eµ , {t ≥ 0 : g ◦ SX(t) = hµ ◦ SX(t)}.
Moreover, define Iµ(t) to be the reinsurance policy satisfying the following conditions:
Iµ(0) = 0 and I
′
µ(t) = I{Gµ}(t), for any t ≥ 0, (3.10)
where I{Gµ} is the indicator function associated with the set Gµ, i.e.
I{Gµ}(t) =
{
1, t ∈ Gµ,
0, t /∈ Gµ, for any t ≥ 0.
Theorem 3.1.3 For a bounded risk variable X, the minimax problem (3.6) has a saddle-
value
S , sup
µ∈P([0,1])
{∫ ∞
0
φµ ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ)
}
. (3.11)
Moreover, there exists µ0 ∈ P([0, 1]) such that S =
∫∞
0
φµ0 ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ0).
Remark 3.1.2 In the proof of Theorem 3.1.3 given in Section 3.3, the Minimax Theorem
3.1.2 is used to exchange the order of minimum and supremum in the expression (3.6). In
order to guarantee the compactness of the set I, which is required by the Minimax Theorem
3.1.2, we need to assume that X is a bounded random loss, i.e. X ∈ L∞(Ω,P,F).
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Theorem 3.1.3 shows that Problem (3.5) has the infimum value∫ X¯
0
φµ0 ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ0). (3.12)
However, as mentioned in Remark 3.1.1, the existence of S, which is the saddle-value of the
function f , is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of the saddle-
point. Therefore, the result of Theorem 3.1.3 is not enough to determine the optimal
reinsurance contract that leads to this minimal value.
First, we need to show that the infimum value S is indeed the minimum value for
Problem (3.3). Note that, Problem (3.3) and Problem (3.5) are equivalent if and only
if the optimal solution to Problem (3.3) exists. This existence is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.1.4 Problem (3.3) is well-defined in the sense that there exists an optimal
solution I∗ ∈ I. Therefore, the infimum value S given in (3.11) is also the minimal value
of Problem (3.3) and it can be achieved at I∗.
The next proposition provides a necessary condition for the expression of the minimizer
of Problem (3.3).
Proposition 3.1.5 Assume µ0 ∈ P([0, 1]) is given by (3.12), i.e. S = f(Iµ0 , µ0), where
S is defined by (3.11). Then, any optimal solution I0 for Problem (3.3) must satisfy the
following conditions:
I0(0) = 0 and I
′
0(t) = I{Gµ0}(t) + α(t)I{Eµ0}(t), for any t ≥ 0, (3.13)
where α(t) is some function between [0, 1].
The following two theorems give the expressions of the optimal reinsurance contract
under two particular cases.
Definition 3.1.1 (1) A pair X and Y of random variables is comonotone on the proba-
bility space (Ω,F ,P), if
(X(ω1)−X(ω2)) (Y (ω1)− Y (ω2)) ≥ 0 almost surely w.r.t. P on Ω.
(2) A risk measure ρ : L∞ (Ω,F ,P)→ R→ R is comonotone, if
ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y ), for any comonotone pair X, Y ∈ L∞ (Ω,F ,P) .
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Theorem 3.1.6 Suppose ρ : L∞ (Ω,F ,P) → R is a law-invariant and comonotone co-
herent risk measure. Then, there exists a probability measure µ on [0, 1] such that any
reinsurance contract of the form
I0(x) =
∫ x
0
[
I{Gµ}(t) + α(t)I{Eµ}(t)
]
dt, for any t ≥ 0, (3.14)
where α(t) is an arbitrary function between [0, 1], will be a minimizer of Problem (3.3).
Theorem 3.1.7 In addition to the assumptions of Proposition 3.1.5, if the set Eµ0 has
Lebesgue measure zero, then the reinsurance contract
Iµ0(x) ,
∫ x
0
I{Gµ0}(t) dt, for x ≥ 0,
defined by (3.10) is one optimal solution to Problem (3.3). Moreover, the corresponding
minimal value is
min
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) =
∫ ∞
0
φµ0 ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ0).
Remark 3.1.3 According to Theorem 3.1.7, the necessary condition for optimality of rein-
surance contract given by expression (3.13) is also a sufficient condition. It implies that
(Iµ0 , µ0) is a saddle point of the minimax function f(I, µ) on I × P([0, 1]), i.e.
sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(Iµ0 , µ) = f(Iµ0 , µ0) = min
I∈I
f(I, µ0). (3.15)
Remark 3.1.4 Theorem 3.1.7 is a consequence of Theorem 3.1.4 and Proposition 3.1.5.
Alternatively, Theorem 3.1.7 can be proved directly from Theorem 3.1.3 by using the argu-
ment involving direction derivative. This proof is summarized at the end of the appendix
of this chapter.
Example 3.1.1 A very commonly used coherent risk measure, thus convex risk measure,
is the Average Value-at-Risk (AVaR). Given a level α, one can define a convex function
β : P([0, 1]) → R ∪ {+∞} via β(µ) = 0, if µ = δα, otherwise β(µ) = +∞. Then, AVaRα
can be induced by substituting β into Definition 3.4 for the convex risk measure.
Since β only takes a finite value at δα, the function∫ X¯
0
φµ ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ)
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achieves its maximal value at probability measure δα, i.e. µ0 = δα. Moreover, h
′
δα
(s) =
1
α
I{[0,α]} and thus hδα(x) = 1αxI{[0,α]} + I{(α,1]}. Note that, functions hδα and g will cross at
most once. When g′(0) > 1
α
, they do cross, and denote by d∗ the root of equation
1
α
=
g(SX(d
∗))
SX(d∗)
,
where a = V aRα(X); when g
′(0) ≤ 1
α
, g is always smaller or equal to hδα on [0, 1] and we
use d∗ = X¯ in this case. It can be easily checked that V aRα(X) ≤ d∗ and Gδα = [d∗, X¯].
Therefore, Theorem 3.1.6 says that the optimal solution to Problem (3.3), by using the
expression (3.14), is
I∗(x) = x− (x− d∗)+, (3.16)
and the corresponding minimal value is
min
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) =
∫ X¯
0
φδα ◦ SX(t)dt− β(δα)
= a+
∫ X¯
d∗
SX(t)dt+
∫ d∗
0
g ◦ SX(t)dt.
This result is consistent with the known result, see details in [Chi and Tan, 2013].
Example 3.1.2 Suppose the reinsurer adopts the net premium principle, which is the
actuarial premium principle with zero risk loading, i.e. PI = E[I(X)]. In this case, the
premium could be viewed as a Wang’s premium with linear distortion g(x) = x. For any
probability measure µ, the induced concave function hµ is no less than g on the entire
interval [0, 1] and thus φµ = hµ ∧ g = g. It implies that Gµ0 = [0, 1]. Therefore, Iµ0(x) =
x on [0, 1], i.e. the optimal reinsurance contract is the full reinsurance. This result is
consistent with what is showed in [Cheung et al., 2014].
3.2 Reinsurance Model with Multiple Reinsurers
In this section, we discuss the optimal reinsurance problem (3.2) in the multiple reinsurers
case with the help of results obtained in Section 3.1.
Recall that, in the n-reinsurer model, the ceded loss function or indemnity function
for Insurer i is denoted by Ii, which is assumed to satisfies Ii ∈ I, and the corresponding
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premium is Pi,Ii , i = 1, . . . , n. Then, the total ceded loss is I(X) =
∑n
i=1 Ii(X), while the
loss retained to the insurer is R(X) = X − I(X). The optimal reinsurance problem we are
considering is
min
(I1,...,In)∈In
ρ
(
X − I(X) +
n∑
i=1
Pi,Ii
)
(3.17)
such that Pi,Ii ,
∫ X¯
0
gi ◦ SIi(X)(t) dt, for i = 1, . . . , n;
where gi : [0, 1] → [0, 1], i = 1, . . . , n are continuous, twice differentiable, non-decreasing
and concave distortion functions, and (I1, . . . , In) ∈ In means
1. Ii : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) satisfy Ii(0) = 0 and Ii is non-decreasing, i = 1, . . . , n ;
2. 0 ≤ Ii(y)− Ii(x) ≤ y − x, for any 0 ≤ x ≤ y <∞, i = 1, . . . , n;
3. 0 ≤ R(y)−R(x) ≤ y − x, for any 0 ≤ x ≤ y <∞.
From the properties of gi, i = 1, . . . , n, the function g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] defined as follows
g(t) , min {gi(t), i = 1, . . . , n} = g1(t) ∧ · · · ∧ gn(t), ∀t ≥ 0,
is a continuous, twice differentiable, non-decreasing and concave function. Therefore, g
can be used as a distortion function to define a corresponding Wang’s premium PI which
is subadditive:
PI ,
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SI(X)(t)dt (3.18)
Denote sets, i = 1, . . . , n,
Ai , {t ≥ 0 : gi ◦ SX(t) = g ◦ SX(t) < gi ◦ SX(t) for j = i+ 1, . . . , n} . (3.19)
Lemma 3.2.1 Problem (3.17) has the same minimal value as the following minimization
problem:
min
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) , (3.20)
where PI is defined by (3.18).
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Remark 3.2.1 Since g(t) = g1(t) ∧ · · · ∧ gn(t) ≤ gi(t) for all t ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n, then
for any feasible reinsurance contract I ∈ I we have PI ≤ Pi,I , i = 1, . . . , n. Lemma
3.2.1 implies that, from the insurer’s point of view, if the insurer is looking for a total
coverage I(X) for his underlying loss X, by selecting carefully a portfolio of n reinsurances
(I1, . . . , In) from In, the insurer can obtain the same effect as I in the sense that
∑n
i=1 Ii =
I but only pays a premium PI =
∑n
i=1 Pi,Ii, which is smaller than the premium Pi,I for
buying I from Reinsurer i only, i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, compare to buying one reinsurance
contract from a single reinsurer, setting up a portfolio of reinsurance contracts can reduce
the total premium, and it can be viewed as a better choice for the insurer based on the
concern of premium budget.
The 1-reinsurer minimization problem (3.20) has been discussed in Section 3.1 and we
have found the formula for the minimizer. By using results in Section 3.1, we can now
state the main result for the multiple reinsurer model.
Proposition 3.2.2 Problem (3.17) has the minimal value∫ X¯
0
[hµ0 ◦ SX(t) ∧ g1 ◦ SX(t) ∧ · · · ∧ gn ◦ SX(t)]dt− β(µ0).
If I0 ∈ I is an optimal solution to Problem (3.20), then (I∗1 , . . . , I∗n) ∈ In is an optimal
solution to Problem (3.17), where, for i = 1, . . . , n,
I∗i (x) =
∫ x
0
I{Ai}(t)I
′
0(t) dt. (3.21)
In the following, we shall consider the particular case when ρ is defined as Average
Value-at-Risk (AVaR) and n = 2. Then Problem (3.17) becomes
min
(I1,I2)∈I2
AVaRα (X − I1(X)− I2(X) + P1,I1 + P2,I2) (3.22)
such that Pi,Ii ,
∫ X¯
0
gi ◦ SIi(X)(t) dt.
Denote T (I1, I2) , AVaRα (X − I1(X)− I2(X))+P1,I1+P2,I2 , for any (I1, I2) ∈ I2. Lemma
3.2.1 implies that T (I1, I2) has the same minimal value as the following minimization
problem
min
I∈I
AVaRα(X − I(X) + PI) (3.23)
such that PI =
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SX(x) dx,
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where g(t) , g1(t) ∧ g2(t), for all t ≥ 0.
Theorem 3.2.3 The optimal pair of reinsurance contracts (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) for Problem (3.22) are
I∗i (x) =
∫ x
0
I{Ai∩[0,d∗]}(t) dt, for i = 1, 2, (3.24)
where d∗ is any value such that g ◦ SX(d∗) = SX(d∗)/α. Moreover, within the set I2, the
value function T (I1, I2) achieves it minimal value
a+
1
α
∫ X¯
d∗
SX(t) dt+
∫ d∗
a
g(SX(t)) dt.
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3.3 Appendix
3.3.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1.1. In order to show the equivalence between (3.5) and (3.6), it is
sufficient to show that ρ(X − I(X) + PI) = sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(I, µ), where f is defined by (3.7).
By using Lemma 4.63 in [Follmer and Schied, 2004], for an arbitrary probability measure
µ in P ([0, 1]), there is a continuous increasing concave function hµ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such
that hµ(0) = µ({0}), hµ(1) = 1 and
h′µ(α) =
∫
(α,1]
1
s
µ(ds).
Taking into account the possibility of µ having non-zero measure at the single point set
{0}, we have∫ 1
0
AVaRα(X − I(X))µ(dα) = R(X¯)µ({0}) +
∫
(0,1]
AVaRα(X − I(X))µ(dα).
By applying Fubini’s Theorem, one gets, for any I ∈ I,∫
(0,1]
AVaRα(X − I(X))µ(dα) =
∫
(0,1]
∫ α
0
1
α
VaRξ(R(X))dξ µ(dα)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
(ξ,1]
1
α
VaRξ(R(X))µ(dα)dξ
=
∫ 1
0
R(VaRξ(X))h
′(ξ)dξ
= −
∫ X¯
0
R(t)h′(SX(t))dSX(t)
= −
(
R(X¯)h(0)−R(0)h(1)−
∫ X¯
0
h ◦ SX(t)R′(t)dt
)
= −R(X¯)h(0) +
∫ X¯
0
hµ(SX(t))R
′(t)dt.
Therefore, we have∫ 1
0
AVaRα(X − I(X))µ(dα) =
∫ X¯
0
hµ(SX(t))R
′(t)dt.
59
It can be easily checked that haµ+(1−a)λ = ahµ + (1 − a)hλ for any µ and λ in P ([0, 1])
and constant a ∈ [0, 1]. It implies that φµ is linear with respect to µ. Thus, the function
f : I × P ([0, 1])→ R defined by (3.7) can be written as follows,
f(I, µ) =
∫ X¯
0
hµ ◦ SX(t) (1− I ′(t)) dt+
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SX(t)I ′(t)dt− β(µ).
Since ρ is translation invariant, we have
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) = ρ (X − I(X)) + PI
= sup
µ∈P([0,1])
(∫ 1
0
AVaRα(R(X))µ(dα)− β(µ)
)
+ PI
= sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(I, µ).
It implies that Problem (3.5) has the minimax expression (3.6).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.3. In order to apply the classical minimax theorem to interchange
the minimum sign and the supremum sign in Problem (3.6), all conditions in Theorem 3.1.2
should be checked carefully:
1) Under the usual supremum norm, the family of all 1-Lipschitz functions on the com-
pact interval [0, ess supX] is a compact set.
2) P ([0, 1]) is a convex set.
3) For each fixed µ ∈ P ([0, 1]), since AV aR and V aR are both comonotonic additive,
f(·, µ) is convex on I, indeed, f(λI1 + (1− λ)I2, µ) = λf(I1, µ) + (1− λ)f(I2, µ) for
any I1 and I2 in I and λ ∈ [0, 1].
4) For each fixed I ∈ I, f(I, µ) is concave on P ([0, 1]) due to the convexity of function
β.
Therefore, by applying the Minimax Theorem 3.1.2, one gets
inf
I∈I
sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(I, µ) = sup
µ∈P([0,1])
inf
I∈I
f(I, µ),
which allows us to first solve the minimization problem inf
I∈I
f(I, µ) and find an expression
for the minimizer Iµ, for an arbitrary fixed µ ∈ P ([0, 1]).
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To this end, we are going to find the lower bound of function f(·, µ) among I. Since g,
h, I ′ and 1− I ′ are all non-negative, one gets
f(I, µ) =
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SX(t)I ′(t)dt+
∫ X¯
0
hµ ◦ SX(t) (1− I ′(t)) dt− β(µ)
≥
∫ X¯
0
min {g ◦ SX(t), hµ ◦ SX(t)} (I ′(t) + 1− I ′(t)) dt− β(µ)
=
∫ X¯
0
φµ ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ).
Conversely, it is easy to check that, the function Iµ define by (3.10) satisfies Iµ ∈ I and
f(Iµ, µ) =
∫
Gµ
g ◦ SX(t)dt+
∫
R+\Gµ
hµ ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ)
=
∫ X¯
0
φµ ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ).
Thus, Iµ is a minimizer of inf
I∈I
f(I, µ) and, moreover, we have S is the saddle value of
minimax problem (3.6).
Now, take a sequence of probability measures {µn}∞n=1 in P([0, 1]) such that
S = lim
n→∞
f(Iµn , µn).
By Helly selection theorem, see [Billingsley, 1995] Page 336, there exists a subsequence
of {µn}∞n=1 that weakly converges to a probability measure µ0. Without loss of general-
ity, assume µn → µ0 weakly as n → ∞. Since [0, 1] is a closed interval in R, one gets
µn([0, 1])→ µ0([0, 1]) and thus µ0 ∈ P([0, 1]). By definition, for any 0 < x < 1,
hµn(x) = µn({0}) +
∫ x
0
∫
(t,1]
1
s
µn(ds)dt
= µn({0}) +
∫
(0,x]
∫ s
0
1
s
dt µ(ds) +
∫
(x,1]
∫ x
0
1
s
dt µ(ds)
= µn([0, x]) + x
∫
(x,1]
1
s
µn(ds)
=
∫ 1
0
[
I{[0,x]}(s) +
x
s
I{(x,1]}(s)
]
µn(ds).
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Note that, for any 0 < x ≤ 1, the integrand on the right hand side of the last equality is a
continuous function on [0, 1]. It implies that, for any 0 < x ≤ 1, as n→∞, we have
hµn(x) =
∫ 1
0
[
I{[0,x]}(s) +
x
s
I{(x,1]}(s)
]
µn(ds)
→
∫ 1
0
[
I{[0,x]}(s) +
x
s
I{(x,1]}(s)
]
µ0(ds) = hµ0(x).
It should be pointed that hµn(0) may not converge to hµ0(0). However, the Borel set
{0} has Lebesgue measure zero, so the discontinuity of sequence hµn(0) won’t effect the
Lebesgue measure. Moreover, we have
lim
n→∞
∫ X¯
0
min {hµn ◦ SX(t), g ◦ SX(t)} dt =
∫ X¯
0
min {hµ0 ◦ SX(t), g ◦ SX(t)} dt.
Meanwhile, the fact that β is non-negative lower-semi-continous function implies that
lim sup
n→∞
−β(µn) = − lim inf
n→∞
β(µn) ≤ −β(µ0).
Thus,
S = lim
n→∞
f(Iµn , µn) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
∫ X¯
0
φµ ◦ SX(t)dt+ lim sup
n→∞
−β(µn)
≤
∫ X¯
0
min {hµ0 ◦ SX(t), g ◦ SX(t)} dt− β(µ0)
= f(Iµ0 , µ0) ≤ S.
As a consequence, we can conclude that the minimax problem (3.6) has saddle-value:
min
I∈I
sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(I, µ) = sup
µ∈P([0,1])
min
I∈I
f(I, µ)
= sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(Iµ, µ)
= sup
µ∈P([0,1])
{∫ X¯
0
φµ ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ)
}
=
∫ X¯
0
φµ0 ◦ SX(t)dt− β(µ0).
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Proof of Theorem 3.1.4. From Theorem 3.1.3, we get
inf
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) = S.
Suppose a sequence {In}∞n=1 ⊂ I satisfies
lim
n→∞
ρ (X − In(X) + PIn) = inf
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) = S.
Under the usual supremum norm, the family of all 1-Lipschitz functions on the compact
interval [0, X¯] is a compact set where X¯ = ess supX <∞. Thus, there is a subsequence of
{In}∞n=1 that converges to a 1-Lipschitz function I∗ with respect to the supremum norm.
Without loss of generality, take limn→∞ ‖In − I∗‖∞ = 0. Since (Ω,F ,P) is an atomless
probability space, it is easy to verify that In(X)
p−→ I∗(X), and thus X − In(X) p−→
X − I∗(X). Due to the Fatou property of ρ, which is automatically satisfied by every law
invariant convex risk measure, we have
ρ(X − I∗(X)) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
ρ(X − In(X)).
Meanwhile, In(X)
p−→ I∗(X) implies In(X) d−→ I∗(X), and thus, for any t ≥ 0,
lim
n→∞
g ◦ SIn(X)(t) = g ◦ SI∗(X)(t).
Since I(x) ≤ x for any x ≥ 0, the survival distribution SIn(X)(t) is bounded above by
SX(t), and then g ◦ SIn(X)(t) ≤ g ◦ SX(t) for any t ≥ 0 because g is non-decreasing.
Obviously, g ◦SX(t) is integrable in the sense that
∫∞
0
g ◦SX(t)dt <∞. By the Dominated
Convergence Theorem, we get
lim
n→∞
PIn = lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
0
g ◦ SIn(X)(t)t. =
∫ ∞
0
g ◦ SI∗(X)(t)dt = PI∗ .
Therefore,
ρ(X − I∗(X) + PI∗) = ρ(X − I∗(X)) + PI∗
≤ lim inf
n→∞
ρ(X − In(X)) + lim
n→∞
PIn = lim inf
n→∞
ρ(X − In(X) + PIn)
≤ S,
and then ρ(X − I∗(X) + PI∗) = S, where I∗ ∈ I. That is, ρ(X − I∗(X) + PI∗) =
minI∈I ρ (X − I(X) + PI) = S, namely, S given by (3.11) is the minimal value of Problem
(3.3) exists and is achieved by I∗.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1.5. Suppose I0 is one optimal solution of Problem 3.3, by
Theorem (3.1.3) we have
ρ (X − I0(X) + PI0) = sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(I0, µ) = S.
It follows that,
S = f(Iµ0 , µ0) = min
I∈I
f(I, µ0) ≤ f(I0, µ0) ≤ sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(I0, µ) = S,
and thus f(Iµ0 , µ0) = f(I0, µ0). By definition (3.10),
f (Iµ0 , µ0) =
∫
Gµ0
g ◦ SX(t)dt+
∫
R+/Gµ0
hµ0 ◦ SX(t)dt.
A direct calculation gives us
0 = f(I0, µ0)− f(Iµ0 , µ0) =
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SX(t)I ′0(t)dt+
∫ X¯
0
hµ0 ◦ SX(t)(1− I ′0(t))dt
−
∫
Gµ0
g ◦ SX(t)dt−
∫
R+/Gµ0
hµ0 ◦ SX(t)dt
=
∫
Gµ0
[hµ0 ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)] (1− I ′0(t))dt
+
∫
R+/(Gµ0∪Eµ0 )
(g ◦ SX(t)− hµ0 ◦ SX(t)) I ′0(t)dt
+
∫
Eµ0
[g ◦ SX(t)I ′0(t) + hµ0 ◦ SX(t)(1− I ′0(t))− hµ0 ◦ SX(t)] dt.
Note that, the first two terms on the right-hand side of the second equality are both
non-negative and the third term is zero. Therefore, we must have I ′0(t) = 0 for any
t ∈ R+/(Gµ0 ∪ Eµ0) and I ′0(t) = 1 for any t ∈ Gµ0 . Since I satisfies “slow growing”
property, on set Eµ, its first derivative I
′ is equal to some function between [0, 1] and
denoted by α(t).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.6. The existence of µ is given by [Kusuoka, 2001]. In his paper,
Kusuoka showed that an equivalent expression for a law invariant and comonotone coherent
risk measure with the Fatou property ρ is
ρ(X) =
∫
[0,1]
AVaRα(X)µ(dα), for any X ∈ L∞,
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where µ is a probability measure on [0, 1]. Comparing with the expression (3.4), under the
additional assumption that ρ is comonotone, we have β ≡ 0 and µ is the maximizer for
any X ∈ L∞. It is easy to see that µ0 in Theorem 3.1.3 turns out to be µ. Therefore, for
any I ∈ I, one gets
ρ(X − I(X)) + PI =
∫ X¯
0
hµ ◦ SX(x) [1− I ′(x)] dx+
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SX(x)I ′(x)dx− β(µ)
≥
∫ X¯
0
min {hµ ◦ SX(x), g ◦ SX(x)} dx− β(µ)
= ρ(X − I0(X)) + PI0 ,
and it implies that I0 is an optimal reinsurance contract.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.1. For any (I1, . . . , In) ∈ In, it is easy to check that the total
ceded loss I ,
∑n
i=1 Ii can be served a feasible reinsurance contract in the single reinsurer
case, namely, I ∈ I. The total premium from n reinsurers is
n∑
i=1
Pi,Ii =
n∑
i=1
∫ X¯
0
gi ◦ SX(t)I ′i(t)dt
≥
∫ X¯
0
[
(g1 ◦ SX(t) ∧ · · · ∧ gn ◦ SX(t))
n∑
i=1
I ′i(t)
]
dt
=
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SX(t)I ′(t)dt
= PI ,
where the inequality holds because gi and Ii, i = 1, . . . , n are all non-negative. Thus, for
any given (I1, . . . , In) ∈ In, the total ceded loss I ∈ I and moreover
∑n
i=1 Pi,Ii ≥ PI , where
PI is defined by (3.18). This implies that
min
(I1,...,In)∈In
ρ
(
X −
n∑
i=1
Ii(X) +
n∑
i=1
Pi,Ii
)
≥ min
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) . (3.25)
Conversely, any I ∈ I can be decomposed into the sum of n reinsurance contracts. Indeed,
I =
∑n
i=1 Ii if Ii(0) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n and the derivative of Ii, i = 1, . . . , n are I
′
i = I{A1}I ′,
where
Ai , {t ≥ 0 : gi ◦ SX(t) < gj ◦ SX(t), j = 1, . . . , n, j 6= i} , for i = 1, . . . , n− 1;
An , {t ≥ 0 : gn ◦ SX(t) ≥ gj ◦ SX(t), j = 1, . . . , n− 1} .
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It is easy to check that the functions Ii, i = 1, . . . , n are non-negative, Lipschitz-continuous
and non-decreasing which imply that (I1, . . . , In) ∈ In. Furthermore, from
∑n
i=1 Ii = I,
one gets
ρ
(
X −
n∑
i=1
Ii(X)
)
= ρ (X − I(X)) ;
and
PI =
∫ X¯
0
[g1 ◦ SX(t) ∧ · · · ∧ gn ◦ SX(t)] I ′(t)dt =
n∑
i=1
∫
Ai
gi ◦ SX(t)I ′(t)dt =
n∑
i=1
Pi,Ii .
Therefore, the inequality in expression (3.25) is actually an equality and this gives us the
result.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.2. The minimal value of Problem (3.17) is given by Lemma
3.2.1 and Theorem 3.1.3. Secondly, consider the n real-valued functions defined by (3.21),
it is easy to see (I∗1 , . . . , I
∗
n) ∈ In and
∑n
i=1 I
∗
i = I0. It implies that,
ρ
(
X −
n∑
i=1
I∗i (X)
)
= ρ (X − I0(X)) , and
n∑
i=1
Pi,I∗i = PI0 ,
and moreover,
ρ
(
X −
n∑
i=1
I∗i (X)
)
+
n∑
i=1
Pi,I∗i = ρ (X − I0(X)) + PI0
=
∫ X¯
0
[hµ0 ◦ SX(t) ∧ g ◦ SX(t)] dt− β (µ0)
=
∫ X¯
0
[hµ0 ◦ SX(t) ∧ g1 ◦ SX(t) ∧ · · · ∧ gn ◦ SX(t)] dt− β(µ0).
Therefore, (I∗1 , . . . , I
∗
n) is the minimizer of Problem (3.17).
Proof of Theorem 3.2.3. Denote g(t) , g1(t)∧g2(t), for all t ≥ 0. Lemma 3.2.1 implies
that
min
(I1,I2)∈I2
T (I1, I2) = min
I∈I
AVaRα (X − I(X) + PI) , (3.26)
where PI =
∫ X¯
0
g ◦ SX(x) dx. From (3.16) in Example 3.1.1, the optimal solution to the
minimization problem on the right hand side of the equation (3.26) has form I∗(x) =
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x − (x − d∗)+, where d∗ ≥ a = VaRα(X) satisfies the equation SX(d∗)/α = g ◦ SX(d∗) if
g′(0) > 1
α
, and d∗ = X¯ if g′(0) ≤ 1
α
. Therefore,
min
I∈I
AVaRα (X − I(X) + PI) = AVaRα(X − I∗(X) + PI∗). (3.27)
Use (3.19) to define two sets A1 and A2 as follows
A1 = {t > 0 : g1 ◦ SX(t) < g2 ◦ SX(t)} , and A2 = R+ \ A1.
By Proposition 3.2.2, the optimal pair (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) ∈ I2 to Problem (3.22) is
I∗i (x) =
∫ x
0
I{Ai}(t)(I
∗)′(t) dt =
∫ x
0
I{Ai∩[0,d∗]}(t) dt, for i = 1, 2.
Moreover, it is easy to check that
T (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) = a+
1
α
∫ X¯
d∗
SX(t) dt+
∫ d∗
a
g ◦ SX(t)dt.
Alternative proof for Theorem 3.1.7
Theorem 3.1.7 is saying that
ρ(X − Iµ0(X) + Pµ0) = max
µ∈P([0,1])
f(Iµ0 , µ) = f(Iµ0 , µ0) = S.
where µ0 is the minimizer of f(Iµ, µ). Therefore, the curial part is to show that the concave
function f(Iµ0 , µ), with respect to µ and achieves its maximal value at point µ0.
Fix a point µ ∈ P([0, 1]), define its corresponding functions
FIµ(λ) , f(Iµ, λ), ∀λ ∈ P([0, 1]),
and define
F (λ) , f(Iλ, λ), ∀λ ∈ P([0, 1]).
Then µ0 is the minimizer of F (µ). For a concave function defined on the real line, as long as
it has zero first derivative at some point, it achieves maximal value at this point. However,
both functions FIµ(λ) and F (λ) are functional on the probability space P([0, 1]) and the
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classical definition of derivative is not valid in this case. To overcome this difficulty, we
need to introduce a more general definition of derivative.
For the fixed point µ ∈ P([0, 1]), define the directional derivative of functions FIµ0 and
F at point µ along direction λ ∈ P([0, 1]) as follows:
F ′Iµ(µ)[λ] , lim
a↑1−
FIµ(aµ+ (1− a)λ)− FIµ(µ)
1− a ,
F ′(µ)[λ] , lim
a↑1−
F (aµ+ (1− a)λ)− F (µ)
1− a .
Each probability measure λ ∈ P([0, 1]) represents a valid direction.
Both F ′Iµ(µ)[λ] and F
′(µ)[λ] are well-defined. Indeed, for fixed µ and λ, it can be shown
by the following argument that [F (aµ+ (1− a)λ)− F (µ)] /(1− a) is non-decreasing with
respect to a: suppose 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, then
bµ+ (1− b)λ = cµ+ (1− c) (aµ+ (1− a)λ) ,
where c = 1− 1−b
1−a ∈ (0, 1). It implies that, together with the concavity property of function
F ,
F (bµ+ (1− b)λ)− F (µ) ≥ (1− c) (F (aµ+ (1− a)λ)− F (µ))
= (1− b)F (aµ+ (1− a)λ)− F (µ)
1− a .
First, we are going to show the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.3.1 For the same µ0 ∈ P([0, 1]) as in Theorem 3.1.7, we have that
F ′Iµ0 (µ0)[λ] = F
′(µ0)[λ], for any λ ∈ P([0, 1]).
Proof. Fix µ and λ in P([0, 1]), denote γa = aµ + (1 − a)λ for a ∈ [0, 1]. From the
definition, one gets
h′γa(x) =
∫
(x,1]
1
s
γa(ds) =
∫
(x,1]
1
s
[aµ(ds) + (1− a)λ(ds)]
= a
∫
(x,1]
1
s
µ(ds) + (1− a)
∫
(x,1]
1
s
λ(ds) = ah′µ(x) + (1− a)h′λ(x),
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and thus hγa(x) = ahµ(x) + (1− a)hλ(x). Therefore,
FIµ(γa)− FIµ(µ) = f(Iµ, γa)− f(Iµ, µ) =
∫
Gcµ
hγa ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t)dt− [β(γa)− β(µ)]
= (1− a)
∫
Gcµ
[hλ ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t)] dt− [β(γa)− β(µ)] ,
where Gcµ = R/Gµ. It implies that
F ′Iµ(µ)[λ] = lim
a↑1−
FIµ(γa)− FIµ(µ)
1− a =
∫
Gcµ
[hλ ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t))] dt− β′(µ)[λ].
In what follows, we calculate the directional derivative of the function F . Note that
F (γa)− F (µ) = f(Iγa , γa)− f(Iµ, µ)
=
∫
Gγa
g ◦ SX(t))dt+
∫
Gcγ
hγa ◦ SX(t))dt
−
(∫
Gµ
[
g ◦ SX(t))dt+
∫
Gcµ
hµ ◦ SX(t))
]
dt
)
− [β(γa)− β(µ)]
=
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ
g ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t)dt+
∫
Gcγa∩Gµ
[hγa ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t))] dt
+
∫
Gcγa∩Gcµ
[hγa ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t)] dt− (β(γa)− β(µ))
=
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ
[g ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t)] dt+
∫
Gcγa∩Gµ
[hγa ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)] dt
+FIµ(γa)− FIµ(µ)−
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ
[hγa ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t))] dt
=
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ
[g ◦ SX(t)− hγa ◦ SX(t)] dt+
∫
Gcγa∩Gµ
[hγa ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)] dt
+FIµ(γa)− FIµ(µ).
It implies that
F ′(µ)[λ]− F ′Iµ(µ)[λ] = lim
a↑1−
1
1− a
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ
[g ◦ SX(t)− hγa ◦ SX(t)] dt (3.28)
+ lim
a↑1−
1
1− a
∫
Gcγa∩Gµ
[hγa ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)] dt,
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and thus, as long as the right hand side of equation (3.28) equals zero, the expected result
holds. To this end, we are going to check these two terms separately.
1) On the set Gγa ∩Gcµ, we have
hµ(SX(t)) ≤ g ◦ SX(t) < hγa ◦ SX(t) = ahµ ◦ SX(t) + (1− a)hλ ◦ SX(t);
therefore,
(1− a)
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ
[g ◦ SX(t)− hλ ◦ SX(t)] dt ≤
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ
[g ◦ SX(t)− hγa ◦ SX(t)] dt < 0.
Note that
Gγa ∩Gcµ =
{
t ≥ 0 : 0 ≤ g(SX(t))− hµ(SX(t)) < 1− α
α
(hλ(SX(t))− g(SX(t)))
}
,
thus,
A ,
⋂
a↑1
(
Gγa ∩Gcµ
)
= {t ≥ 0 : g (SX(t)) = hµ (SX(t)) < hλ (SX(t))} ⊂ Eµ,
and∫
A
[g ◦ SX(t)− hλ ◦ SX(t)] dt ≤ lim
a↑1−
1
1− a
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ
[g ◦ SX(t)− hγa ◦ SX(t)] dt ≤ 0.
In particular, for µ0, under the assumption that g = hµ0 holds only on a Lebesgue’s
measure zero set, we have
lim
a↑1−
1
1− a
∫
Gγa∩Gcµ0
g ◦ SX(t)− hγa ◦ SX(t)dt = 0.
2) On the set Gcγa ∩Gµ, we have
hγa ◦ SX(t) = ahµ ◦ SX(t) + (1− a)hλ ◦ SX(t) ≤ g ◦ SX(t) < hµ ◦ SX(t),
therefore
(1− a)
∫
Gcγa∩Gµ
[hλ ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)] dt ≤
∫
Gcγa∩Gµ
[hγa ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)] dt < 0.
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Denote M , inf
t∈Gcγa∩Gµ
{hλ ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)}, then M > −∞ and
Gcγa ∩Gµ =
{
t ≥ 0 : 1− a
a
[hλ ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)] ≤ g ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t) < 0
}
⊆
{
t ≥ 0 : 1− a
a
M ≤ g ◦ SX(t)− hµ ◦ SX(t) < 0
}
.
It implies that the Lebesgue measure of Gcγa ∩Gµ converges to zero as a ↑ 1 for any
µ ∈ P([0, 1]). Thus,
lim
a↑1−
1
1− a
∫
Gcγa∩Gµ0
[hγa ◦ SX(t)− g ◦ SX(t)] dt = 0.
Therefore, Equation (3.28) implies that for any λ ∈ P([0, 1]), we have
F ′(µ0)[λ] = F ′Iµ0 (µ0)[λ]
as required.
Note that P([0, 1]) is a convex subset of the set of all signed measures on [0, 1], denoted
by M([0, 1]), which is a Banach space. Denote M∗ to be the dual space of M([0, 1]),
i.e.M∗ is the set of all linear functionals on P([0, 1]). For any function H : P([0, 1])→ R,
if H takes a finite value at µ ∈ P([0, 1]) , define
∂H(µ) , {µ∗ ∈M∗ : H(λ) ≤ H(µ) + 〈µ∗, λ〉 − 〈µ∗, µ〉, for any λ ∈M} ,
where 〈µ∗, λ〉 is the value of linear functional µ∗ ∈M∗ at probability measure λ.
For µ0 ∈ P([0, 1]), define a corresponding function ψ : P([0, 1]) → R via ψ(λ) =
F ′(µ0)[λ] for any λ ∈ P([0, 1]). Since µ0 gives the maximal value of F (µ), function ψ is
always non-positive and thus finite.
Lemma 3.3.2 Under the same condition as in Theorem 3.1.7, the sets ∂F (µ0) and ∂ψ(µ0)
are non-empty and
∂F (µ0) = ∂ψ(µ0).
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Proof. It is known that F (µ) achieves its maximal value at probability measure µ0, i.e.
F (λ) ≤ F (µ0) for any λ ∈ P([0, 1]). It implies that 0 ∈ ∂F (µ0) and thus ∂F (µ0) 6= ∅. For
any µ∗ ∈ ∂F (µ0), i.e. µ∗ such that
F (λ) ≤ F (µ0) + 〈µ∗, λ〉 − 〈µ∗, µ0〉, for any λ ∈ P([0, 1]),
one gets
ψ(λ) = lim
a↑1−
F (aµ0 + (1− a)λ)− F (µ0)
1− a
≤ lim
a↑1−
〈µ∗, aµ0 + (1− a)λ)〉 − 〈µ∗, µ0〉
1− a
= 〈µ∗, λ〉 − 〈µ∗, µ0〉.
It implies that µ∗ ∈ ∂ψ(µ0) because ψ(µ0) = 0 and moreover, ∂ψ(µ) 6= ∅.
Conversely, for any µ∗ ∈ ∂ψ(µ0),
ψ(λ) ≤ ψ(µ0) + 〈µ∗, λ〉 − 〈µ∗, µ0〉 = 〈µ∗, λ〉 − 〈µ∗, µ0〉,
holds for any λ ∈ P([0, 1]). Since
F ′(µ0)[λ] = sup
(1−a)>0
F (aµ+ (1− a)λ)− F (µ0)
1− a ,
one gets
F (λ)− F (µ0) ≤ F ′(µ0)[λ] = ψ(λ) ≤ 〈µ∗, λ〉 − 〈µ∗, µ0〉.
It implies that µ∗ ∈ ∂F (µ0).
As a consequence of Lemma 3.3.1, an equivalent definition for ψ is ψ(λ) = F ′Iµ0 (µ0)[λ]
for any λ ∈ P([0, 1]). Then, by using the same argument as in Lemma 3.3.2, we have
∂F (µ0) = ∂ψ(µ0) = ∂FIµ0 (µ0).
Therefore, 0 ∈ ∂FIµ0 (µ0), or equivalently, function FIµ0 achieves its maximal value among
the set P([0, 1]) at µ0.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.7.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.7. From the above argument, one gets
ρ (X − Iµ0(X)) + PIµ0 = sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(Iµ0 , µ) = sup
µ∈P([0,1])
FIµ0 (µ) = FIµ0 (µ0).
72
Theorem 3.1.3 shows that the minimal value for Problem (3.3) is f(Iµ0 , µ0) = FIµ0 (µ0),
thus ρ (X − I(X)) + PI achieve its minimal value at Iµ0 , i.e.
min
I∈I
ρ (X − I(X) + PI) = ρ (X − Iµ0(X)) + PIµ0 .
Indeed, (Iµ0 , µ0) is the saddle point of the minimax function f(I, µ) on I × P([0, 1]), i.e.
sup
µ∈P([0,1])
f(Iµ0 , µ) = FIµ0 (µ0) = f(Iµ0 , µ0) = minI∈I
f(I, µ0).
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Chapter 4
Joint perspectives of both an insurer
and a reinsurer
In this chapter, we study optimal reinsurance designs from the perspectives of both an
insurer and a reinsurer and take into account both an insurer’s aims and a reinsurer’s goals
in reinsurance contract designs. One of the main objectives for an insurer when buying a
reinsurance is to control his risk, while one of the main goals for a reinsurer when selling
a reinsurance is to make a profit. Of course, a reinsurer also worries about his own risk
when selling a reinsurance contract and needs to control his risk as well.
We assume both the insurer and the reinsurer use VaR to measure their own losses and
develop optimal reinsurance contracts that minimize the convex combination of the VaR
risk measures of the insurer’s loss and the reinsurer’s loss under two types of constraints.
The constraints describe the interests of both the insurer and the reinsurer. With the first
type of constraints, the insurer and the reinsurer have their own limit on the VaR of their
own loss. With the second type of constraints, the insurer has a limit on the VaR of his
loss while the reinsurer has a target on his profit in selling a reinsurance contract. For
both types of constraints, we derive the optimal reinsurance forms within a wide class of
reinsurance policies and under the expected value reinsurance premium principle. These
optimal reinsurance forms are more complicated than the optimal reinsurance contracts
from the perspective of one party only. The proposed models can also be reduced to the
problems of minimizing the VaR of one party’s loss under the constraints on the interests
of both the insurer and the reinsurer.
In this chapter, we assume the underlying non-negative random loss X has support on
[0,∞) and E[X] <∞. To avoid tedious discussions and arguments, we simply suppose that
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the survival function SX(x) of X is continuous and decreasing on [0,∞) with SX(0) = 1.
Furthermore, we assume that the reinsurance premium is calculated by the expected value
principle, namely, PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)], where θ > 0.
4.1 Reinsurance models taking into account the in-
terests of both an insurer and a reinsurer
Assume the insurer and the reinsurer use the VaR with risk levels 0 < α < 1 and 0 <
β < 1, respectively, to measure their own losses. Without a reinsurance, the VaR of the
insurer’ loss is VaRα(X). With a reinsurance contract I, the VaR of the insurer’s loss
is VaRα(X − I(X) + PI), and the insurer requires VaRα(X − I(X) + PI) ≤ VaRα(X).
Furthermore, the insurer wants the VaR to be reduced to a tolerated value L1 so that
VaRα(X − I(X) + PI) ≤ L1, (4.1)
where L1 > 0 is the threshold representing the maximum VaR tolerated by the insurer
after a reinsurance. Thus, it is reasonable to assume L1 ≤ VaRα(X).
On the other hand, the reinsurer also worries about his loss in selling the contract I
and wants to set a threshold L2 > 0 for the VaR of his loss so that
VaRβ(I(X)− PI) ≤ L2. (4.2)
Note that I(X)−X ≤ 0 ≤ PI . Thus, I(X)− PI ≤ X and VaRβ(I(X)− PI) ≤ VaRβ(X).
Hence, it is reasonable to assume L2 ≤ VaRβ(X).
As the seller of the reinsurance contract I, the reinsurer expects to make a profit,
namely, to have I(X) ≤ PI . Assume that the reinsurer wants to make a profit at least
L3 ≥ 0 at a confidence level at least 0 < γ < 1 in selling the reinsurance contract I, namely
the profit target L3 and the confidence level γ satisfy
P (PI − I(X) ≥ L3) = 1− P (I(X) > PI − L3) ≥ γ. (4.3)
To obtain feasible and applicable models for optimal reinsurance designs from the per-
spectives of both an insurer and a reinsurer, we have to make some assumptions on the
relationships between the confidence level γ and each of the risk levels α and β, and the
safety loading factor θ. In doing so, suppose 1 − γ ≤ β. Then, VaRβ (I(X)− PI) ≤
VaR1−γ (I(X)− PI) ≤ −L3 ≤ 0, where the second inequality follows from (4.3). However,
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the risk level β is used to measure the maximum possible loss of the reinsurer. If 1−γ ≤ β,
then the level β will lead to a non-positive VaR for his loss I(X)−PI . Such a non-positive
VaR cannot provide useful information for the reinsurer. Thus, we assume β < 1 − γ. In
addition, we assume α < 1 − γ as well, since the risk levels α and β should be near in
practice.
Furthermore, for a feasible contract I ∈ I, note that I(X) is a nonnegative ran-
dom variable and PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)], thus by Markov’s inequality, it is easy to see
P (I(X) > PI) ≤ 1/(1 + θ) or equivalently P (I(X) ≤ PI) ≥ θ/(1 + θ), which implies that
the reinsurer will make a profit, namely, I(X) ≤ PI , with a probability at least θ/(1 + θ).
Thus, it is reasonable to assume γ > θ/(1 + θ) since L3 is the profit target or the min-
imum profit desire for the reinsurer to sell a reinsurance contract and only a very high
confidence level γ is acceptable for the reinsurer. Note that γ > θ/(1 + θ) is equivalent to
1− γ < 1/(1 + θ). Hence, the assumptions of α < 1− γ and β < 1− γ imply α < 1/(1 + θ)
and β < 1/(1 + θ), respectively.
Throughout the chapter, we denote a = VaRα(X), b = VaRβ(X), c = VaR1−γ(X),
and vθ = VaR 1
1+θ
(X). Therefore, for any I ∈ I, by the properties of the VaR, we have
VaRα(X−I(X)+PI) = a−I(a)+PI , VaRβ(I(X)−PI) = I(b)−PI , and VaR1−γ(I(X)) =
I(c). It is easy to check that (4.1) is equivalent to a− I(a) ≤ L1 − PI , (4.2) is equivalent
to I(b) ≤ L2 + PI , and (4.3) is equivalent to I(c) ≤ PI − L3. Moreover, note that α ∨ β <
1− γ < 1/(1 + θ) is equivalent to vθ < c < a ∧ b.
Thus, when the insurer and the reinsurer have the limits L1 and L2, respectively, on
the VaRs of their own losses in a reinsurance contract, the set of the feasible reinsurance
contracts acceptable by both the insurer and the reinsurer is
I1 = {I ∈ I : I(b)− L2 ≤ PI ≤ I(a)− a+ L1} , (4.4)
where I1 is obtained when the constraints (4.1) and (4.2) are imposed on I.
Furthermore, when the insurer has the limit L1 on the VaR of his loss and the reinsurer
has the target L3 on his profit in a reinsurance contract, the set of the feasible reinsurance
contracts acceptable by both the insurer and the reinsurer is
I2 = {I ∈ I : I(c) + L3 ≤ PI ≤ I(a)− a+ L1} , (4.5)
where I2 is obtained when the constraints (4.1) and (4.3) are imposed on I.
The desired sets I1 and I2 may be empty. We have to impose some restrictions on L1,
L2, and L3 so that I1 and I2 are non-empty. First, for any I ∈ I1, we have L1 + L2 ≥
a− I(a) + PI + I(b)− PI = a+ I(b)− I(a). Furthermore, by the 1-Lipschitz continuity of
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I, we have I(b)− I(a) ≥ 0 if b > a and I(b)− I(a) ≥ b−a if a > b. Hence, L1 +L2 ≥ a∧ b.
Moreover, we assume
vθ + (1 + θ)
∫ a
vθ
SX(x)dx ≤ L1. (4.6)
This condition will guarantee that I1 is non-empty as showed in Lemma 4.2.2.
Next, for any I ∈ I2, because a ≥ c and I is 1-Lipschitz continuous, we have a+ PI −
L1 − PI + L3 ≤ I(a)− I(c) ≤ a− c, and thus c ≤ L1 − L3.
Furthermore, we assume
(1 + θ)
(∫ vθ
0
+
∫ ∞
c
)
SX(x)dx− vθ ≥ L3. (4.7)
The conditions (4.6) and (4.7) will guarantee I2 to be non-empty as proved in Lemma
4.3.5.
When Ii, i = 1, 2, is the set of feasible reinsurance contracts acceptable by both the
insurer and the reinsurer, from the insurer’s perspective, an optimal reinsurance contract
is a solution to the optimization problem of
min
I∈Ii
VaRα (X − I(X) + PI) , (4.8)
while from the reinsurer’s perspective, an optimal reinsurance contract is a solution to the
optimization problem of
min
I∈Ii
VaRβ (I(X)− PI) . (4.9)
Instead of solving Problems (4.8) and (4.9) separately, we consider the unified mini-
mization problem of
min
I∈Ii
V (I), (4.10)
where the objective function
V (I) = λVaRα (X − I(X) + PI) + (1− λ)VaRβ (I(X)− PI)
= λa+ (2λ− 1)PI − λI(a) + (1− λ)I(b),
is the convex combination of the VaRs of the insurer’s loss and the reinsurer’s loss, with
λ ∈ [0, 1] a weighting factor. When λ = 0, V (I) = VaRβ (I(X)− PI) and Problem (4.10)
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is reduced to Problem (4.9). When λ = 1, V (I) = VaRα (X − I(X) + PI) and Problem
(4.10) is reduced to Problem (4.8). Thus, Problems (4.8) and (4.9) can be viewed as special
cases of Problem (4.10).
When a = b, the objective function V (I) becomes
V (I) = λa+ (1− 2λ)(I(a)− PI) = (1− λ)a+ (2λ− 1)(a− I(a) + PI),
which implies that Problem (4.10) is reduced to either Problem (4.8) when 1/2 < λ ≤ 1
or Problem (4.9) when 0 ≤ λ < 1/2. However, these two problems are covered in Problem
(4.10) by setting λ = 1 and λ = 0, respectively. Thus, we assume a 6= b.
Furthermore, when λ = 1/2, the objective function V (I) becomes
V (I) =
a
2
+
1
2
(I(b)− I(a)) .
Thus, Problem (4.10) is reduced to minI∈Ii {I(b)− I(a)}, i = 1, 2. Note that the 1-
Lipschitz property of I implies that 0 ≤ I(b) − I(a) ≤ b − a for a < b and I(b) − I(a) ≥
−(a− b) for a > b. Hence, minI∈Ii {I(b)− I(a)} = −(a− b)+. Thus, the optimal contract
I∗ to the problem of minI∈Ii {I(b)− I(a)} and hence to Problem (4.10) is any contract
I∗ ∈ Ii satisfying I∗(a) − I∗(b) = (a − b)+. We will see in Remarks 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 that
such optimal contracts I∗ exist in Ii for i = 1, 2, and thus Problem (4.10) is solved for
λ = 1/2. Hence, we assume λ 6= 1/2.
In summary, in the rest of this chapter, we assume that the following conditions hold:{
λ 6= 1
2
, a 6= b, L3 + c ≤ L1 ≤ a, L2 ≤ b, 0 < vθ < c < a ∧ b ≤ L1 + L2,
and the inequalities (4.6) and (4.7) hold.
(4.11)
Next, we will solve Problem (4.10) for i = 1, 2 in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
4.2 Constraints on both an insurer’s loss and a rein-
surer’s loss
In this section, we will solve Problem (4.10) for i = 1, namely, to solve the minimization
problem of
min
I∈I1
V (I). (4.12)
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In this problem, V (I) = λa+ (2λ− 1)PI − λI(a) + (1− λ)I(b) and I1 is the set of feasible
reinsurance contracts acceptable by both the insurer and the reinsurer. The definition of
I1 also describes the constraints on the VaRs of both an insurer’s loss and a reinsurer’s
loss. A reinsurance contract I is said to be acceptable if I ∈ I1.
First, we introduce some notation. Define the two types of feasible contract Imξa,ξb and
IMξa,ξb in I for some pairs of (ξa, ξb) as follows:
(1) If a < b, for each pair (ξa, ξb) ∈ [0, a]× [0, b] and ξa ≤ ξb, define
Imξa,ξb(x) = (x− a+ ξa)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− (b− ξb + ξa))+ − (x− b)+,
IMξa,ξb(x) = x− (x− ξa)+ + (x− a)+ − (x− (a+ ξb − ξa))+ + (x− b)+.
(2) If a > b, for each pair (ξa, ξb) ∈ [0, a]× [0, b] and ξa ≥ ξb, define
Imξa,ξb(x) = (x− b+ ξb)+ − (x− b)+ + (x− (a− ξa + ξb))+ − (x− b)+,
IMξa,ξb(x) = x− (x− ξb)+ + (x− b)+ − (x− (b+ ξa − ξb))+ + (x− a)+.
Since Imξa,ξb(0) = 0 and limx→∞ SX(x) = 0, we have
PImξa,ξb
= (1 + θ)E
[
Imξa,ξb(X)
]
= (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
Imξa,ξb(x)dFX(x)
= −(1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
Imξa,ξb(x)dSX(x) = (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
SX(x)dI
m
ξa,ξb
(x)
= (1 + θ)
(∫ a∧b
a∧b−ξa∧ξb
+
∫ a∨b
a∨b−|ξb−ξa|
)
SX(x)dx.
Similarly, we have
PIMξa,ξb
= (1 + θ)E
[
IMξa,ξb(X)
]
= (1 + θ)
(∫ ξa∧ξb
0
+
∫ a∧b+|ξb−ξa|
a∧b
+
∫ ∞
a∨b
)
SX(x)dx.
It is easy to verify that for any I ∈ I1 satisfying I(a) = ξa and I(b) = ξb, we have
Imξa,ξb(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ IMξa,ξb(x) for all x ≥ 0 as illustrated by Figure 4.1 and thus PImξa,ξb ≤ PI ≤
PIMξa,ξb
.
Next, we define the set Ξa,b ⊂ [0, a]× [0, b] as follows:
79
Figure 4.1: Relation between arbitrary I ∈ I1 and the pair (Imξa,ξb , IMξa,ξb).
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(a) When a < b, Ξa,b is the set of all pairs (ξa, ξb) satisfying
ξa ≤ ξb ≤ ξa + b ∧ (L1 + L2)− a, (4.13)
ξb − L2 ≤ PIMξa,ξb = (1 + θ)
(∫ ξa
0
+
∫ a+ξb−ξa
a
+
∫ ∞
b
)
SX(x)dx, (4.14)
L1 − a+ ξa ≥ PImξa,ξb = (1 + θ)
(∫ a
a−ξa
+
∫ b
b−ξb+ξa
)
SX(x)dx. (4.15)
(b) When a > b, Ξa,b is the set of all pairs (ξa, ξb) satisfying
ξb + (a− L1 − L2)+ ≤ ξa ≤ ξb + a− b, (4.16)
ξb − L2 ≤ PIMξa,ξb = (1 + θ)
(∫ ξb
0
+
∫ b+ξa−ξb
b
+
∫ ∞
a
)
SX(x)dx, (4.17)
L1 − a+ ξa ≥ PImξa,ξb = (1 + θ)
(∫ b
b−ξb
+
∫ a
a−ξa+ξb
)
SX(x)dx. (4.18)
To solve Problem (4.12), we introduce the auxiliary functions g1, g2, and g3 and discuss
their properties in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.1 (a) Define g1(ξ) = ξ − (1 + θ)
∫ a
a−ξ SX(x)dx for ξ ∈ [0, a]. Then, g1 is
continuous, increasing on [0, a−vθ), strictly decreasing on (a−vθ, a], and maxξ∈[0, a] g1(ξ) =
g1(a− vθ).
(b) Define g2(ξ) = ξ − (1 + θ)
(∫ ξ
0
+
∫∞
b
)
SX(x)dx for ξ ∈ [0, a ∧ b]. Then, g2 is
continuous, strictly decreasing on [0, vθ), increasing on (vθ, a ∧ b], and minξ∈[0, a∧b] g2(ξ) =
g2(vθ).
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(c) Define g3(ξ) = ξ − (1 + θ)
∫ a
b−ξ SX(x)dx for ξ ∈ [0, b]. Then, g3 is continuous,
increasing on [0, b− vθ), strictly decreasing on (b− vθ, b], and maxξ∈[0, b] g3(ξ) = g3(b− vθ).
(d) Assume a < b. Then g2(ξa) < g1(ξa) for any ξa ∈ [0, a]. In addition, PIMξa,ξb , PImξa,ξb ,
and ξb − PIMξa,ξb are continuous and strictly increasing in ξb ∈ [ξa, ξa + b− a].
(e) Assume a > b. Then g2(ξb) < g3(ξb) for any ξb ∈ [0, b]. In addition, PIMξa,ξb , PImξa,ξb ,
and ξa − PImξa,ξb are continuous and strictly increasing in ξa ∈ [ξb, ξb + a− b].
Lemma 4.2.2 The following three statements are equivalent:
(i) Inequality (4.6) holds.
(ii) I1 6= ∅.
(iii) Ξa,b 6= ∅.
In addition, (4.6) implies
vθ − (1 + θ)
(∫ vθ
0
+
∫ ∞
b
)
SX(x)dx ≤ L2. (4.19)
Lemma 4.2.3 Problem (4.12) has the same minimal value as the minimization problem
min
(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξb) (4.20)
in the sense that minI∈I1 V (I) = min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb), where, v(ξa, ξb) = λa + (2λ −
1)Pξa,ξb − λξa + (1− λ)ξb and
Pξa,ξb =
{
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξa,ξb , if 0 ≤ λ <
1
2
,
(ξb − L2) ∨ PImξa,ξb , if
1
2
< λ ≤ 1. (4.21)
Moreover, let (ξ∗a, ξ
∗
b ) ∈ Ξa,b be the minimizer of Problem (4.20). Then, a contract I∗
of the form
I∗(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− (d1 + ξ∗a ∧ ξ∗b ))+ + (x− d2)+ − (x− (d2 + |ξ∗b − ξ∗a|))+
+ (x− d3)+ (4.22)
for some (d1, d2, d3) ∈ [0, a ∧ b− ξ∗a ∧ ξ∗b ]× [a ∧ b, a ∨ b− |ξ∗b − ξ∗a|]× [a ∨ b, ∞], satisfying
PI∗ = Pξ∗a, ξ∗b , is an optimal solution to Problem (4.12).
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Lemma 4.2.3 reduces the infinite-dimensional optimization problem (4.12) to a two-
dimensional optimization problem (4.20). In the following two theorems, we give the
explicit expressions of (ξ∗a, ξ
∗
b ) and (d1, d2, d3) for the optimal solution I
∗ presented in
(4.22).
Theorem 4.2.4 Suppose a < b, then Problem (4.20) has minimizer (ξ∗a, ξ
∗
b ) with ξ
∗
a = ξ
∗
b
and the optimal solution to Problem (4.12), denoted by I∗, is given as follows.
(a) In the case 0 ≤ λ < 1/2:
(i) If g1(vθ) ≥ a− L1, then ξ∗a = vθ and
I∗(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − vθ)+ + (x− d3)+,
for some d1 ∈ [0, a− vθ] and d3 ∈ [b,∞] such that PI∗ = vθ − (a− L1) ∨ g2(vθ).
(ii) If g1(vθ) < a− L1, then there exists ξ1 ∈ [vθ ∧ (a− vθ), vθ ∨ (a− vθ)] such that
g1(ξ1) = a− L1. Moreover, ξ∗a = ξ1 and
I∗(x) = (x− a+ ξ1)+ − (x− a)+.
(b) In the case 1/2 < λ ≤ 1:
(i) If g2(a− vθ) ≤ L2, then ξ∗a = a− vθ and
I∗(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − a+ vθ)+ + (x− d3)+,
for some d1 ∈ [0, vθ] and d3 ∈ [b,∞] such that PI∗ = a− vθ − L2 ∧ g1(a− vθ).
(ii) If g2(a− vθ) > L2, then there exists ξ2 ∈ [vθ ∧ (a− vθ), vθ ∨ (a− vθ)] such that
g2(ξ2) = L2. Moreover, ξ
∗
a = ξ2 and
I∗(x) = x− (x− ξ2)+ + (x− b)+.
Theorem 4.2.5 Suppose a > b, then Problem (4.20) has minimizer (ξ∗a, ξ
∗
b ) with ξ
∗
a =
ξ∗b + a− b and the optimal solution to Problem (4.12), denoted by I∗, is given as follows.
(a) In the case 0 ≤ λ < 1/2:
(i) If g3(vθ) ≥ b− L1, then ξ∗b = vθ and
I∗(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − vθ)+ + (x− b)+ − (x− d3)+,
for some d1 ∈ [0, b− vθ] and d3 ∈ [a,∞] such that PI∗ = vθ − (b− L1) ∨ g2(vθ).
82
(ii) If g3(vθ) < b − L1, then there exists ξ3 ∈ [vθ ∧ (b− vθ), vθ ∨ (b− vθ)] such that
g3(ξ3) = b− L1. Moreover, ξ∗b = ξ3 and
I∗(x) = (x− b+ ξ3)+ − (x− a)+.
(b) In the case of 1/2 < λ ≤ 1:
(i) If g2(b− vθ) ≤ L2, then ξ∗b = b− vθ and
I∗(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − b+ vθ)+ + (x− b)+ − (x− d3)+,
for some d1 ∈ [0, vθ] and d3 ∈ [a,∞] such that PI∗ = b− vθ − L2 ∧ g3(b− vθ).
(ii) If g2(b − vθ) > L2, then there exists ξ4 ∈ [vθ ∧ (b− vθ), vθ ∨ (b− vθ)] such that
g2(ξ4) = L2. Moreover, ξ
∗
b = ξ4 and
I∗(x) = x− (x− ξ4)+ + (x− b)+.
Remark 4.2.1 From Theorems 4.2.5 and 4.2.4, it is easy to see that the optimal solution
I∗ can be separated into two different cases of 0 ≤ λ < 1/2 and 1/2 < λ ≤ 1, but the
parameters in each case don’t depend on λ.
By the proofs of Theorems 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, we know that the optimal contracts I∗ in
Theorems 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 satisfy I∗(a)− I∗(b) = (a− b)+, and hence the optimal solutions
I∗ in Theorems 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 are also the solutions to Problem (4.12) when λ = 1/2. 
4.3 Constraints on an insurer’s loss and a reinsurer’s
profit
In this section, we solve Problem (4.10) for i = 2, namely, we solve the minimization
problem
min
I∈I2
V (I). (4.23)
In this problem, V (I) = λa+ (2λ− 1)PI − λI(a) + (1− λ)I(b) and I2 is the set of feasible
reinsurance contracts acceptable by both the insurer and the reinsurer. The definition of
I2 also describes the constraints on the VaR of the insurer’s loss and on the reinsurer’s
profit. A reinsurance contract I is said to be acceptable if I ∈ I2.
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It is easy to check that for any given (ξc, ξa, ξb) ∈ [0, c]× [0, a]× [0, b], if I ∈ I satisifes
I(c) = ξc, I(a) = ξa, and I(b) = ξb, then I
m
ξc,ξa,ξb
(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ IMξc,ξa,ξb(x) for all x ≥ 0 and
PImξc,ξa,ξb
≤ PI ≤ PIMξc,ξa,ξb , where
Imξc,ξa,ξb(x) = (x− c+ ξc)+ − (x− c)+ + (x− (a ∧ b− ξa ∧ ξb + ξc))+ − (x− a ∧ b)+
+ (x− (a ∨ b− |ξa − ξb|))+ − (x− a ∨ b)+,
IMξc,ξa,ξb(x) =x− (x− ξc)+ + (x− c)+ − (x− (c+ ξa ∧ ξb − ξc))+
+ (x− a ∧ b)+ − (x− (a ∧ b+ |ξa − ξb|))+ + (x− a ∨ b)+,
are two feasible reinsurance contracts in I.
To solve Problem (4.23), we introduce auxiliary functions hi for i = 1, ..., 7, A
M
ξc
, Aξc ,
Amξc , B
M
ξc
, and Bmξc , and discuss their properties in the following three propositions.
Proposition 4.3.1 Assume a 6= b.
(a) Define h1(ξc) = (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫∞
c
)
SX(x)dx− ξc for ξc ∈ [0, c]. Then h1(ξc) is con-
tinuous, concave, strictly increasing on [0, vθ), decreasing on (vθ, c], and maxξc∈[0, c] h1(ξc) =
h1(vθ).
(b) Define h2(ξc) = (1 + θ)
∫ a
c−ξc SX(x)dx− ξc for ξc ∈ [0, c]. Then h2(ξc) is continuous,
convex, decreasing on [0, c − vθ), strictly increasing on (c − vθ, c], and minξc∈[0, c] h2(ξc) =
h2(c− vθ). Moreover, h2(ξc) < h1(ξc) for ξc ∈ [0, c].
Proposition 4.3.2 Assume a < b.
(a) Functions PIMξc,ξa,ξb
, PImξc,ξa,ξb
, ξb − PIMξc,ξa,ξb , and ξb − PImξc,ξa,ξb , are continuous and
strictly increasing in ξb ∈ [ξa, ξa + b− a].
(b) Given ξc ∈ [0, c], define AMξc (ξa) = PIMξc,ξa,ξa+b−a and A
m
ξc
(ξa) = PImξc,ξa,ξa , for ξa ∈
[ξc, ξc + a − c], and Aξc(ξa) = PIMξc,ξa,ξa , for ξa ∈ [ξc, ξc + b − c]. Then all the functions
AMξc (ξa), A
m
ξc
(ξa), ξa − AMξc (ξa) and ξa − Amξc(ξa) are continuous and strictly increasing in
ξa ∈ [ξc, ξc + a− c], and Aξc(ξa) and ξa −Aξc(ξa) are continuous and strictly increasing in
ξa ∈ [ξc, ξc + b− c].
(c) Define h3(ξc) = Aξc(ξc + a − c) − ξc for ξc ∈ [0, c]. Then h3(ξc) is continuous,
concave, strictly increasing on [0, vθ), decreasing on (vθ, c], and maxξc∈[0, c] h3(ξc) = h3(vθ).
(d) Define h4(ξc) = A
m
ξc
(ξc + a−L1 +L3)− ξc for ξc ∈ [0, c]. Then h4(ξc) is continuous,
convex, decreasing on [0, c − vθ), strictly increasing on (c − vθ, c], and minξc∈[0, c] h4(ξc) =
h4(c− vθ).
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(e) Define h5(ξc) = Aξc(ξc + a−L1 +L3)− ξc for ξc ∈ [0, c]. Then h5(ξc) is continuous,
concave, strictly increasing on [0, vθ), decreasing on (vθ, c], and maxξc∈[0, c] h5(ξc) = h5(vθ).
(f) Given ξc ∈ [0, c], it holds that Amξc(ξa) < Aξc(ξa) < AMξc (ξa) for ξa ∈ [ξc, ξc + a − c].
Furthermore, it holds that h4(ξc) < h5(ξc) ≤ h3(ξc) for ξc ∈ [0, c]. In addition, h5(ξc) =
h3(ξc) if and only if c = L1 − L3.
Proposition 4.3.3 Assume a > b.
(a) Functions PIMξc,ξa,ξb
, PImξc,ξa,ξb
, ξa − PIMξc,ξa,ξb , and ξa − PImξc,ξa,ξb , are continuous and
strictly increasing in ξa ∈ [ξb, ξb + a− b].
(b) Given ξc ∈ [0, c], define BMξc (ξb) = PIMξc,ξb+a−b,ξb and B
m
ξc
(ξb) = PImξc,ξb+a−b,ξb
for ξb ∈
[ξc, ξc + b− c]. Then all the functions BMξc (ξb), Bmξc (ξb), ξb −BMξc (ξb), and ξb −Bmξc (ξb), are
continuous and strictly increasing in ξb ∈ [ξc, ξc + b− c].
(c) Define h6(ξc) = B
m
ξc
(ξc+(b−L1+L3)+)−ξc for ξc ∈ [0, c]. Then h6(ξc) is continuous,
convex, decreasing on [0, c − vθ), strictly increasing on (c − vθ, c], and minξc∈[0,c] h6(ξc) =
h6(c− vθ).
(d) Define h7(ξc) = B
M
ξc
(ξc+(b−L1+L3)+)−ξc for ξc ∈ [0, c]. Then h7(ξc) is continuous,
concave, strictly increasing on [0, vθ), decreasing on (vθ, c], and maxξc∈[0,c] h7(ξc) = h7(vθ).
(e) Given ξc ∈ [0, c], it holds that Bmξc (ξb) < BMξc (ξb) for ξb ∈ [ξc, ξc+b−c]. Furthermore,
it holds that h6(ξc) < h7(ξc) for ξc ∈ [0, c].
Furthermore, we need to define the following sets. Let Ξc,a,b be the set of all (ξc, ξa, ξb) ∈
[0, c]× [0, a]× [0, b] such that
ξc + (a ∧ b+ L3 − L1)+ ≤ ξa ∧ ξb ≤ ξa ∨ ξb, (4.24)
ξc + L3 ≤ PIMξc,ξa,ξb , (4.25)
L1 − a+ ξa ≥ PImξc,ξa,ξb . (4.26)
Let Ξc be the set of all ξc ∈ [0, c] such that
L3 + ξc ≤ (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫ ∞
c
)
SX(x)dx, (4.27)
L1 − c+ ξc ≥ (1 + θ)
∫ a
c−ξc
SX(x)dx. (4.28)
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For each ξc ∈ Ξc, if a < b, then let Ξa,ξc be the set of all ξa ∈ [ξc+a+L3−L1, ξc+a−c]
such that
ξc + L3 ≤ (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫ c+ξa−ξc
c
+
∫ ∞
a
)
SX(x)dx, (4.29)
a− L1 ≤ ξa − (1 + θ)
(∫ c
c−ξc
+
∫ a
a−ξa+ξc
)
SX(x)dx, (4.30)
and if b < a, let Ξb,ξc be the set of all ξb ∈ [ξc + (b+ L3 − L1)+, ξc + b− c] such that
ξc + L3 ≤ (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫ c+ξb−ξc
c
+
∫ ∞
b
)
SX(x)dx, (4.31)
b− L1 ≤ ξb − (1 + θ)
(∫ c
c−ξc
+
∫ a
b−ξb+ξc
)
SX(x)dx. (4.32)
If a < b, for each (ξc, ξa) ∈ Ξc × Ξa,ξc , let Ξb,ξc,ξa be the set of all ξb ∈ [ξa, ξa + b − a]
such that (ξc, ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξc,a,b. If a > b, for each (ξc, ξb) ∈ Ξc × Ξb,ξc , let Ξa,ξc,ξb be the set of
all ξa ∈ [ξb, ξb + a− b] such that (ξc, ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξc,a,b.
Proposition 4.3.4 All the sets Ξc, Ξa,ξc, Ξb,ξc, Ξb,ξc,ξa, and Ξa,ξc,ξb, are closed intervals
and can be expressed as follows.
(a) The set Ξc = [ξ
m
c , ξ
M
c ] for some 0 ≤ ξmc ≤ ξMc ≤ c.
(b) When a < b, given ξc ∈ Ξc, the set Ξa,ξc = [ξma (ξc), ξMa (ξc)] for some ξc + a + L3 −
L1 ≤ ξma (ξc) ≤ ξMa (ξc) ≤ ξc + a − c, and given (ξc, ξa) ∈ Ξc × Ξa,ξc, the set Ξb,ξc,ξa =
[ξmb (ξc, ξa), ξ
M
b (ξc, ξa)] for some ξa ≤ ξmb (ξc, ξa) ≤ ξMb (ξc, ξa) ≤ ξa + b− a.
(c) When a > b, given ξc ∈ Ξc, the set Ξb,ξc = [ξmb (ξc), ξMb (ξc)] for some ξc + (b+ L3 −
L1)
+ ≤ ξmb (ξc) ≤ ξMb (ξc) ≤ ξc + b − c, and given (ξc, ξb) ∈ Ξc × Ξb,ξc, the set Ξa,ξc,ξb =
[ξma (ξc, ξb), ξ
M
a (ξc, ξb)] for some ξb ≤ ξma (ξc, ξb) ≤ ξMa (ξc, ξb) ≤ ξb + a− b.
Lemma 4.3.5 The following three statements are equivalent:
(i) Inequalities (4.6) and (4.7) hold.
(ii) I2 6= ∅.
(iii) Ξc,a,b 6= ∅.
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Lemma 4.3.6 Problem (4.23) has the same minimal value as the minimization problem
min
(ξc,ξa,ξb)∈Ξc,a,b
w(ξc, ξa, ξb) (4.33)
in the sense that minI∈I2 V (I) = min(ξc,ξa,ξb)∈Ξc,a,b w(ξc, ξa, ξb), where w(ξc, ξa, ξb) = λa +
(2λ− 1)Pξc,ξa,ξb − λξa + (1− λ)ξb and
Pξc,ξa,ξb =
{
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξc,ξa,ξb , if 0 ≤ λ <
1
2
,
(ξc + L3) ∨ PImξc,ξa,ξb , if
1
2
< λ ≤ 1. (4.34)
To solve the three-dimensional problem (4.33), we consider the following three-step
minimization problem:{
minξc∈Ξc
{
minξa∈Ξa,ξc
[
minξb∈Ξb,ξc,ξa w(ξc, ξa, ξb)
]}
, if a < b,
minξc∈Ξc
{
minξb∈Ξb,ξc
[
minξa∈Ξa,ξc,ξb w(ξc, ξa, ξb)
]}
, if a > b.
(4.35)
In doing so, we define the minimizers of Problem (4.35) and the corresponding functions
as follows.
For a < b, define minξb∈Ξb,ξc,ξa w(ξc, ξa, ξb) = w(ξc, ξa, ξ
∗
b (ξc, ξa)) = w2(ξc, ξa) and
minξa∈Ξa,ξc w2(ξc, ξa) = w2(ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc)) = w1(ξc), where
ξ∗b (ξc, ξa) = arg min
ξb∈Ξb,ξc,ξa
w(ξc, ξa, ξb) and ξ
∗
a(ξc) = arg min
ξa∈Ξa,ξc
w2(ξc, ξa).
For a > b, denote minξa∈Ξa,ξc,ξb w(ξc, ξa, ξb) = w(ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc, ξb), ξb) = w2(ξc, ξb) and
minξb∈Ξb,ξc w2(ξc, ξb) = w2(ξc, ξ
∗
b (ξc)) = w1(ξc), where
ξ∗a(ξc, ξb) = arg min
ξa∈Ξa,ξc,ξb
w(ξc, ξa, ξb) and ξ
∗
b (ξc) = arg min
ξb∈Ξb,ξc
w2(ξc, ξb).
Moreover, denote minξc∈Ξc w1(ξc) = w1(ξ
∗
c ), where ξ
∗
c = arg minξc∈Ξc w1(ξc). In addition,
for a < b, denote ξ∗a = ξ
∗
a(ξ
∗
c ) and ξ
∗
b = ξ
∗
b (ξ
∗
c , ξ
∗
a). For a > b, denote ξ
∗
b = ξ
∗
b (ξ
∗
c ) and
ξ∗a = ξ
∗
a(ξ
∗
c , ξ
∗
b ).
Lemma 4.3.7 The three-step minimization problem (4.35) is well-defined in the sense that
the minimizer for each step exists. In particular, the minimizers of Problem (4.35) can be
expressed as follows.
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(a) If a < b and 0 ≤ λ < 1
2
, then
ξ∗c = ξ
m
c ∨
(
vθ ∧ ξMc
)
, ξ∗a = sup
{
ξa ∈ Ξa,ξ∗c : Aξ∗c (ξa) < ξ∗c + L3
}
, and ξ∗b = ξ
m
b (ξ
∗
c , ξ
∗
a).
(b) If a < b and 1
2
< λ ≤ 1, then
ξ∗c = ξL3,h2 ∨ ξL3,h3 , ξ∗a = ξ∗c + a− c, and ξ∗b = ξmb (ξ∗c , ξ∗a)
where
ξL3,h2 = sup {ξc ∈ [0, c− vθ] : h2(ξc) ≥ L3} ,
ξL3,h3 = sup {ξc ∈ [0, vθ] : h3(ξc) ≤ L3} .
(c) If a > b and 0 ≤ λ < 1
2
, then
ξ∗c = ξ
m
c ∨
(
vθ ∧ ξMc
)
, ξ∗b = ξ
m
b (ξ
∗
c ), and ξ
∗
a = ξ
∗
b + a− b.
(d) If a > b and 1
2
< λ ≤ 1, then
ξ∗c = ξ
m
c ∨
[
(c− vθ) ∧ ξMc
]
, ξ∗b = ξ
∗
c + b− c, and ξ∗a = ξ∗c + a− c.
Theorem 4.3.8 A contract I∗ of the form
I∗(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − ξ∗c )+ + (x− d2)+ − (x− (d2 + ξ∗a ∧ ξ∗b − ξ∗c ))+ (4.36)
+ (x− d3)+ − (x− (d3 + |ξ∗b − ξ∗a|))+ + (x− d4)+
for some (d1, d2, d3, d4) ∈ [0, c−ξ∗c ]×[c, a∧b−ξ∗a∧ξ∗b +ξ∗c ]×[a∧b, a∨b−|ξ∗a−ξ∗b |]×[a∨b, ∞],
satisfying PI∗ = Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b , is an optimal solution to Problem (4.23).
Remark 4.3.1 Figure 4.2 illustrates the optimal form (4.36) in the case of a < b.
By the proof of Theorem 4.3.8, we know that the optimal contract I∗ in Theorem 4.3.8
satisfies I∗(a) − I∗(b) = (a − b)+, and hence the optimal solution I∗ in Theorem 4.3.8 is
also the solution to Problem (4.23) when λ = 1/2. 
Next, we will derive the explicit expressions of the parameters in the optimal solution
I∗ given in Theorem 4.3.8 in the following four corollaries.
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Figure 4.2: Optimal form of the contract when a < b
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Corollary 4.3.9 Suppose a < b and 0 ≤ λ < 1/2 and let I∗ be the optimal solution to
Problem (4.23).
(a) In the case h2(vθ) ≤ L1 − c:
(i) If L3 ≤ h4(vθ), then
I∗(x) = (x− c+ vθ)+ − (x− c)+ + (x− a+ ξa,0 − vθ)+ − (x− a)+,
where ξa,0 is the solution to the equation of PI∗ = ξa,0 + L1 − a.
(ii) If h4(vθ) < L3 ≤ h5(vθ), then
I∗(x) = (x−d∗1)+−(x−d∗1−vθ)++(x−d∗2)+−(x−d∗2−(a−L1+L3))++(x−d∗3)+,
where (d∗1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3) ∈ [0, c−vθ]×[c, L1−L3]×[b, ∞] is the solution to the equation
of PI∗ = vθ + L3.
(iii) If h5(vθ) < L3, then
I∗(x) = x− (x− vθ)+ + (x− c)+ − (x− c− ξa,1 + vθ)+ + (x− b)+,
where ξa,1 is the solution to the equation of PI∗ = vθ + L3.
(b) In the case h2(vθ) > L1 − c, then we have
I∗(x) = (x− c+ ξL1−c, h2)+ − (x− a)+,
where ξL1−c, h2 = inf {ξc ∈ [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)] : h2(ξc) = L1 − c}.
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Corollary 4.3.10 Suppose a < b and 1/2 < λ ≤ 1 and let I∗ be the optimal solution to
Problem (4.23).
(a) If L3 ≤ h2(0), then
I∗(x) = (x− c+ ξL3, h2)+ − (x− a)+,
where ξL3, h2 = sup {ξc ∈ [0, c− vθ] : h2(ξc) ≥ L3} .
(b) If h2(0) < L3 < h3(0), then
I∗(x) = (x− c)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d∗)+,
where d∗ ∈ [b,∞] satisifes PI∗ = L3.
(c) If h3(0) ≤ L3, then
I∗(x) = x− (x− ξL3, h3)+ + (x− c)+ − (x− (c+ ξ∗b − ξL3, h3))+ + (x− b)+,
where ξL3, h3 = sup {ξc ∈ [0, vθ] : h3(ξc) ≤ L3} and ξ∗b ∈ [ξL3, h3 +a−c, ξL3, h3 +b−c] satisfies
PI∗ = ξL3, h3 + L3.
Corollary 4.3.11 Suppose a > b and 0 ≤ λ < 1/2 and let I∗ be an optimal solution to
Problem (4.23).
(a) In the case h2(vθ) ≤ L1 − c:
(i) If (b+ L3 − L1)+ + L1 − b < h6(vθ), then
I∗(x) = (x− c+ vθ)+ − (x− c)+ + (x− (b− ξb,0 + vθ))+ − (x− a)+,
where ξb,0 ∈ [vθ + (b + L3 − L1)+, vθ + b − c] is the solution to the equation of
PI∗ = ξb,0 − b+ L1.
(ii) If h6(vθ) ≤ (b+ L3 − L1)+ + L1 − b < h7(vθ), then
I∗(x) = (x− d∗1)+ − (x− d∗1 − vθ)+ + (x− c)+
− (x− c− (b+ L3 − L1)+)+ + (x− b)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d∗2)+,
where (d∗1, d
∗
2) ∈ [0, c − vθ] × [a,∞] is the solution to the equation of PI∗ =
vθ + L3 ∨ (L1 − b).
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(iii) If L3 < h7(vθ) ≤ (b+ L3 − L1)+ + L1 − b, then
I∗(x) = x− (x− vθ)+ + (x− c)+ − (x− c− (b+ L3 − L1)+)+ + (x− b)+.
(iv) If h7(vθ) ≤ L3, then
I∗(x) = x− (x− vθ)+ + (x− c)+ − (x− (c+ ξb,1 − vθ))+ + (x− b)+,
where ξb,1 ∈ [vθ + (b + L3 − L1)+, vθ + b − c] is the solution to the equation of
PI∗ = vθ + L3.
(b) In the case h2(vθ) > L1 − c, then we have I∗(x) = (x − c + ξL1−c, h2)+ − (x − a)+,
where ξL1−c, h2 = inf {ξc ∈ [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)] : h2(ξc) = L1 − c}.
Corollary 4.3.12 Suppose a > b and 1/2 < λ ≤ 1 and let I∗ be the optimal solution to
Problem (4.23).
(a) If h1(c− vθ) < L3, then
I∗(x) = x− (x− ξL3, h1)+ + (x− c)+,
where ξL3, h1 = sup {ξc ∈ [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)] : h1(ξc) = L3}.
(b) If L3 ≤ h1(c− vθ), then
I∗(x) = (x− d∗1)+ − (x− d∗1 − c+ vθ)+ + (x− c)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d∗2)+,
where (d∗1, d
∗
2) ∈ [0, vθ]×[a,∞] is the solution to the equation of PI∗ = c−vθ+L3∨h2(c−vθ).
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4.4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1. We only prove (a) and (d). Other results of Proposition
4.2.1 can be proved similarly and are omitted.
(a) It is easy to see that g1(ξa) is continuous in ξa ∈ [0, a]. Since α < 1/(1 + θ), we
have that g′1(ξa) = 1− (1 + θ)SX(a− ξa) is non-negative for ξa ∈ [0, a− vθ) and is negative
for ξa ∈ (a− vθ, a]. Hence, the desired results hold.
(d) Suppose a < b, note that g2(ξa) = ξa − PIMξa,ξa < ξa − PImξa,ξa = g1(ξa) for any
ξa ∈ [0, a]. For each (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, ξa ≤ ξb by (4.13) and it is obvious that PIMξa,ξb and PImξa,ξb
are continuous and strictly increasing in ξb ∈ [0, b]. For any (ξa, ξ1) and (ξa, ξ2) ∈ Ξa,b with
ξ1 < ξ2, we have 0 ≤ PIMξa,ξ2 − PIMξa,ξ1 = (1 + θ)
∫ a+ξ2−ξa
a+ξ1−ξa SX(x)dx ≤ (1 + θ)(ξ2 − ξ1)SX(a) ≤
(1 + θ)α (ξ2 − ξ1) < ξ2 − ξ1, where the third inequality follows from SX(x) ≤ α for any
x ≥ VaRα(X) = a. Therefore, ξb−PIMξa,ξb is continuous and strictly increasing in ξb ∈ [0, b].
Proof of Lemma 4.2.2. We assume a < b. The proof for the case of a > b is similar to
the case of a < b and is omitted.
(i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose (4.6) holds, namely g1(a − vθ) ≥ a − L1. Since g1(0) = 0 ≤
a − L1 and g1 is continuous and increasing on [0, a − vθ], there exists ξa ∈ [0, a − vθ]
such that g1(ξa) = a − L1, and moreover, g1(ξa) = a − L1 ≤ L2. Consider the contract
I(x) = (x − a + ξa)+ − (x − a)+ ∈ I, it is easy to check that I(a) = I(b) = ξa and
PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] = ξa − g1(ξa) = ξa − a + L1. This contract I is acceptable, namely
I ∈ I1, because the contract I satisfies a − I(a) + PI = a − ξa + ξa − a + L1 = L1, and
I(b)− PI = ξa − (ξa − a+ L1) = a− L1 ≤ L2. Thus, I1 6= ∅.
Meanwhile, by Proposition 4.2.1(b) and (d), we know that g1(ξa) = a−L1 ≤ L2 implies
that g2(vθ) ≤ g2(ξa) < g1(ξa) ≤ L2, namely (4.19) holds. Thus, (4.6) implies (4.19).
(ii) ⇒ (iii). Suppose I1 6= ∅. For any I ∈ I1, denote ξa = I(a) and ξb = I(b). We are
going to check that (ξa, ξb) satisfies (4.13), (4.14), and (4.15). Since I ∈ I1, we have
ξb − L2 ≤ PI ≤ ξa + L1 − a. (4.37)
Furthermore, the 1-Lipschitz property of I implies ξa ≤ ξb ≤ ξa + b − a. Hence, (4.13)
holds. Moreover, it is easy to see that Imξa,ξb(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ IMξa,ξb(x) for all x ≥ 0, and thus
PImξa,ξb
≤ PI ≤ PIMξa,ξb . (4.38)
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From (4.37) and (4.38), we have ξb − L2 ≤ PIMξa,ξb and PImξa,ξb ≤ ξa + L1 − a, namely (4.14)
and (4.15) hold. Therefore, (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b and thus Ξa,b 6= ∅.
(iii) ⇒ (i). Suppose Ξa,b 6= ∅. For any (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, we have
a− L1 ≤ ξa − (1 + θ)
(∫ a
a−ξa
+
∫ b
b−ξb+ξa
)
SX(x)dx ≤ ξa − (1 + θ)
∫ a
a−ξa
SX(x)dx = g1(ξa)
≤ a− vθ − (1 + θ)
∫ a
vθ
SX(x)dx = g1(a− vθ),
where the first inequality is from (4.15) and the last one is due to the fact that g1 is
increasing on [0, a− vθ]. Thus, (4.6) holds.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.3. We assume a < b. The proof for the case of a > b is similar to
the case of a < b and is omitted.
For each (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, by (4.13), we have ξb−L2 ≤ ξa+b∧(L1+L2)−L2−a ≤ ξa+L1−a,
which, together with (4.14), implies ξb−L2 ≤ (L1 − a+ ξa)∧PIMξa,ξb . Hence, by (4.15) and
PImξa,ξb
≤ PIMξa,ξb , we have (ξb − L2) ∨ PImξa,ξb ≤ (L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξa,ξb . Therefore, by the
definition of Pξa,ξb given in (4.21), we have
(ξb − L2) ∨ PImξa,ξb ≤ Pξa,ξb ≤ (L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξa,ξb . (4.39)
It is easy to check that any contract with the form of
I(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − ξa)+ + (x− d2)+ − (x− d2 − ξb + ξa)+ + (x− d3)+, (4.40)
for some (d1, d2, d3) ∈ [0, a − ξa] × [a, b − ξb + ξa] × [b, ∞], satisfies I ∈ I, I(a) = ξa,
I(b) = ξb, and I
m
ξa,ξb
(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ IMξa,ξb(x) for all x ≥ 0. Thus, PImξa,ξb ≤ PI ≤ PIMξa,ξb . In
particular, when d1 = a − ξa, d2 = b − ξb + ξa, and d3 = ∞, the form (4.40) is reduced
to Imξa,ξb . When d1 = 0 , d2 = a, and d3 = b, the form (4.40) is reduced to I
M
ξa,ξb
. For the
contract I of the form (4.40), its premium
PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] = (1 + θ)
(∫ d1+ξa
d1
+
∫ d2+ξb−ξa
d2
+
∫ ∞
d3
)
SX(x)dx
can be viewed as a function of (d1, d2, d3). Obviously, the premium PI = PI(d1, d2, d3) is a
real-valued continuous function on [0, a− ξa]× [a, b− ξb + ξa]× [b,∞]. Since [0, a− ξa]×
[a, b− ξb + ξa]× [b,∞] is a connected set, the image of PI(d1, d2, d3) is also a connected set.
Thus,
{PI = (1 + θ)E[I(X)] : I has the expression (4.40)} =
[
PImξa,ξb
, PIMξa,ξb
]
.
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For each (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, note that Pξa,ξb ∈
[
PImξa,ξb
, PIMξa,ξb
]
, thus there exists I ∈ I with the
expression (4.40) such that PI = Pξa,ξb , and moreover, such I ∈ I1 due to (4.39).
The existence of the minimizer (ξ∗a, ξ
∗
b ) of Problem (4.20) will be demonstrated in the
proof of Theorems 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. Since (ξ∗a, ξ
∗
b ) ∈ Ξa,b, by the above arguments, there
exists I∗ ∈ I1 of the form (4.22) such that I∗(a) = ξ∗a, I∗(b) = ξ∗b , and PI∗ = Pξ∗a,ξ∗b .
It can be easily checked that V (I∗) = v(ξ∗a, ξ
∗
b ). Meanwhile, for any I ∈ I1, we have
(I(a), I(b)) ∈ Ξa,b by the proof of Lemma 4.2.2 for (ii) ⇒ (iii). From (4.21), we have
PI ≤ PI(a), I(b) when 0 ≤ λ < 1/2, and PI ≥ PI(a), I(b) when 1/2 < λ ≤ 1. Therefore,
(2λ− 1)PI ≥ (2λ− 1)PI(a), I(b) and
V (I) = λa+ (2λ− 1)PI − λI(a) + (1− λ)I(b) ≥ v(I(a), I(b)) ≥ min
(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξb),
(4.41)
which implies that minI∈I1 V (I) ≥ min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb) = v(ξ∗a, ξ∗b ) = V (I∗) ≥ minI∈I1 V (I).
Hence, minI∈I1 V (I) = V (I
∗) and I∗ is the optimal solution to Problem (4.12). Therefore,
a contract I∗ of the form (4.22) for some (d1, d2, d3) ∈ [0, a− ξ∗a]× [a, b− ξ∗b + ξ∗a]× [b, ∞],
satisfying I∗(a) = ξ∗a, I
∗(b) = ξ∗b , PI∗ = Pξ∗a, ξ∗b , is the optimal solution to Problem (4.12).
Proof of Theorem 4.2.4. Assume a < b. For each (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, we have ξa ≤ ξb by
(4.13), ξb − PIMξa,ξb ≤ L2 by (4.14), and PImξa,ξb ≤ L1 − a + ξa by (4.15). Since ξb − PIMξa,ξb
and PImξa,ξb
are strictly increasing in ξb ∈ [ξa, ξa + b − a] by Proposition 4.2.1(d), we have
ξa − PIMξa,ξa ≤ ξb − PIMξa,ξb ≤ L2 and PImξa,ξa ≤ PImξa,ξb ≤ L1 − a + ξa. Thus, (ξa, ξa) ∈ Ξa,b.
From (4.14) and (4.15), we know that (ξa, ξa) ∈ Ξa,b is equivalent to
g2(ξa) ≤ L2 and a− L1 ≤ g1(ξa). (4.42)
(a) Consider the case 0 ≤ λ < 1
2
. By Lemma 4.2.3, minI∈I1 V (I) = min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb),
where v(ξa, ξb) = λa+ (2λ− 1)Pξa,ξb − λξa + (1− λ)ξb and Pξa,ξb = (L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξa,ξb .
For each (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, since ξa ≤ ξb and ξa − PIMξa,ξa ≤ ξb − PIMξa,ξb , together with
the definition of Pξa,ξb given by (4.21) and the facts that −(x ∧ y) = (−x) ∨ (−y) and
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kz + k(x ∨ y) = k[(z + x) ∨ (z + y)] for k > 0, we have
v(ξa, ξb) = λa− λξa + (1− λ)ξb − (1− 2λ)
[
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξa,ξb
]
= λa− λξa + λξb + (1− 2λ)
[
(ξb − L1 + a− ξa) ∨
(
ξb − PIMξa,ξb
)]
≥ λa+ (1− 2λ)
[
(a− L1) ∨
(
ξa − PIMξa,ξa
)]
= (1− λ)a− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ) [g2(ξa)− (a− L1)]+ = v(ξa, ξa).
Hence, min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb) ≥ min(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξa), and since (ξa, ξa) ∈ Ξa,b, we have
min
(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξb) = min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξa)
= (1− λ)a− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ) min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
[g2(ξa)− (a− L1)]+
= (1− λ)a− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ)
[
min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξa)− (a− L1)
]+
.
Note that PIMξa,ξa
= ξa − g2(ξa) and then
Pξa,ξa = (ξa − a+ L1) ∧ PIMξa,ξa = ξa − (a− L1) ∨ g2(ξa), (4.43)
(i) If g1(vθ) ≥ a− L1, note that g2(vθ) ≤ L2 by (4.19), thus ξa = vθ satisfies condition
(4.42), namely (vθ, vθ) ∈ Ξa,b. In this case,
min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξa) ≥ min
ξa∈[0,a]
g2(ξa) = g2(vθ) ≥ min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξa),
where the equality holds due to Proposition 4.2.1(b). Therefore, min(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b g2(ξa) =
g2(vθ) and (ξ
∗
a, ξ
∗
b ) = (vθ, vθ). It implies that Pξ∗a,ξ∗b = Pvθ,vθ = vθ − (a − L1) ∨ g2(vθ) from
(4.43), and
min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξa) = v(vθ, vθ) = (1− λ)a− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ) [g2(vθ)− (a− L1)]+ .
By Lemma 4.2.3, a contract I∗ of the form (4.22) satisfying I∗(a) = vθ, I∗(b) = vθ,
and PI∗ = Pvθ,vθ , is the optimal solution to Problem (4.12). Note that ξ
∗
a = ξ
∗
b . Thus,
I∗(x) = (x − d1)+ − (x − d1 − vθ)+ + (x − d3)+ for some d1 ∈ [0, a − vθ] and d3 ∈ [b,∞]
such that PI∗ = vθ − (a− L1) ∨ g2(vθ) is the optimal solution to Problem (4.12).
(ii) If g1(vθ) < a − L1, note that g1(a − vθ) ≥ a − L1 from (4.6), thus there exists
ξ1 ∈ [vθ ∧ (a − vθ), vθ ∨ (a − vθ)] such that g1(ξ1) = a − L1 due to the continuity and
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monotonicity of g1 on this interval. From Proposition 4.2.1(d), we know g2(ξ) < g1(ξ) for
any ξ ∈ [0, a]. In particular, g2(ξ1) < g1(ξ1) = a− L1 ≤ L2 and thus ξ1 satisfies condition
(4.42), namely (ξ1, ξ1) ∈ Ξa,b. For any (ξa, ξa) ∈ Ξa,b, we have [g2(ξ1)− (a− L1)]+ = 0 ≤
[g2(ξa)− (a− L1)]+. Then,[
min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξa)− (a− L1)
]+
= 0 = [g2(ξ1)− (a− L1)]+ ,
and ξ∗a = ξ1. In this case, we have Pξ∗a,ξ∗b = Pξ1,ξ1 = ξ1− (a−L1)∨ g2(ξ1) = ξ1− a+L1 and
min(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξa) = v(ξ1, ξ1) = (1− λ)a− (1− 2λ)L1. Therefore, the optimal contract
of the form (4.22) is reduced to I∗(x) = (x−a+ξ1)+−(x−a)+ with d1 = a−ξa and d3 =∞
because the contract I∗ satisfies I∗(a) = I∗(b) = ξ1 and PI∗ = ξ1 − g1(ξ1) = ξ1 − a+ L1 =
Pξ1,ξ1 .
(b) For the case 1
2
< λ ≤ 1. By Lemma 4.2.3, we have minI∈I1 V (I) = min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb),
where v(ξa, ξb) = λa+ (2λ− 1)Pξa,ξb − λξa + (1− λ)ξb and Pξa,ξb = (ξb − L2) ∨ PImξa,ξb . For
each (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, since ξa ≤ ξb and PImξa,ξa ≤ PImξa,ξb , we have
v(ξa, ξb) = λa− λξa + (1− λ)ξb + (2λ− 1)
[
(ξb − L2) ∨ PImξa,ξb
]
≥ λa− λξa + (1− λ)ξa + (2λ− 1)
[
(ξa − L2) ∨ PImξa,ξa
]
= v(ξa, ξa) = λa+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1)
[
(ξa − L2) ∨ PImξa,ξa − (ξa − L2)
]
= λa+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1)
[
PImξa,ξa − (ξa − L2)
]+
= λa+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1) [L2 − g1(ξa)]+ .
Hence, min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb) ≥ min(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξa), and since (ξa, ξa) ∈ Ξa,b, we have
min
(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξb) = min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξa) = λa+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1) min
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
[L2 − g1(ξa)]+
= λa+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1)
[
L2 − max
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
g1(ξa)
]+
.
Note that PImξa,ξa = ξa − g1(ξa) and then
Pξa,ξa = (ξa − L2) ∨ PImξa,ξa = ξa − L2 ∧ g1(ξa), (4.44)
(i) If g2(a− vθ) ≤ L2, note that a− L1 ≤ g1(a− vθ) by (4.6), thus ξa = a− vθ satisfies
condition (4.42), namely (a− vθ, a− vθ) ∈ Ξa,b ⊂ [0, a]× [0, b]. In this case,
max
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
g1(ξa) ≤ max
ξa∈[0,a]
g1(ξa) = g1(a− vθ) ≤ max
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
g1(ξa),
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where the equality holds due to Proposition 4.2.1(a). Therefore, max(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b g1(ξa) =
g1(a − vθ) and (ξ∗a, ξ∗b ) = (a − vθ, a − vθ). It implies that Pξ∗a,ξ∗b = Pa−vθ,a−vθ = a − vθ −
L2 ∧ g1(a− vθ) due to (4.44), and min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξa) = v(a− vθ, a− vθ) = λa− (2λ−
1) [g1(a− vθ) ∧ L2] .
By Lemma 4.2.3, a contract I∗ of the form (4.22) satisfying I∗(a) = a−vθ, I∗(b) = a−vθ,
and PI∗ = Pa−vθ,a−vθ , is the optimal solution to Problem (4.12). Note that ξ
∗
a = ξ
∗
b = a−vθ.
Thus, I∗(x) = (x− d1)+− (x− d1− a+ vθ)+ + (x− d3)+ for any d1 ∈ [0, vθ] and d3 ∈ [b,∞]
such that PI∗ = a− vθ − L2 ∧ g1(a− vθ) is the optimal solution to Problem (4.12).
(ii) If g2(a − vθ) > L2, note that L2 ≥ g2(vθ) by (4.19), thus there exists ξ2 ∈ [vθ ∧
(a− vθ), vθ ∨ (a− vθ)] such that L2 = g2(ξ2) due to the continuity and monotonicity of g2
as showed in Proposition 4.2.1(b). Moreover, (ξ2, ξ2) ∈ Ξa,b from the observation a−L1 ≤
L2 = g2(ξ2) < g1(ξ2). For any (ξa, ξa) ∈ Ξa,b, we have [L2 − g1(ξ2)]+ = 0 ≤ [L2 − g1(ξa)]+.
Thus, [
L2 − max
(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξa)
]+
= 0 = [L2 − g1(ξa)]+ ,
and ξ∗a = ξ2. In this case, we have Pξ∗a,ξ∗a = Pξ2,ξ2 = ξ2−L2∧ g1(ξ2) = ξ2−L2 due to (4.44),
and min(ξa,ξa)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξa) = v(ξ2, ξ2) = λa + (1 − 2λ)L2. Therefore, the optimal contract
of the form (4.22) is reduced to I∗(x) = x − (x − ξ2)+ + (x − b)+ with d1 = 0 and d3 = b
because the contract I∗ satisfies I∗(a) = I∗(b) = ξ2 and PI∗ = ξ2 − g2(ξ2) = ξ2 − L2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.5. Assume b < a. For each (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, we have ξb ≤ ξa ≤
ξb+a−b by (4.16), ξb−L2 ≤ PIMξa,ξb by (4.17), and a−L1 ≤ ξa−PImξa,ξb by (4.18). Since PIMξa,ξb
and ξa−PImξa,ξb are continuous and strictly increasing in ξa ∈ [0, a] by Proposition 4.2.1(e),
we have ξb − L2 ≤ PIMξa,ξb ≤ PIMξb+a−b,ξb and a − L1 ≤ ξa − PImξa,ξb ≤ ξb + a − b − PImξb+a−b,ξb .
Thus, (ξb + a − b, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b. By (4.17) and (4.18), we know that (ξb + a − b, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b is
equivalent to
g2(ξb) ≤ L2 and g3(ξb) ≥ b− L1. (4.45)
(a) Consider the case 0 ≤ λ < 1
2
. By Lemma 4.2.3, minI∈I1 V (I) = min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb),
where v(ξa, ξb) = λa+ (2λ− 1)Pξa,ξb − λξa + (1− λ)ξb and Pξa,ξb = (L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξa,ξb .
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For (ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, since ξa ≤ ξb + a− b and PIMξa,ξb ≤ PIMξb+a−b,ξb , we have
v(ξa, ξb) = λa− λξa + (1− λ)ξb − (1− 2λ)
[
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξa,ξb
]
≥ λa− λ(ξb + a− b) + (1− λ)ξb − (1− 2λ)
[
(L1 − b+ ξb) ∧ PIMξb+a−b,ξb
]
= v(ξb + a− b, ξb)
= λb+ (1− 2λ)(b− L1)− (1− 2λ)
[
(L1 − b+ ξb) ∧ PIMξb+a−b,ξb − (L1 − b+ ξb)
]
= (1− λ)b− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ)
[
L1 − b+ ξb − PIMξb+a−b,ξb
]+
= (1− λ)b− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ) [g2(ξb)− (b− L1)]+ .
Hence, min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb) = min(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξb+a−b, ξb), and since (ξb+a−b, ξb) ∈
Ξa,b, we have
min
(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξb) = min
(ξb+a−b,ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξb + a− b, ξb)
= (1− λ)b− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ) min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
[g2(ξb)− (b− L1)]+
= (1− λ)b− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ)
[
min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξb)− (b− L1)
]+
.
Note that PIMξb+a−b,ξb
= ξb − g2(ξb) and then
Pξb+a−b,ξb = (ξb + a− b− a+ L1) ∧ PIMξb+a−b,ξb = ξb − (b− L1) ∨ g2(ξb), (4.46)
(i) If g3(vθ) ≥ b− L1, note that g2(vθ) ≤ L2 by (4.19), thus ξb = vθ satisfies condition
(4.45), namely (vθ + a− b, vθ) ∈ Ξa,b. In this case,
min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξb) ≥ min
ξb∈[0,b]
g2(ξb) = g2(vθ) ≥ min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξb),
where the equality holds due to Proposition 4.2.1(b). Therefore, min(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b g2(ξb) =
g2(vθ) and (ξ
∗
a, ξ
∗
b ) = (vθ+a−b, vθ). It implies that Pξ∗a,ξ∗b = Pvθ+a−b,vθ = vθ−(b−L1)∨g2(vθ)
due to (4.46), and
min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξb + a− b, ξb) = v(vθ + a− b, vθ)
= (1− λ)b− (1− 2λ)L1 + (1− 2λ) [g2(vθ)− (b− L1)]+ .
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By Lemma 4.2.3, a contract I∗ of the form (4.22) satisfying I∗(a) = vθ + a− b, I∗(b) = vθ
and PI∗ = Pvθ+a−b,vθ , is the optimal solution to Problem (4.12). In this case, note that
ξ∗a = vθ + a− b and ξ∗b = vθ. It implies that the range for d2 given in (4.22) is reduced to a
single point set, that is d2 ∈ [b, a−I∗(a)+I∗(b)] = {b} and then, d2 = b. Hence, the optimal
solution to Problem (4.12) is reduced to I∗(x) = (x−d1)− (x−d1− vθ)+ + (x− b)+− (x−
a)++(x−d3)+ for some d1 ∈ [0, b−vθ] and d3 ∈ [a,∞] such that PI∗ = vθ−(b−L1)∨g2(vθ).
(ii) If g3(vθ) < b − L1, note that g3(b − vθ) ≥ b − L1 by (4.6) and g3 is continuous on
[0, b], thus there exists ξ3 ∈ [vθ ∧ (b − vθ), vθ ∨ (b − vθ)] such that g3(ξ3) = b − L1. From
Proposition 4.2.1(e), we known that g2(ξ) < g3(ξ) for all ξ ∈ [0, b]. In particular, g2(ξ3) <
g3(ξ3) = b− L1 ≤ L2 and then ξ3 satisfies condition (4.45), namely (ξ3 + a− b, ξ3) ∈ Ξa,b.
For any (ξb + a − c, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, we have [g2(ξ3)− (b− L1)]+ = 0 ≤ [g2(ξb)− (b− L1)]+.
Then, [
min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
g2(ξb)− (b− L1)
]+
= 0 = [g2(ξ3)− (b− L1)]+ ,
and ξ∗b = ξ3. In this case, we have Pξ∗a,ξ∗b = Pξ3+a−b,ξ3 = ξ3 − (b−L1)∨ g2(ξ3) = ξ3 − b+L1
due to (4.46) and
min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξb + a− b, ξb) = v(ξ3 + a− b, ξ3) = (1− λ)b− (1− 2λ)L1.
The optimal contract of the form (4.22) is reduced to I∗(x) = (x − b + ξ3)+ − (x − a)+
with d1 = b− ξ3, d2 = b, and d3 =∞ because the contract I∗ satisfies I∗(a) = ξ3 + a− b,
I∗(b) = ξ3 and PI∗ = ξ3 − g3(ξ3) = ξ3 − b+ L1.
(b) Consider the case 1
2
< λ ≤ 1. By Lemma 4.2.3, minI∈I1 V (I) = min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb),
where v(ξa, ξb) = λa−λξa+(1−λ)ξb+(2λ−1)Pξa,ξb and Pξa,ξb = (ξb−L2)∨PImξa,ξb . For any
(ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, it is easy to check that ξa ≤ ξb+a−b and PImξa,ξb−ξa ≥ PImξb+a−b,ξb−(ξb+a−b),
thus
v(ξa, ξb) = λa+ (1− λ)(ξb − ξa) + (2λ− 1)
[
(ξb − L2 − ξa) ∨
(
PImξa,ξb
− ξa
)]
≥ λa+ (1− λ)(b− a) + (2λ− 1)
[
(b− a− L2) ∨
(
PImξb+a−b,ξb
− (ξb + a− b)
)]
= v(ξb + a− b, ξb) = λb+ (2λ− 1)
[
(−L2) ∨
(
PImξb+a−b,ξb
− ξb
)]
= λb+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1)
[
PImξb+a−b,ξb
− (ξb − L2)
]+
= λb+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1) [L2 − g3(ξb)]+ .
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Hence, min(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξa, ξb) ≥ min(ξb+a−b,ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξb+a−b, ξb), and since (ξb+a−b, ξb) ∈
Ξa,b, we have
min
(ξa,ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξa, ξb) = min
(ξb+a−b,ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξb + a− b, ξb)
= λb+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1) min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
[L2 − g3(ξb)]+
= λb+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1)
[
L2 − max
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
g3(ξb)
]+
.
Note that PImξb+a−b,ξb
= ξb − g3(ξb) and then
Pξb+a−b,ξb = (ξb − L2) ∨ PImξb+a−b,ξb = ξb − L2 ∧ g3(ξb), (4.47)
(i) If g2(b− vθ) ≤ L2, note that g3(b− vθ) ≥ b− L1 by (4.6), thus ξb = b− vθ satisfies
condition (4.45), namely (a− vθ, b− vθ) ∈ Ξa,b. It implies that
max
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
g3(ξb) ≤ max
ξb∈[0,b]
g3(ξb) = g3(b− vθ) ≤ max
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
g3(ξb).
where the equality holds due to Proposition 4.2.1(c). Therefore, we obtain that
max(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b g3(ξb) = g3(b− vθ) and (ξ∗a, ξ∗b ) = (a− vθ, b− vθ). It implies that Pξ∗a,ξ∗b =
Pa−vθ,b−vθ = b− vθ − g3(b− vθ) ∧ L2 due to (4.47), and
min
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
v(ξb + a− b, ξb) = λb+ (1− 2λ)L2 + (2λ− 1) [L2 − g3(b− vθ)]+ .
By Lemma 4.2.3, a contract I∗ of the form (4.22) satisfying I∗(a) = a− vθ, I∗(b) = b− vθ,
and PI∗ = Pa−vθ,b−vθ , is the optimal solution to Problem (4.12). Note that in this case,
ξ∗a = a − vθ and ξ∗b = b − vθ. Hence, d2 ∈ [b, a − I∗(a) + I∗(b)] = {b} and thus d2 = b.
Therefore, the optimal solution I∗ is reduced to I∗(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − b+ vθ)+ +
(x − b)+ − (x − a)+ + (x − d3)+ for some d1 ∈ [0, vθ] and d3 ∈ [a,∞] such that PI∗ =
b− vθ − L2 ∧ g3(b− vθ).
(ii) If g2(b−vθ) > L2, note that g2(vθ) ≤ L2 due to (4.19), thus there exists ξ4 ∈ [vθ∧(b−
vθ), vθ∨ (b−vθ)] such that g2(ξ4) = L2 due to the continuity and monotonicity of g2. Since
a−L1 ≤ L2 = g2(ξ4) < g3(ξ4), we have that ξ4 satisfies (4.45), namely (ξ4+a−b, ξ4) ∈ Ξa,b.
For all (ξb + a− b, ξb) ∈ Ξa,b, we have [L2 − g3(ξ4)]+ = 0 ≤ [L2 − g3(ξb)]+. Thus,[
L2 − max
(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b
g3(ξb)
]+
= 0 = [L2 − g3(ξ4)]+ ,
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and ξ∗b = ξ4. In this case, we have Pξ∗a,ξ∗b = Pξ4+a−b,ξ4 = ξ4 − L2 ∧ g3(ξ4) = ξ4 − L2 due to
(4.47), and min(ξb+a−b, ξb)∈Ξa,b v(ξb+a−b, ξb) = v(ξ4 +a−b, ξ4) = λb+(1−2λ)L2. Therefore,
the optimal contract of the form (4.22) is reduced to I∗(x) = x − (x − ξ4)+ + (x − b)+
because the contract f ∗ satisfies I∗(a) = ξ4 + a − b, I∗(b) = ξ4, and PI∗ = ξ4 − g2(ξ4) =
ξ4 − L2 = Pξ4+a−b,ξ4 .
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1. (a) Obviously, h1(ξc) = (1+θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫∞
c
)
SX(x)dx−ξc is
continuous and differentiable with h′1(ξc) = (1+θ)SX(ξc)−1. Since h′1(ξc) is decreasing in ξc,
we obtain that h1(ξc) is a concave function of ξc. For any 0 ≤ ξc < vθ, we have SX(ξc) > 11+θ ,
where vθ = VaR 1
1+θ
(X) = inf
{
x ≥ 0 : SX(x) ≤ 11+θ
}
. Thus, h′1(ξc) = (1+θ)SX(ξc)−1 > 0
for any 0 ≤ ξc < vθ, and h1(ξc) is strictly increasing on [0, vθ). For any c ≥ ξc > vθ, we
have SX(ξc) ≤ 11+θ . Thus, h′1(ξc) = (1 + θ)SX(ξc) − 1 ≤ 0 for any c ≥ ξc > vθ, and h1(ξc)
is decreasing on (vθ, c]. Hence, maxξc∈[0,c] h1(ξc) = h1(vθ).
(b) Obviously, h2(ξc) = (1 + θ)
∫ a
c−ξc SX(x)dx− ξc is continuous and differentiable with
h′2(ξc) = (1 + θ)SX(c− ξc)− 1. For ξc < c− vθ, we have c− ξc > vθ and SX(c− ξc) ≤ 11+θ .
For ξc > c − vθ, we have c − ξc < vθ and SX(c − ξc) > 11+θ . Thus, h2(ξc) is decreasing on
[0, c − vθ), strictly increasing on (c − vθ, c] and minξc∈[0,c] h2(ξc) = h2(c − vθ). Since c < a
and SX(x) is continuous and decreasing in x ≥ 0, we have, for ξc ∈ [0, c],
h1(ξc)− h2(ξc) = (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫ a
c
+
∫ ∞
a
)
SX(x)dx− (1 + θ)
(∫ c
c−ξc
+
∫ a
c
)
SX(x)dx
= (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
−
∫ c
c−ξc
+
∫ ∞
a
)
SX(x)dx
= (1 + θ)
∫ ξc
0
[SX(x)− SX(x+ c− ξc)] dx+ (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
a
SX(x)dx > 0,
where SX(x) ≥ SX(x+ c− ξc) and SX(a) = α > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.2. We prove (b) for the function Aξc only. The proofs for all
the other functions and results in (a)-(f) can be obtained using similar arguments and are
omitted.
(b) Clearly, Aξc(ξa) = PIMξc,ξa,ξa
= (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫ c+ξa−ξc
c
+
∫∞
b
)
SX(x)dx is continuous
and strictly increasing in ξa with A
′
ξc
(ξa) = (1 + θ)SX(c + ξa − ξc) > 0. Note that SX(c +
ξa − ξc) ≤ SX(c) = 1 − γ < 11+θ and ddξa [ξa − Aξc(ξa)] = 1 − (1 + θ)SX(c + ξa − ξc) > 0.
Thus, ξa − Aξc(ξa) is continuous and strictly increasing in ξa ∈ [ξc, ξc + b− c].
Proof of Proposition 4.3.3. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of
Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 and is omitted.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.4. (a) Note that Ξc ⊂ [0, c]. If Ξc = [0, c], then ξmc = 0,
ξMc = c and the proof is done. Now, assume Ξc 6= [0, c]. From (4.27) and (4.28), ξc ∈ Ξc
is equivalent to h1(ξc) ≥ L3 and h2(ξc) ≤ L1 − c. From Proposition 4.3.1(a) and (b), we
have that h1 is concave and h2 is convex on [0, c]. Denote ξ
m
c = inf Ξc and ξ
M
c = sup Ξc.
Then 0 ≤ ξmc ≤ ξMc ≤ c because Ξc ⊂ [0, c]. There exists a sequence {xn}∞n=1 ⊂ Ξc
such that xn → ξmc as n → ∞. For each n, we have h1(xn) ≥ L3 and h2(xn) ≤ L1 − c
because xn ∈ Ξc. By continuity of h1 and h2, h1(ξmc ) = limn→∞ h1(xn) ≥ L3 and h2(ξmc ) =
limn→∞ h2(xn) ≤ L1 − c and thus, ξmc ∈ Ξc. Using a similar argument, we can prove
ξMc ∈ Ξc. For any ξc ∈ (ξmc , ξMc ), there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that ξc = δξmc +(1−δ)ξMc . It is
easy to see that ξc ∈ Ξc because h1(ξc) = h1(δξmc +(1−δ)ξMc ) ≥ δh1(ξmc )+(1−δ)h1(ξMc ) ≥
δL3 + (1 − δ)L3 = L3 from the concavity of h1; and h2(ξc) = h2(δξmc + (1 − δ)ξMc ) ≤
δh2(ξ
m
c ) + (1− δ)h2(ξMc ) ≤ δ(L1 − c) + (1− δ)(L1 − c) = L1 − c from the convexity of h2.
Therefore, Ξc = [ξ
m
c , ξ
M
c ] ⊂ [0, c].
The proofs of (b) and (c) are similar to (a) and are omitted.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.5. We assume a < b. The proof for the case of a > b is similar to
the case of a < b and is omitted.
(i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose (4.6) and (4.7) hold, which are equivalent to h2(c − vθ) ≤ L1 − c
and L3 ≤ h1(vθ), respectively. We will prove I2 6= ∅ by considering the following two cases.
Case 1: If h2(0)∨h2(c) ≥ L1−c, by the continuity of h2 and (4.6), there exists ξc ∈ [0, c]
such that h2(ξc) = L1 − c, and thus L3 ≤ L1 − c = h2(ξc) < h1(ξc). Consider the contract
I(x) = (x−c+ξc)+− (x−a)+ ∈ I. It is easy to check that I(c) = ξc, I(a) = ξc+a−c, and
PI = h2(ξc)+ξc = L1−c+ξc. Thus I ∈ I2 since a−I(a)+PI = a−(ξc+a−c)+L1−c+ξc = L1
and PI − I(c) = L1 − c ≥ L3.
Case 2: If h2(0) ∨ h2(c) < L1 − c, then h2(ξc) ≤ L1 − c for all ξc ∈ [0, c], and in
particular, h2(vθ) ≤ L1 − c. Note that L3 ≤ h1(vθ) by (4.7), we have
vθ − c+ L1 ≥ h2(vθ) + vθ = PImvθ, vθ+a−c and vθ + L3 ≤ h1(vθ) + vθ = PIMvθ, vθ+a−c ,
where Imvθ, vθ+a−c(x) = (x − c + vθ)+ − (x − a)+ and IMvθ, vθ+a−c(x) = x − (x − vθ)+ +
(x − c)+ for all x ≥ 0. Since c ≤ L1 − L3, we have vθ + L3 ≤ vθ − c + L1. Note that
PImvθ,vθ+a−c
≤ PIMvθ,vθ+a−c , and thus (vθ + L3) ∨ PImvθ,vθ+a−c ≤ (vθ − c+ L1) ∧ PIMvθ,vθ+a−c . Using
similar arguments to those used in the proof of Lemma 4.2.3, we know that as a function
of (d1, d2) ∈ [0, c − vθ] × [a,∞], PI = PI(d1, d2) = (1 + θ)
(∫ d1+vθ
d1
+
∫ d2
c
)
SX(x)dx can
take all its intermediate values in the interval [PImvθ, vθ+a−c
, PIMvθ, vθ+a−c
]. Thus, there exists
(d1, d2) ∈ [0, c − vθ] × [a,∞] such that PI(d1, d2) = (vθ + L3) ∨ PImvθ, vθ+a−c . Consider the
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contract I(x) = (x − d1)+ − (x − d1 − vθ)+ + (x − c)+ − (x − d2)+, it is easy to check
that I(c) = vθ, I(a) = vθ + a − c, and PI = PI(d1, d2) = (vθ + L3) ∨ PImvθ, vθ+a−c . Thus,
I(c) + L3 = vθ + L3 ≤ PI ≤ vθ − c+ L1 = I(a)− a+ L1 and I ∈ I2.
Therefore, by combining Cases 1 and 2, we get I2 6= ∅.
(ii) ⇒ (iii). Suppose I2 6= ∅. For any I ∈ I2, denote ξc = I(c), ξa = I(a) and ξb = I(b).
Note that for a < b and I ∈ I2, we have ξa ≤ ξb and ξc + L3 ≤ PI ≤ ξa − a + L1,
and thus (4.24) holds. It is easy to check that Imξc,ξa,ξb(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ IMξc,ξa,ξb(x) for all
x ≥ 0 and thus PImξc,ξa,ξb ≤ PI ≤ PIMξc,ξa,ξb . Moreover we get (ξc + L3) ∨ PImξc,ξa,ξb ≤ PI ≤
(ξa − a+ L1) ∧ PIMξc,ξa,ξb and it implies that (4.25) and (4.26) hold for (ξc, ξa, ξb). By its
definition, (ξc, ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξc,a,b and then Ξc,a,b 6= ∅.
(iii) ⇒ (i). Suppose Ξc,a,b 6= ∅. From (4.25), we get
L3 ≤ (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫ c+ξa−ξc
c
+
∫ a+ξb−ξa
a
+
∫ ∞
b
)
SX(x)dx− ξc
≤ (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫ ∞
c
)
SX(x)dx− ξc = h1(ξc) ≤ h1(vθ).
Thus, (4.7) holds. From (4.26) and the fact that ξa − Amξc(ξa) is increasing in ξa, we get
a− L1 ≤ ξa − (1 + θ)
(∫ c
c−ξc
+
∫ a
a−ξa+ξc
+
∫ b
b−ξb+ξa
)
SX(x)dx
≤ ξa − (1 + θ)
(∫ c
c−ξc
+
∫ a
a−ξa+ξc
)
SX(x)dx = ξa − Amξc(ξa)
≤ ξc + a− c− Amξc(ξc + a− c) = a− c− h2(ξc) ≤ a− c− h2(c− vθ),
where h2(ξc) = A
m
ξc
(ξc + a− c)− ξc. Thus, (4.6) holds.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.6. We assume a < b. The proof for the case of a > b is similar to
the case of a < b and is omitted.
For any I ∈ I2, from the proof of Lemma 4.3.5 for (ii) ⇒ (iii), we have (ξc + L3) ∨
PImξc,ξa,ξb
≤ PI ≤ (ξa − a+ L1) ∧ PIMξc,ξa,ξb , where (ξc, ξa, ξb) = (I(c), I(a), I(b)) ∈ Ξc,a,b. By
the definition (4.34) of Pξc,ξa,ξb , it is easy to check PI ≤ PI(c),I(a),I(b) for 0 ≤ λ < 1/2 and
PI ≥ PI(c),I(a),I(b) for 1/2 < λ ≤ 1. Therefore, we have (2λ − 1)PI ≥ (2λ − 1)PI(c),I(a),I(b),
and
V (I) = λa+ (2λ− 1)PI − λI(a) + (1− λ)I(b)
≥ λa+ (2λ− 1)PI(c),I(a),I(b) − λI(a) + (1− λ)I(b) = w(I(c), I(a), I(b)).
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Thus minI∈I2 V (I) ≥ min(ξc,ξa,ξb)∈Ξc,a,b w(ξc, ξa, ξb).
On the contrary, for any (ξc, ξa, ξb) ∈ Ξc,a,b, using similar arguments to those used in the
proof of Lemma 4.2.3, we know that there exists I ∈ I such that PI = Pξc,ξa,ξb , I(c) = ξc,
I(a) = ξa and I(b) = ξb. Thus, I satisfies ξc + L3 ≤ PI ≤ ξa + L1 − a, namely I ∈ I2 and
V (I) = w(ξc, ξa, ξb). It implies that minI∈I2 V (I) ≤ min(ξc,ξa,ξb)∈Ξc,a,b w(ξc, ξa, ξb). Thus,
minI∈I2 V (I) = min(ξc,ξa,ξb)∈Ξc,a,b w(ξc, ξa, ξb).
Proof of Lemma 4.3.7. (a) Assume a < b and 0 ≤ λ < 1/2. For any (ξc, ξa) ∈ Ξc×Ξa,ξc
where Ξc = [ξ
m
c , ξ
M
c ] and Ξa,ξc = [ξ
m
a (ξc), ξ
M
a (ξc)], in the first step, we solve the problem of
minξb∈Ξb,ξc,ξa w(ξc, ξa, ξb), where Ξb,ξc,ξa = [ξ
m
b (ξc, ξa), ξ
M
b (ξc, ξa)]. By Lemma 4.3.6, we have
w(ξc, ξa, ξb) = λa+ (2λ− 1)
[
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξc,ξa,ξb
]
− λξa + (1− λ)ξb
= λa− λξa + λξb + (1− 2λ)
[
(ξb − L1 + a− ξa) ∨
(
ξb − PIMξc,ξa,ξb
)]
,
thus w(ξc, ξa, ξb) inherits the increment in ξb ∈ Ξb,ξc,ξa from the function ξb − PIMξc,ξa,ξb by
Proposition 4.3.2(a). Therefore, the minimizer of minξb∈Ξb,ξc,ξa w(ξc, ξa, ξb), is the left-end
point ξ∗b (ξc, ξa) = ξ
m
b (ξc, ξa) of the set Ξb,ξc,ξa .
In the second step, we solve the problem of min
ξa∈Ξa,ξc
w(ξc, ξa, ξ
m
b (ξc, ξa)) = min
ξa∈Ξa,ξc
w2(ξc, ξa).
In doing so, consider the supremum of the set {ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc : Aξc(ξa) < ξc +L3}, denoted by
ξa,ξc = sup {ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc : Aξc(ξa) < ξc + L3} . (4.48)
By convention, the supremum (4.48) is defined as the left-end point ξma (ξc) of the set Ξa,ξc
if the set {ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc : Aξc(ξa) < ξc + L3} is empty. Note that Aξc(ξa) is continuous and
strictly increasing in ξa, thus there are three possible scenarios for the supremum (4.48).
First of all, if ξc + L3 ≤ Aξc(ξma (ξc)), then ξa,ξc = ξma (ξc). Secondly, if Aξc(ξma (ξc)) <
ξc + L3 < Aξc(ξ
M
a (ξc)), then ξ
m
a (ξc) < ξa,ξc < ξ
M
a (ξc) and Aξc(ξa,ξc) = ξc + L3. The
last scenario is that if Aξc(ξ
M
a (ξc)) ≤ ξc + L3, then ξa,ξc = ξMa (ξc). In the following, we
discuss the properties of the function w2(ξc, ξa) in the second scenario, that is to assume
Aξc(ξ
m
a (ξc)) < ξc + L3 < Aξc(ξ
M
a (ξc)).
Case a.1. For ξma (ξc) ≤ ξa ≤ ξa,ξc , we have Aξc(ξa) ≤ ξc + L3, and then PIMξc,ξa,ξa =
Aξc(ξa) ≤ ξc + L3. By (4.29), we have PIMξc,ξa,ξa+b−a ≥ ξc + L3. Since PIMξc,ξa,ξb is continuous
and strictly increasing in ξb, we know that the equation PIMξc,ξa,ξb
= ξc + L3 has a unique
solution ξb,0 ∈ [ξa, ξa + b− a], namely, (4.25) is satisfied by (ξc, ξa, ξb,0). Meanwhile, (4.26)
is satisfied by (ξc, ξa, ξb,0) because PImξc,ξa,ξb,0
≤ PIMξc,ξa,ξb,0 = ξc + L3 ≤ L1 − a + ξa. Thus,
104
(ξc, ξa, ξb,0) ∈ Ξc,a,b and ξb,0 ∈ Ξb,ξc,ξa . For any ξb < ξb,0, because PIMξc,ξa,ξb < ξc + L3,
namely, (4.25) is not satisfied, we have that (ξc, ξa, ξb) /∈ Ξc,a,b and then ξb /∈ Ξb,ξc,ξa .
Therefore, ξmb (ξc, ξa) = ξb,0 and PIMξc,ξa,ξmb (ξc,ξa)
= ξc + L3. Now, for any ξ1 and ξ2 such that
ξma (ξc) ≤ ξ1 < ξ2 ≤ ξa,ξc , we have that ξmb (ξc, ξi) satisfies PIMξc,ξi,ξmb (ξc,ξi) = ξc+L3, for i = 1, 2.
Then, the equation PIM
ξc,ξ1,ξ
m
b
(ξc,ξ1)
= ξc + L3 = PIM
ξc,ξ2,ξ
m
b
(ξc,ξ2)
implies that
∫ a+ξmb (ξc,ξ1)−ξ1
a+ξmb (ξc,ξ2)−ξ2
SX(x)dx =
∫ c+ξ2−ξc
c+ξ1−ξc
SX(x)dx > 0.
Since SX(x) is positive and decreasing in x, we have a+ξ
m
b (ξc, ξ1)−ξ1−(a+ξmb (ξc, ξ2)−ξ2) ≥
c+ ξ2− ξc− (c+ ξ1− ξc) and thus ξmb (ξc, ξ1) ≥ ξmb (ξc, ξ2). Moreover, ξmb (ξc, ξ2)→ ξmb (ξc, ξ1)
as ξ2 → ξ1. Therefore, ξmb (ξc, ξa) is continuous and decreasing in ξa ∈ [ξma (ξc), ξa,ξc ]. Since
ξ∗b (ξc, ξa) = ξ
m
b (ξc, ξa) and PIM
ξc,ξa,ξ
∗
b
(ξc,ξa)
= ξc + L3 ≤ L1 − a+ ξa, we have
w2(ξc, ξa) = λa+ (2λ− 1)
[
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIM
ξc,ξa,ξ
∗
b
(ξc,ξa)
]
− λξa + (1− λ)ξ∗b (ξc, ξa)
= λa+ (2λ− 1)(ξc + L3)− λξa + (1− λ)ξ∗b (ξc, ξa)
is continuous and decreasing in ξa ∈ [ξma (ξc), ξa,ξc ]. In particular, when ξa = ξa,ξc , it is
easy to check that the equation Aξc(ξa,ξc) = ξc + L3 implies that ξ
m
b (ξc, ξa,ξc) = ξa,ξc , and
w2(ξc, ξa,ξc) = λa+ (1− 2λ) (ξa,ξc − (ξc + L3)).
Case a.2. For ξa,ξc < ξa ≤ ξMa (ξc), we have that Aξc(ξa) > ξc + L3, then (4.25)
is satisfied by (ξc, ξa, ξa). Since ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc , (4.30) implies that (ξc, ξa, ξa) satisfies (4.26).
Thus, (ξc, ξa, ξa) ∈ Ξc,a,b. It implies that ξa ∈ Ξb,ξc,ξa and then ξmb (ξc, ξa) = ξa. We have
ξ∗b (ξc, ξa) = ξa and
w2(ξc, ξa) = λa+ (2λ− 1)
[
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIM
ξc,ξa,ξ
∗
b
(ξc,ξa)
]
− λξa + (1− λ)ξ∗b (ξc, ξa)
= λa+ (1− 2λ) [(a− L1) ∨ (ξa − Aξc(ξa))] ,
which inherits the continuity and increment in ξa form the function ξa−Aξc(ξa) by Propo-
sition 4.3.2(b). Note that ξc + L3 ≤ ξa,ξc − a+ L1 and then
lim
ξa↓ξa,ξc
w2(ξc, ξa) = λa+ (1− 2λ) [(a− L1) ∨ (ξa,ξc − Aξc(ξa,ξc))]
= λa+ (1− 2λ) [(a− L1) ∨ (ξa,ξc − (ξc + L3))]
= λa+ (1− 2λ) (ξa,ξc − (ξc + L3)) = w2(ξc, ξa,ξc).
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By combining Cases a.1 and Case a.2, we obtain that, when Aξc(ξ
m
a (ξc)) < ξc +L3 <
Aξc(ξ
M
a (ξc)), the function w2(ξc, ξa) is continuous in ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc and minimized at the point
ξ∗a(ξc) = ξa,ξc . If ξc +L3 ≤ Aξc(ξma (ξc)), by using the same arguments in Case a.2, we have
that w2(ξc, ξa) is continuous in ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc and minimized at the point ξ∗a(ξc) = ξa,ξc = ξma (ξc).
If Aξc(ξ
M
a (ξc)) ≤ ξc+L3, by using the same arguments in Case a.1, we have that w2(ξc, ξa)
is continuous in ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc and minimized at the point ξ∗a(ξc) = ξa,ξc = ξMa (ξc). In short, we
conclude that w2(ξc, ξa) is continuous in ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc and minimized at the point ξ∗a(ξc) = ξa,ξc .
In the last step, we solve the problem of minξc∈Ξc w2(ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc)) = minξc∈Ξc w1(ξc). Note
that, for each ξc ∈ Ξc, ξMa (ξc) = ξc + a− c and ξma (ξc) ≥ ξc + L3 + a− L1. By Proposition
4.3.2(b), we know that ξa − Aξc(ξa) and ξa − Amξc(ξa) are both continuous and strictly
increasing in ξa. Consider the following two cases.
Case a.i. If L3 ≤ h5(ξc), namely ξc + L3 ≤ Aξc(ξc + L3 + a− L1), note that ξma (ξc) ≥
ξc+L3 +a−L1 and Aξc(ξa) is increasing on Ξa,ξc , thus Aξc(ξma (ξc)) ≥ Aξc(ξc+L3 +a−L1) ≥
ξc + L3. It implies that the set {ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc : Aξc(ξa) < ξc + L3} is empty. Thus, we have
ξ∗a(ξc) = ξ
m
a (ξc) and Aξc(ξ
∗
a(ξc)) ≥ ξc + L3. From the arguments in Case a.2, we have
ξ∗b (ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc)) = ξ
∗
a(ξc) and
w2(ξc, ξa) = λa+ (1− 2λ) [(a− L1) ∨ (ξ∗a(ξc)− Aξc(ξ∗a(ξc)))] .
Suppose Aξc(ξ
∗
a(ξc)) < ξ
∗
a(ξc)+L1−a, then ξ∗a(ξc) > Aξc(ξ∗a(ξc))−L1+a ≥ ξc+L3+a−L1 and
ξ∗a(ξc) − Amξc(ξ∗a(ξc)) ≥ ξ∗a(ξc) − Aξc(ξ∗a(ξc)) > a − L1. Note that ξa − Amξc(ξa) is continuous
and increasing in ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc , then there exists ξ ∈ [ξc + L3 + a − L1, ξ∗a(ξc)) such that
ξ − Amξc(ξ) > a − L1, which implies that ξ satisfies (4.29). Moreover, ξ satisfies (4.30)
because ξc + L3 ≤ Aξc(ξc + L3 + a− L1) ≤ Aξc(ξ) ≤ AMξc (ξ). Conditions (4.29) and (4.30)
imply ξ ∈ Ξa,ξc , namely ξ ≥ ξma (ξc), which contradicts the fact that ξ < ξ∗a(ξc) = ξma (ξc).
Therefore, Aξc(ξ
∗
a(ξc)) ≥ ξ∗a(ξc)+L1−a and w2(ξc, ξa) = λa+(1−2λ)(a−L1) is a constant
function.
Case a.ii. If L3 > h5(ξc), namely ξc + L3 > Aξc(ξc + a − L1 + L3). Since Aξc(ξc +
b− c) ≥ ξc + L3, by (4.27), and the fact that Aξc(ξa) is continuous and strictly increasing
in ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc , we see that there exists ξa,1 ∈ [ξc + a − L1 + L3, ξc + b − c], which is the
unique solution to the equation of Aξc(ξa,1) = L3 + ξc. Thus, ξ
∗
a(ξc) = ξa,1 ∧ ξMa (ξc) =
ξa,1 ∧ (ξc + a − c) ≤ ξa,1 and Aξc(ξ∗a(ξc)) ≤ Aξc(ξa,1) = ξc + L3. Consider the contract
I(x) = x− (x− ξc)+ + (x− c)+ − (x− (c+ ξa,1 − ξc))+ + (x− b)+, it is easy to check that
I(c) = ξc, I(a) = (ξc+a−c)∧ξa,1 = ξ∗a(ξc), I(b) = ξa,1, and PI = Aξc(ξa,1) = ξc+L3. Since
I(c) +L3 = ξc +L3 = PI = (ξc +L3 +a−L1)−a+L1 ≤ I(a)−a+L1, we have I ∈ I2 and
(ξc, (ξc+a−c)∧ξa,1, ξa,1) ∈ Ξc,a,b. For any ξb < ξa,1, we have (ξc, (ξc+a−c)∧ξa,1, ξb) /∈ Ξc,a,b
because either (4.24) is invalid when ξa,1 < ξc+a−c, or (4.25) is invalid when ξa,1 ≥ ξc+a−c
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from the observation that PIMξc,ξc+a−c,ξb
= Aξc(ξb) < Aξc(ξa,1) = ξc + L3. It implies that
ξb /∈ Ξb,ξc,ξ∗a(ξc) for any ξb < ξa,1 and then ξ∗b (ξc, ξ∗a(ξc)) = ξmb (ξc, ξ∗a(ξc)) = ξa,1. It is easy to
check that, PIM
ξc,(ξc+a−c)∧ξa,1,ξa,1
= Aξc(ξa,1) = ξc + L3 ≤ ξa,1 − a+ L1. Thus,
w1(ξc) = λa− λξ∗a(ξc) + (1− λ)ξ∗b (ξc, ξ∗a(ξc)) + (2λ− 1)
[
(L1 − a+ ξ∗a(ξc)) ∧ PIM
ξc,ξ
∗
a(ξc),ξ
∗
b
(ξc,ξ
∗
a(ξc))
]
= λa− λ((ξc + a− c) ∧ ξa,1) + (1− λ)ξa,1 + (2λ− 1)(ξc + L3)
and it has derivative on the set Ξc \ {ξc : Aξc(ξc + a− c) = L3 + ξc + a− c} with
w′1(ξc) = [1− λ− λ I(ξa,1 < ξc + a− c)]
(
d
dξc
ξa,1 − 1
)
=
1
SX(c+ ξa,1 − ξc)
(
1
1 + θ
− SX(ξc)
)
[1− λ− λ I(ξa,1 < ξc + a− c)],
where d
dξc
ξa,1 = 1+
[
1
1+θ
− SX(ξc)
]
/SX(c+ξa,1−ξc) since ξa,1 satisfies the equation ξc+L3 =
Aξc(ξa,1). Note that w
′
1(ξc) ≤ 0⇐⇒ 11+θ ≤ SX(ξc)⇐⇒ ξc ≤ vθ.
By combining Case a.i and Case a.ii, we obtain that w′1(ξc) ≤ 0 when ξc ≤ vθ and
w′1(ξc) ≥ 0 when ξc > vθ. Therefore, ξ∗c = ξmc ∨
(
vθ ∧ ξMc
)
.
(b) Assume a < b and 1/2 < λ ≤ 1. By Lemma 4.3.6, we have
w(ξc, ξa, ξb) = λa+ (2λ− 1)
[
(ξc + L3) ∨ PImξc,ξa,ξb
]
− λξa + (1− λ)ξb,
where PImξc,ξa,ξb
is increasing in ξb. Thus, w(ξc, ξa, ξb) is continuous and increasing in ξb. It
implies that ξ∗b (ξc, ξa) = ξ
m
b (ξc, ξa) and
w2(ξc, ξa) = min
ξb∈Ξb,ξc,ξa
w(ξc, ξa, ξb) = w(ξc, ξa, ξ
m
b (ξc, ξa)),
where Ξb,ξc,ξa = [ξ
m
b (ξc, ξa), ξ
M
b (ξc, ξa)]. As discussed in (a), there are three possible scenar-
ios for ξa,ξc defined by (4.48), and we consider the following two cases under the assumption
that Aξc(ξ
m
a (ξc)) < ξc + L3 < Aξc(ξ
M
a (ξc)).
Case b.1. If ξma (ξc) ≤ ξa ≤ ξa,ξc , then Aξc(ξa) ≤ ξc + L3 and from the arguments in
Case a.1, we know that ξ∗b (ξc, ξa) is the solution to the equation of ξc +L3 = PIM
ξc,ξa,ξ
∗
b
(ξc,ξa)
and is decreasing in ξa. It follows that
w2(ξc, ξa) = λa+ (2λ− 1)
[
(ξc + L3) ∨ PIm
ξc,ξa,ξ
∗
b
(ξc,ξa)
]
− λξa + (1− λ)ξ∗b (ξc, ξa)
= λa+ (2λ− 1)(ξc + L3)− λξa + (1− λ)ξ∗b (ξc, ξa)
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is continuous and decreasing in ξa. In particular, when ξa = ξa,ξc , we have that w2(ξc, ξa,ξc) =
λa + (2λ − 1)(ξc + L3 − ξa,ξc) where ξ∗b (ξc, ξa,ξc) = ξa,ξc is induced from the equation
Aξc(ξa,ξc) = ξc + L3.
Case b.2. If ξa,ξc < ξa ≤ ξMa (ξc), then Aξc(ξa) > ξc + L3 and from the arguments used
in Case a.2, we have ξ∗b (ξc, ξa) = ξa. Since ξa − Amξc(ξa) is increasing in ξa, we see that
w2(ξc, ξa) = λa+ (2λ− 1)
[
(ξc + L3) ∨ PImξc,ξa,ξa
]
+ (1− 2λ)ξa
= λa+ (2λ− 1) [(ξc + L3 − ξa) ∨ (Amξc(ξa)− ξa)]
is continuous and decreasing in ξa. Moreover, A
m
ξc
(ξa,ξc) < Aξc(ξa,ξc) = ξc +L3 implies that
limξa↓ξa,ξc w2(ξc, ξa) = w2(ξc, ξa,ξc).
By combining Case b.1 and Case b.2, we see that w2(ξc, ξa) is decreasing in ξa and
ξ∗a(ξc) = ξ
M
a (ξc) = ξc + a − c. In the other two scenarios, by using the same argument as
in Case b.1 and Case b.2, we can show that w2(ξc, ξa) is decreasing in ξa and ξ
∗
a(ξc) =
ξMa (ξc) = ξc + a− c.
Next, we will solve the minimization problem of minξc∈Ξc w1(ξc) = minξc∈Ξc w2(ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc)) =
minξc∈Ξc w2(ξc, ξc + a− c). Note that h3(ξc) = Aξc(ξc + a− c)− ξc = Aξc(ξ∗a(ξc))− ξc.
If h3(ξc) < L3, namely Aξc(ξ
∗
a(ξc)) < ξc + L3, then, from Case b.1, the value function
w1(ξc) is reduced to w1(ξc) = λa+(2λ−1)(ξc+L3)−λ(ξc+a−c)+(1−λ)ξ∗b (ξc, ξc+a−c),
where ξ∗b (ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc)) is the solution to the equation
ξc + L3 = PIM
ξc,ξ
∗
a(ξc),ξ
∗
b
(ξc,ξ
∗
a(ξc))
= (1 + θ)
(∫ ξc
0
+
∫ c+ξ∗b (ξc,ξ∗a(ξc))−ξc
c
+
∫ ∞
b
)
SX(x)dx.
Thus, ξ∗b (ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc)) is continuous in ξc and
d
dξc
ξ∗b (ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc)) = 1 +
1
1+θ
−SX(ξc)
SX(c+ξ
∗
b (ξc,ξ
∗
a(ξc))−ξc) .
If h3(ξc) ≥ L3, namelyAξc(ξ∗a(ξc)) ≥ ξc+L3, then, from Case b.2, we have ξ∗b (ξc, ξ∗a(ξc)) =
ξ∗a(ξc) = ξc + a− c and
w1(ξc) = λa+ (2λ− 1)
{
[ξc + L3 − ξ∗a(ξc)] ∨
[
Amξc(ξ
∗
a(ξc))− ξ∗a(ξc)
]}
= λa+ (1− 2λ)(a− c) + (2λ− 1) [L3 ∨ h2(ξc)] ,
where h2(ξc) = Aξc(ξc + a− c)− ξc.
Therefore, w1(ξc) satisfies
d
dξc
w1(ξc) =

(2λ− 1) ((1 + θ)SX(c− ξc)− 1) , if L3 < h2(ξc),
0, if h2(ξc) < L3 < h3(ξc),
1−λ
SX(c+ξ
∗
b (ξc,ξ
∗
a(ξc))−ξc)
(
1
1+θ
− SX(ξc)
)
, if h3(ξc) < L3.
(4.49)
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By Proposition 4.3.1(b) and Proposition 4.3.2(c), we have that h2 is convex and achieves
it minimal value at c− vθ while h3 is concave and achieves its maximal value at vθ. Thus,
ξL3,h2 = sup {ξc ∈ [0, c− vθ] : L3 ≤ h2(ξc)} and ξL3,h3 = sup {ξc ∈ [0, vθ] : h3(ξc) ≤ L3} are
both well-defined. Now consider the following three cases.
Case b.i. Suppose L3 ≤ h2(0) < h3(0). Firstly, since h2 is decreasing on [0, c − vθ]
and h3 is increasing on [0, vθ], we have ξL3,h3 = 0 ≤ ξL3,h2 . Secondly, since L3 ≤ L1− c and
h2 is decreasing on [0, c − vθ], we have sup {ξc ∈ [0, c− vθ] : L1 − c ≤ h2(ξc)} ≤ ξL3,h2 ≤
c − vθ, where h2(c − vθ) ≤ L1 − c due to (4.7). Thus, h2(ξL3,h2) ≤ L1 − c, and moreover,
L3 ≤ h2(ξL3,h2) ≤ h1(ξL3,h2). Thus, ξL3,h2 satisfies (4.27) and (4.28), namely ξL3,h2 ∈ Ξc.
For any ξc ≤ ξL3,h2 , we have h2(ξc) ≥ h2(ξL3,h2) ≥ L3, and thus, from (4.49), w′(ξc) =
(2λ − 1) [(1 + θ)SX(c− ξc)− 1] ≤ 0. If ξL3,h2 < ξc and L3 < h2(ξc), then ξc ≥ c − vθ
from the observation that h2(ξ) ≤ h2(ξL3,h2) = L3 for any ξL3,h2 < ξ < c − vθ. Then
w′(ξc) = (2λ− 1) [(1 + θ)SX(c− ξc)− 1] ≥ 0. If ξL3,h2 < ξc and h2(ξc) < L3 < h3(ξc), then
w′2(ξc) = 0. If ξL3,h2 < ξc and h3(ξc) < L3, then ξc ≥ vθ from the observation that h3(ξ) ≥
h3(0) > 0 for any 0 < ξ ≤ vθ, then w′2(ξc) = 1−λSX(c+ξ∗b (ξc,ξ∗a(ξc))−ξc)
(
1
1+θ
− SX(ξc)
) ≥ 0. In
short, w2(ξc) ≤ 0 for any ξc ≤ ξL3,h2 , and w2(ξc) ≥ 0 for any ξc > ξL3,h2 . Thus, we conclude
that w1(ξc) achieves its minimal value at the point ξ
∗
c = ξL3,h2 .
Case b.ii. Suppose L3 ≥ h3(0) > h2(0). Using similar arguments as in Case b.i, we
conclude that ξL3,h2 = 0 ≤ ξL3,h3 , ξL3,h3 ∈ Ξc, and w1(ξc) achieves its minimal value at
ξ∗c = ξL3,h3 .
Case b.iii. Suppose h2(0) < L3 < h3(0), then ξL3,h2 = ξL3,h3 = 0. Inequalities
h1(0) ≥ h3(0) > L3 and h2(0) < L3 ≤ L1 − c imply that 0 satisfies (4.27) and (4.28) and
thus 0 ∈ Ξc. Thus, it follows from Case b.i and Case b.ii that w′(ξc) ≥ 0 for all ξc ∈ [0, c]
and thus ξ∗c = 0.
By combining Case b.i, Case b.ii, and Case b.iii, we obtain ξ∗c = ξL3,h2 ∨ ξL3,h3 .
(c) Assume b < a and 0 ≤ λ < 1/2. By Lemma 4.3.6, we have that
w(ξc, ξa, ξb) = λa+ (2λ− 1)
[
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξc,ξa,ξb
]
− λξa + (1− λ)ξb
=λa+ (1− λ)ξb − (1− λ)
[
(L1 − a+ ξa) ∧ PIMξc,ξa,ξb
]
− λ
[
(a− L1) ∨
(
ξa − PIMξc,ξa,ξb
)]
is continuous in ξa ∈ Ξa,ξc,ξb . Note that ξa − PIMξc,ξa,ξb is increasing in ξa by Proposition
4.3.3(a). Thus, w(ξc, ξa, ξb) is decreasing in ξa and ξ
∗
a(ξc, ξb) = ξ
M
a (ξc, ξb) = ξb+a−b. Next,
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we will solve the problem of minξb∈Ξb,ξc w2(ξc, ξb), where
w2(ξc, ξb) = min
ξa∈Ξa,ξc,ξb
w(ξc, ξa, ξb) = w(ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc, ξb), ξb)
= λa− λ(ξb + a− b) + (1− λ)ξb + (2λ− 1)
[
(L1 − b+ ξb) ∧ PIMξc,ξb+a−b,ξb
]
= λb+ (1− 2λ) [(b− L1) ∨ (ξb −BMξc (ξb))] .
The function ξb−BMξc (ξb) is increasing in ξb by Proposition 4.3.3(b) and thus ξ∗b (ξc) = ξmb (ξc).
Note that (4.24) implies ξ∗b (ξc) ≥ ξc + (L3 − L1 + b)+. Moreover, from (4.31) and (4.32),
ξb ∈ Ξb,ξc is equivalent to ξc + L3 ≤ BMξc (ξb) and b − L1 ≤ ξb − Bmξc (ξb). Consider the
following three cases.
Case c.1. Suppose h7(ξc) ≥ L3 and h6(ξc) ≤ L3 ∨ (L1 − b), which mean ξc + L3 ≤
BMξc (ξc + (b−L1 +L3)+) and Bmξc (ξc + (b−L1 +L3)+) ≤ ξc + (b−L1 +L3)+ +L1− b. Thus,
ξ∗b (ξc) = ξc + (b+ L3 − L1)+ ∈ Ξb,ξc and
min
ξc∈Ξc
w1(ξc) = min
ξc∈Ξc
w2(ξc, ξ
∗
b (ξc)) = min
ξc∈Ξc
{
λb+ (1− 2λ) [(b− L1) ∨ ((b− L3 − L1)+ − h7(ξc))]}
= λb+ (1− 2λ)
[
(b− L1) ∨
(
(b+ L3 − L1)+ − max
ξc∈Ξc
h7(ξc)
)]
.
By Proposition 4.3.3(d), we know that h7 is increasing on [0, vθ) and decreasing on (vθ, c],
which, together with 0 ≤ λ < 1/2, imply that w1(ξc) is decreasing if ξc ∈ [0, vθ) and
increasing if ξc ∈ (vθ, c].
Case c.2. Suppose h7(ξc) < L3, then h6(ξc) ≤ h7(ξc) < L3 ≤ L3 ∨ (L1 − b). It follows
that ξc+L3 > B
M
ξc
(ξc+(b−L1+L3)+) and Bmξc (ξc+(b−L1+L3)+) ≤ ξc+(b−L1+L3)++L1−b.
Note that, ξc ∈ Ξc and (4.27) implies ξc + L3 ≤ h1(ξc) = BMξc (ξc + b− c). Since BMξc (ξb) is
continuous and strictly increasing in ξb, there exists ξb,1 ∈ [ξc + (b− L1 + L3)+, ξc + b− c]
such that ξb,1 is the unique solution to the equation of ξc + L3 = B
M
ξc
(ξb,1), and thus
ξb,1 satisfies (4.31). Meanwhile, since ξb − Bmξc (ξb) is strictly increasing in ξb, we have
ξb,1 − Bmξc (ξb,1) ≥ ξc + (b − L1 + L3)+ − Bmξc (ξc + (b − L1 + L3)+) ≥ b − L1 which implies
that ξb,1 satisfies (4.32). Thus, ξb,1 ∈ Ξb,ξc . For any ξb < ξb,1, we have ξb /∈ Ξc,ξb because
BMξc (ξb) < B
M
ξc
(ξb,1) = ξc + L3. Therefore, ξ
∗
b (ξc) = ξ
m
b (ξc) = ξb,1. Moreover,
w1(ξc) = λa+ (2λ− 1)(ξc + L3)− λ (ξ∗b (ξc) + a− b) + (1− λ)ξ∗b (ξc)
= λb+ (1− 2λ) (ξ∗b (ξc)− ξc − L3) ,
which implies that
w′1(ξc) = (1− 2λ)
(
dξ∗b (ξc)
dξc
− 1
)
=
1− 2λ
SX(c+ ξ∗b (ξc) + ξc)
(
1
1 + θ
− SX(ξc)
)
,
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where d
dξc
ξ∗b (ξc) = 1 +
(
1
1+θ
− SX(ξc)
)
/SX(c + ξ
∗
b (ξc) + ξc) is induced from the equation
BMξc (ξ
∗
b (ξc)) = B
M
ξc
(ξb,1) = ξc + L3. Thus, the function w1(ξc) is decreasing if ξc ∈ [0, vθ)
and increasing if ξc ∈ (vθ, c].
Case c.3. Suppose h7(ξc) ≥ L3 and h6(ξc) > L3 ∨ (L1 − b), which imply ξc + L3 ≤
BMξc (ξc+(b−L1 +L3)+) and Bmξc (ξc+(b−L1 +L3)+) > ξc+(b−L1 +L3)+ +L1− b. By the
similar arguments in Case c.2, we know that there exists ξb,0 ∈ [ξc+(b−L1+L3)+, ξc+b−c]
such that ξb,0 is the unique solution to the equation of L1− b+ ξb,0 = Bmξc (ξb,0) and ξ∗b (ξc) =
ξb,0. Hence, w1(ξc) = λb+ (2λ− 1)(L1− b+ ξ∗b (ξc)) + (1− 2λ)ξ∗b (ξc) = (2λ− 1)(L1− b) +λb
is a constant function.
By combining Case c.1, Case c.2, and Case c.3, we obtain that w1(ξc) is decreasing
if ξc ∈ [0, vθ) and increasing if ξc ∈ (vθ, c]. Therefore, ξ∗c = ξmc ∨
(
vθ ∧ ξMc
)
.
(d) Assume b < a and 1/2 < λ ≤ 1. By Lemma 4.3.6, we have
w(ξc, ξb, ξa) = λa− λξa + (1− λ)ξb + (2λ− 1)
[
(ξc + L3) ∨ PImξc,ξa,ξb
]
= λa+ (1− λ)ξb − (1− λ)ξa + (2λ− 1)
[
(ξc + L3 − ξa) ∨
(
PImξc,ξa,ξb
− ξa
)]
.
Thus w(ξc, ξa, ξb) is continuous and decreasing in ξa due to the properties of PImξc,ξa,ξb
− ξa
given in Proposition 4.3.3(a). Hence, we have ξ∗a(ξc, ξb) = ξ
M
a (ξc, ξb) = ξb + a− b and
w2(ξc, ξb) = w(ξc, ξ
∗
a(ξc, ξb), ξb) = λa− λ(ξb + a− b) + (1− λ)ξb + (2λ− 1)
[
(ξc + L3) ∨Bmξc (ξb)
]
= λb+ (2λ− 1) [(ξc + L3 − ξb) ∨ (Bmξc (ξb)− ξb)] .
Thus w2(ξc, ξb) is continuous and decreasing in ξb due to the properties of B
m
ξc
(ξb)−ξb given
in Proposition 4.3.3(b). It implies ξ∗b (ξc) = ξ
M
b (ξc) = ξc + b− c and thus
min
ξc∈Ξc
w1(ξc) = min
ξc∈Ξc
w2(ξc, ξ
∗
b (ξc))
= min
ξc∈Ξc
{
λb+ (2λ− 1) [(c+ L3 − b) ∨ (Bmξc (ξc + b− c)− (ξc + b− c))]}
= min
ξc∈Ξc
{(1− λ)b+ (2λ− 1)c+ (2λ− 1) [L3 ∨ h2 (ξc)]}
= (1− λ)b+ (2λ− 1)c+ (2λ− 1)
[
L3 ∨ min
ξc∈Ξc
h2 (ξc)
]
.
Since h2(ξc) is continuous, decreasing on [0, c− vθ), and increasing on (c− vθ, c], we obtain
that w1(ξc) is continuous and ξ
∗
c = ξ
m
c ∨
[
(c− vθ) ∧ ξMc
]
.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.8. We assume a < b. The proof for the case of a > b is similar
to the case of a < b and is omitted.
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For a < b, we have ξ∗b = ξ
∗
b (ξ
∗
c , ξ
∗
a) ∈ Ξb,ξ∗c ,ξ∗a . Note that Ξb,ξ∗c ,ξ∗a is the set of all
ξb ∈ [ξ∗a, ξ∗a + b− a] such that (ξ∗c , ξ∗a, ξb) ∈ Ξc,a,b, thus (ξ∗c , ξ∗a, ξ∗b ) ∈ Ξc,a,b. It is easy to check
that any contract I of the form
I(x) = (x− d1)+ − (x− d1 − ξ∗c )+ + (x− d2)+ − (x− (d2 + ξ∗a − ξ∗c ))+
+ (x− d3)+ − (x− (d3 + ξ∗b − ξ∗a))+ + (x− d4)+ (4.50)
for some (d1, d2, d3, d4) ∈ [0, c− ξ∗c ]× [c, a− ξ∗a + ξ∗c ]× [a, b− ξ∗b + ξ∗a]× [b,∞], satisfies I ∈ I,
I(c) = ξ∗c , I(a) = ξ
∗
a, I(b) = ξ
∗
b and I
m
ξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b
(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ IMξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b (x) for all x ≥ 0. For I of
the form (4.50), its premium is given by
PI = P (d1, d2, d3, d4) = (1 + θ)
(∫ d1+ξ∗c
d1
+
∫ d2+ξ∗a−ξ∗c
d2
+
∫ d3+ξ∗b−ξ∗a
d3
+
∫ ∞
d4
)
SX(x)dx,
which is a real-valued continuous function of (d1, d2, d3, d4). Thus {PI : I has expression (4.50)} =
[PIm
ξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b
, PIM
ξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b
]. By (4.34), we have PIm
ξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b
≤ Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b ≤ PIMξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b and ξ
∗
c + L3 ≤
Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b ≤ ξ∗a − a + L1. Therefore, there exists I∗ ∈ I2 such that I∗(c) = ξ∗c , I∗(a) = ξ∗a,
I∗(b) = ξ∗b , and PI∗ = Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b . For any I ∈ I2, denote ξc = I(c), ξa = I(a), and ξb = I(b),
then
V (I∗) = λa+ (2λ− 1)Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b − λξ∗a + (1− λ)ξ∗b = w(ξ∗c , ξ∗a, ξ∗b )
= w(ξ∗c , ξ
∗
a(ξ
∗
c ), ξ
∗
b (ξ
∗
c , ξ
∗
a(ξ
∗
c ))) = w2(ξ
∗
c , ξ
∗
a(ξ
∗
c )) = w1 (ξ
∗
c ) = min
ξ∈Ξc
w1(ξ)
≤ w1 (ξc) = min
ξ∈Ξa,ξc
w2(ξc, ξ) ≤ w2(ξc, ξa) = min
ξ∈Ξb,ξc,ξa
w (ξc, ξa, ξ)
≤ w (ξc, ξa, ξb) = λa+ (2λ− 1)Pξc,ξa,ξb − λξa + (1− λ)ξb ≤ V (I),
where the last inequality is from the proof of Lemma 4.3.6. Therefore, a contract I∗ of the
form (4.36) for some (d1, d2, d3, d4) ∈ [0, c− ξ∗c ]× [c, a− ξ∗a + ξ∗c ]× [a, b− ξ∗b + ξ∗a]× [b, ∞],
satisfying I∗(c) = ξ∗c , I
∗(a) = ξ∗a, I
∗(b) = ξ∗b , and PI∗ = Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b , is an optimal solution to
Problem (4.23).
Proof of Corollary 4.3.9. Suppose a < b and 0 ≤ λ < 1/2. By (4.27) and (4.28), we
have that ξc ∈ Ξc is equivalent to h1(ξc) ≥ L3 and h2(ξc) ≤ L1− c. Note that (4.6) implies
h2(c− vθ) ≤ L1 − c while (4.7) implies h1(vθ) ≥ L3.
(a) Assume h2(vθ) ≤ L1− c. Note that h1(vθ) ≥ L3, thus we have vθ ∈ Ξc. By Lemma
4.3.7(a), we get ξ∗c = vθ. It follows that ξ
∗
a = ξ
∗
a(vθ) = sup {ξa ∈ Ξa,vθ : Avθ(ξa) < vθ + L3},
ξ∗b = ξ
∗
b (vθ, ξ
∗
a) = ξ
m
b (vθ, ξ
∗
a), and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (L1 − a+ ξ∗a) ∧ PIMξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b .
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(i) If L3 ≤ h4(vθ), note that h4(vθ) < h5(vθ), thus vθ + L3 ≤ Amvθ(vθ + a − L1 +
L3) < Avθ(vθ + a − L1 + L3). From Case a.i in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, we have
ξ∗b = ξ
∗
a = ξ
m
a (vθ). We will specify the value of ξ
m
a (vθ). Since (vθ + a−L1 +L3) +L1− a ≤
Amvθ(vθ + a − L1 + L3) from L3 ≤ h4(vθ), (vθ + a − c) + L1 − a ≥ Amvθ(vθ + a − c) from
h2(vθ) ≤ L1 − c, and Amvθ(ξa) is continuous and strictly increasing in ξa ∈ Ξa,vθ , there
exists ξa,0 ∈ [vθ + L3 + a − L1, vθ + a − c], which is the unique solution to the equation
of ξa,0 + L1 − a = Amvθ(ξa,0). Hence, ξa,0 satisfies (4.30) for ξc = vθ. Meanwhile, ξa,0
satisfies (4.29) for ξc = vθ because vθ + L3 ≤ ξa,0 + L1 − a = Amvθ(ξa,0) < AMvθ (ξa,0). Thus,
ξa,0 ∈ Ξa,vθ . For any ξa < ξa,0, since ξa − Amvθ(ξa) is strictly increasing, we know that
ξa −Amvθ(ξa) < ξa,0 −Amvθ(ξa,0) = a− L3. It implies that (4.30) with ξc = vθ is not satisfied
by ξa, and then ξa /∈ Ξa,vθ . Therefore, ξma (vθ) = ξa,0. It follows that ξ∗b = ξ∗a = ξa,0 and
Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξa,0 + L1 − a) ∧ PIMvθ,ξa,0,ξa,0 = (ξa,0 + L1 − a) ∧Avθ(ξa,0) = ξa,0 + L1 − a. Hence,
I∗(x) = (x− c+ vθ)+− (x− c)+ + (x− (a− ξa,0 + vθ))+− (x− a)+ since it is easy to check
that I∗(c) = vθ, I∗(a) = I∗(b) = ξa,0, and PI∗ = Amvθ(ξa,0) = ξa,0 + L1 − a. Thus, I∗ is the
optimal contract by Theorem 4.3.8.
(ii) If h4(vθ) < L3 ≤ h5(vθ), which means Amvθ(vθ + a−L1 +L3) < (vθ +L3 + a−L1) +
L1−a = vθ+L3 ≤ Avθ(vθ+a−L1 +L3), then vθ+L3 +a−L1 satisfies (4.29) and (4.30) for
ξc = vθ. It implies vθ+L3+a−L1 ∈ Ξa,vθ , where Ξa,vθ ⊂ [vθ+L3+a−L1, a] by its definition,
and thus, ξma (vθ) = vθ +L3 + a−L1. From Case a.i in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, we have
ξ∗b = ξ
∗
a = ξ
m
a (vθ) = vθ+L3 +a−L1 and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξ∗a +L1−a)∧PIMvθ,ξ∗a,ξ∗a = (ξ
∗
a +L1−a)∧
Avθ(vθ+a−L1+L3) = vθ+L3. As a function of (d1, d2, d3) ∈ [0, c−vθ]×[c, L1−L3]×[b,∞],
PI = PI(d1, d2, d3) = (1 + θ)
(∫ d1+vθ
d1
+
∫ d2+a+L3−L1
d2
+
∫ ∞
d3
)
SX(x)dx
can take all values on [PI(c − vθ, L1 − L3,∞), PI(0, c, b)]. Since PI(c − vθ, L1 − L3,∞) =
h4(vθ) + vθ < L3 + vθ ≤ h5(vθ) + vθ = PI(0, c, b), there exists (d∗1, d∗2, d∗3) ∈ [0, c − vθ] ×
[c, L1 − L3]× [b,∞] such that PI(d∗1, d∗2, d∗3) = vθ + L3. Therefore,
I∗(x) = (x− d∗1)+ − (x− d∗1 − vθ)+ + (x− d∗2)+ − (x− d∗2 − (a− L1 + L3))+ + (x− d∗3)+
because it satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = PI(d
∗
1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3) = vθ + L3.
(iii) If h5(vθ) < L3, by the arguments in Case a.ii in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, we
know that there exists ξa,1 ∈ [vθ +L3 + a−L1, vθ + b− c] such that Avθ(ξa,1) = vθ +L3 and
(ξ∗c , ξ
∗
a, ξ
∗
b ) = (vθ, (vθ+a−c)∧ξa,1, ξa,1). It implies that Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξ∗a−a+L1)∧PIMξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b =
(ξ∗a − a + L1) ∧ Avθ(ξa,1) = vθ + L3. Hence, I∗(x) = x − (x − vθ)+ + (x − c)+ − (x −
(c + ξa,1 − vθ))+ + (x − b)+ since it easy to check that I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and
PI∗ = Avθ(ξa,1) = vθ + L3.
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(b) Assume h2(vθ) > L1 − c. Note that h2(c − vθ) ≤ L1 − c and h2 is continuous and
monotone on [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)], thus the equation h2(ξc) = L1 − c has solutions
on [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)]. Denote
ξL1−c, h2 = inf {ξc ∈ [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)] : h2(ξc) = L1 − c} . (4.51)
Notice that L3 ≤ L1 − c = h2(ξL1−c, h2) < h1(ξL1−c, h2) implies that (4.27) and (4.28) are
satisfied by ξL1−c, h2 and thus ξL1−c, h2 ∈ Ξc. Suppose vθ < c−vθ, then vθ ≤ ξL1−c, h2 ≤ c−vθ.
For any ξc < ξL1−c, h2 , we have h2(ξc) > L1 − c because h2 is decreasing on [0, c − vθ]. It
implies that ξc /∈ Ξc because it does not satisfy (4.28). Thus ξL1−c, h2 = ξmc and moreover,
vθ ≤ ξL1−c, h2 = ξmc ≤ ξMc . By Lemma 4.3.7(a), we have ξ∗c = ξmc ∨ (vθ ∧ ξMc ) = ξL1−c, h2 . In
the other case of vθ ≥ c− vθ, we have h2(ξc) > h2(ξL1−c, h2) = L1 − c for any ξc > ξL1−c, h2
because h2 is strictly increasing on [c − vθ, c]. It implies that ξc /∈ Ξc because it does not
satisfy (4.28). Thus ξMc = ξL1−c, h2 ≤ vθ. By Lemma 4.3.7(a), we have ξ∗c = ξmc ∨(vθ∧ξMc ) =
ξL1−c, h2 . Therefore, in both of the two cases, ξ
∗
c = ξL1−c, h2 . Note that the equation
h2(ξL1−c, h2) = L1 − c can be rewritten as Amξ∗c (ξ∗c + a − c) = (ξ∗c + a − c) + L1 − a. Since
the function ξa − Amξ∗c (ξc) is strictly increasing in ξa, for any ξa < ξ∗c + a − c, we have
ξa−Amξ∗c (ξc) < (ξ∗c +a− c)−Amξ∗c (ξ∗c +a− c) = a−L1, which means that (4.30) with ξc = ξ∗c
are not satisfied by ξa. Thus, Ξa,ξ∗c = {ξ∗c + a− c} is a single point set. It is easy to check
that ξ∗b = ξ
m
b (ξ
∗
c , ξ
∗
a) = ξ
∗
a = ξ
∗
c +a− c and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξ∗a−a+L1)∧PIMξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = ξ
∗
a−a+L1,
where PIM
ξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b
= Aξ∗c (ξ
∗
a) ≥ Amξ∗c (ξ∗a) = h2(ξ∗c )+ξ∗c = L1−c+ξ∗c = ξ∗a−a+L1. The contract
I∗(x) = (x− c+ ξL1−c,h2)+− (x− a)+ is the optimal one because it satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x for
x = c, a, b and PI∗ = h2(ξ
∗
c )− ξ∗c = ξ∗c − c+ L1.
Proof of Corollary 4.3.10. Suppose a < b and 1/2 < λ ≤ 1. By Lemma 4.3.7(b), we
have that ξ∗c = ξL3,h2 ∨ ξL3,h3 , ξ∗a = ξ∗c + a − c, ξ∗b = ξmb (ξ∗a, ξ∗c ) and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξ∗c + L3) ∨
PIm
ξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b
, where ξL3,h2 = sup {ξc ∈ [0, c− vθ] : h2(ξc) ≥ L3} and ξL3,h3 = sup {ξc ∈ [0, vθ] : h3(ξc) ≤ L3}.
Note that h2(c− vθ) ≤ h2(0) < h3(0) ≤ h3(vθ).
(a) If L3 ≤ h2(0), from Case b.i in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, we have ξ∗c = ξL3,h2 ,
ξ∗a = ξ
∗
c + a − c, and h2(ξ∗c ) ≥ L3, where h2(ξ∗c ) = Amξ∗c (ξ∗c + a − c) − ξ∗c = Amξ∗c (ξ∗a) − ξ∗c .
Since h3(ξ
∗
c ) ≥ h2(ξ∗c ) ≥ L3, namely Aξ∗c (ξ∗a) ≥ ξ∗c + L3, from Case b.2 in the proof of
Lemma 4.3.7, we have ξ∗b = ξ
∗
a = ξ
∗
c + a − c. Then Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξ∗c + L3) ∨ PImξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b =
(ξ∗c +L3)∨Amξ∗c (ξ∗a) = Amξ∗c (ξ∗a). Consider the contract I∗(x) = (x− c+ ξ∗c )+− (x− a)+, it is
easy to check that I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = (1 + θ)
∫ a
c−ξL3,h2
SX(x)dx = A
m
ξ∗c (ξ
∗
a).
Thus, I∗ is the optimal contract by Theorem 4.3.8.
(b) If h2(0) < L3 < h3(0), from Case b.iii in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, we have
ξ∗c = 0 and ξ
∗
a = a − c. Since h3(0) > L3, namely, A0(a − c) = h3(0) > L3, from Case
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b.2 in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, we have ξ∗b = ξ
∗
a = a − c and moreover Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b =
(ξ∗c + L3) ∨ PImξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = L3 ∨ A
m
0 (a − c) = L3 ∨ h2(0) = L3. As a function of d, for any
d ∈ [b,∞], PI = PI(d) = (1 + θ)
(∫ a
c
+
∫∞
d
)
SX(x)dx is continuous and decreasing in d.
Note that PI(∞) = h2(0) < L3 < h3(0) = PI(b), thus there exists d∗ ∈ [b,∞] such that
PI(d
∗) = L3. The contract I∗(x) = (x − c)+ − (x − a)+ + (x − d∗)+ is optimal because it
satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = PI(d
∗) = L3.
(c) If h3(0) ≤ L3, from Case b.ii in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, we have ξ∗c = ξL3,h3 ,
ξ∗a = ξL3,h3 + a − c, and h3(ξ∗c ) ≤ L3. Since h3(ξ∗c ) = Aξ∗c (ξ∗c + a − c) − ξ∗c = Aξ∗c (ξ∗a) − ξ∗c ,
we have Aξ∗c (ξ
∗
a) = h3(ξ
∗
c ) + ξ
∗
c ≤ ξ∗c + L3. From Case b.1 in the proof of in Lemma
4.3.7, we have that ξ∗b is the solution to the equation of ξ
∗
c + L3 = PIM
ξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b
and it can
be checked that Aξ∗c (ξ
∗
b ) = PIM
ξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b
= (ξ∗c + L3) ∨ PImξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b . Therefore, I
∗(x) =
x− (x−ξL3,h3)+ +(x−c)+− (x− (c+ξ∗b −ξL3,h3))+ +(x−b)+ because it satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x
for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = Aξ∗c (ξ
∗
b ) = ξ
∗
c + L3.
Proof of Corollary 4.3.11. Suppose b < a and 0 ≤ λ < 1/2. By Lemma 4.3.7(c), we
have ξ∗c = ξ
m
c ∨
(
vθ ∧ ξMc
)
, ξ∗b = ξ
m
b (ξ
∗
c ), ξ
∗
a = ξ
∗
b +a−b, and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξ∗b−b+L1)∧BMξ∗c (ξ∗b ).
(a) Assume h2(vθ) ≤ L1 − c, which means vθ ∈ Ξc, thus ξ∗c = vθ.
(i) If (b+L3−L1)++L1−b < h6(vθ), which is equivalent to vθ+(b+L3−L1)++L1−b <
Bmvθ(vθ + (b + L3 − L1)+), note that (vθ + b − c) + L1 − b = vθ + L1 − c ≥ vθ + h2(vθ) =
Bmvθ(vθ + b− c) and ξb−Bmvθ(ξb) is continuous and strictly increasing in ξb, thus there exists
ξb,0 ∈ [vθ + (b + L3 − L1)+, vθ + b − c] such that ξb,0 + L1 − b = Bmvθ(ξb,0), namely ξb,0
satisfies (4.32) for ξc = vθ. Moreover, vθ + L3 ≤ ξb,0 + L1 − b = Bmvθ(ξb,0) ≤ BMvθ (ξb,0)
implies that ξb,0 satisfies (4.31) for ξc = vθ. Thus, ξb,0 ∈ Ξb,vθ . For any ξb < ξb,0, ξb /∈ Ξb,vθ
because it does not satisfy (4.32) from ξb − Bmvθ(ξb) < ξb,0 − Bmvθ(ξb,0) = b − L1. Thus,
ξmb (vθ) = ξb,0 and moreover, Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξb,0 − b + L1) ∧ BMvθ (ξb,0) = ξb,0 − b + L1. Then
I∗(x) = (x − c + vθ)+ − (x − c)+ + (x − (b − ξb,0 + vθ))+ − (x − a)+ because it satisfies
I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = B
m
vθ
(ξb,0) = ξb,0 + L1 − b.
(ii) If h6(vθ) ≤ (b+L3−L1)+ +L1−b < h7(vθ), which is equivalent to Bmvθ(vθ+(b+L3−
L1)
+) ≤ vθ+(b+L3−L1)++L1−b < BMvθ (vθ+(b+L3−L1)+), note that ξ∗c +L3 = vθ+L3 ≤
vθ + (b+L3−L1)+ +L1− b, thus vθ + (b+L3−L1)+ satisfies (4.31) and (4.32) for ξc = vθ.
Since Ξb,vθ ⊂ [vθ + (b + L3 − L1)+, b], we have ξ∗b = ξmb (vθ) = vθ + (b + L3 − L1)+ ∈ Ξb,vθ .
Moreover, Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = B
M
vθ
(ξ∗b )∧ (ξ∗b +L1− b) = vθ + (b+L3−L1)+ +L1− b. As a function
of (d1, d2) ∈ [0, c− vθ]× [a,∞],
PI = PI(d1, d2) = (1 + θ)
(∫ d1+vθ
d1
+
∫ c+(b+L3−L1)+
c
+
∫ a
b
+
∫ ∞
d2
)
SX(x)dx
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can take all the values on [PI(c−vθ,∞), PI(0, a)]. Note that PI(c−vθ,∞) = vθ +h6(vθ) ≤
vθ + (b+ L3 − L1)+ + L1 − b < vθ + h7(vθ) = PI(0, a), thus there exist d∗1 ∈ [0, c− vθ] and
d∗2 ∈ [a,∞] such that PI(d∗1, d∗2) = vθ + (b+ L3 − L1)+ + L1 − b. Hence,
I∗(x) = (x− d∗1)+ − (x− d∗1 − vθ)+ + (x− c)+
− (x− c− (b+ L3 − L1)+)+ + (x− b)+ − (x− a)+ + (x− d∗2)+
because it satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = PI(d
∗
1, d
∗
2) = vθ + L3 ∨ (L1 − b).
(iii) If L3 < h7(vθ) ≤ (b + L3 − L1)+ + L1 − b, which is equivalent to vθ + L3 <
BMvθ (vθ+(b+L3−L1)+) ≤ vθ+(b+L3−L1)++L1−b, using similar arguments as in case (b),
we have ξ∗b = ξ
m
b (ξ
∗
c ) = vθ +(b+L3−L1)+ and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = BMvθ (ξ∗b )∧ (ξ∗b +L1−b) = BMvθ (ξ∗b ).
Hence, I∗(x) = x− (x− vθ)+ + (x− c)+ − (x− c− (b+L3 −L1)+)+ + (x− b)+ because it
satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = B
M
vθ
(ξ∗b ).
(iv) If h7(vθ) ≤ L3, which is equivalent to BMvθ (vθ + (b + L3 − L1)+) ≤ vθ + L3, using
similar arguments as in (i), there exists ξb,1 ∈ [vθ + (b + L3 − L1)+, vθ + b − c] such that
vθ+L3 = B
M
vθ
(ξb,1). Moreover, ξ
∗
b = ξ
m
b (ξ
∗
c ) = ξb,1 and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξb,1−b+L1)∧BMvθ (ξb,1) =
BMvθ (ξb,1) = vθ+L3. Hence, I
∗(x) = x−(x−vθ)+ +(x−c)+−(x−(c+ξb,1−vθ))+ +(x−b)+
because it satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x, for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = B
M
vθ
(ξb,1) = vθ + L3.
(b) Assume h2(vθ) > L1 − c. Using the same arguments for the proof of Corollary
4.3.9(b), we have vθ /∈ Ξc and ξ∗c = ξL1−c, h2 that is defined by (4.51). For any ξb < ξ∗c +b−c,
since ξb − Bmξ∗c (ξb) is continuous and strictly increasing in ξb, we have ξb − Bmξ∗c (ξb) < (ξ∗c +
b − c) − Bξ∗c (ξ∗c + b − c) = −h2(ξ∗c ) + b − c = b − L1. It implies that ξb does not satisfies
(4.32) and thus ξb /∈ Ξb,ξ∗c . Therefore, Ξb,ξ∗c = {ξ∗c + b− c} is a single point set. Moreover,
ξ∗a = ξ
∗
c + a − c and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξ∗b − b + L1) ∧ BMξ∗c (ξ∗b ) = ξ∗b − b + L1 = ξ∗c − c + L1.
Hence, I∗(x) = (x − c + ξ∗c )+ − (x − a)+ because it satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and
PI∗ = B
m
ξ∗c (ξ
∗
b ) = ξ
∗
c − c+ L1.
Proof of Corollary 4.3.12. Suppose b < a and 1/2 < λ ≤ 1. By Lemma 4.3.7(d),
we have ξ∗c = ξ
m
c ∨
[
(c− vθ) ∧ ξMc
]
, ξ∗b = ξ
∗
c + b − c, ξ∗a = ξ∗c + a − c, and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b =
(ξ∗c +L3)∨PImξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξ
∗
c +L3)∨(h2(ξ∗c )+ξ∗c ). By (4.27) and (4.28), we know that c−vθ ∈ Ξc
is equivalent to h1(c− vθ) ≥ L3 and h2(c− vθ) ≤ L1 − c. Note that h2(c− vθ) ≤ L1 − c by
(4.7).
(a) If h1(c − vθ) < L3, then c − vθ /∈ Ξc. Furthermore, note that h1(vθ) ≥ L3 by
(4.7) and h1 is continuous and monotone on [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)], thus the equation
h1(ξc) = L3 has solutions on [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)]. Denote
ξL3,h1 = sup {ξc ∈ [vθ ∧ (c− vθ), vθ ∨ (c− vθ)] : h1(ξc) = L3} . (4.52)
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Then, we have h1(ξL3,h1) = L3. Moreover, h2(ξL3,h1) ≤ h1(ξL3,h1) = L3 ≤ L1 − c. Thus,
ξL3,h1 ∈ Ξc. Suppose vθ ≤ ξL3,h1 ≤ c − vθ, since h1 is decreasing on [vθ, c − vθ], we have
h1(ξc) < L3, for any ξc > ξL3,h1 , namely ξc does not satisfy (4.27) and ξc /∈ Ξc. It implies
that ξMc = ξL3,h1 ≤ c − vθ and thus ξ∗c = ξL3,h1 . Suppose c − vθ ≤ ξL3,h1 ≤ vθ, since h1
is strictly increasing on [c − vθ, vθ], we have h1(ξc) < h1(ξL3,h1) = L3 for any ξc < ξL3,h1 ,
namely ξc does not satisfy (4.27) and ξc /∈ Ξc. We also conclude that ξ∗c = ξmc = ξL3,h1 .
Moreover, Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = (ξL3,h1 + L3) ∨ (h2(ξL3,h1) + ξL3,h1) = L3 + ξL3,h1 , where h2(ξL3,h1) ≤
h1(ξL3,h1) = ξL3,h1 . The optimal contract is I
∗(x) = x− (x− ξL3,h1)+ + (x− c)+ because it
satisfies I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = ξL3,h1 + h1(ξL3,h1) = ξL3,h1 + L3.
(b) If h1(c − vθ) ≥ L3 which means c − vθ ∈ Ξc, then ξ∗c = c − vθ, ξ∗b = b − vθ,
ξ∗a = a−vθ, and Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b = c−vθ+L3∨h2(c−vθ). As a function of (d1, d2) ∈ [0, vθ]× [a,∞],
PI = PI(d1, d2) = (1 + θ)
(∫ d1+c−vθ
d1
+
∫ a
c
+
∫∞
d2
)
SX(x)dx is continuous and can take all the
values on [PI(0, a), PI(vθ,∞)]. Note that h1(c − vθ) ≥ L3 by (4.27) and h1(ξc) ≥ h2(ξc)
for all ξc ∈ [0, c], then PI(0, a) = h1(c− vθ) + c− vθ ≥ L3 ∨ h2(c− vθ) + c− vθ. Together
with PI(vθ,∞) = h2(c − vθ) + c − vθ ≤ L3 ∨ h2(c − vθ) + c − vθ, we know that there
exists (d∗1, d
∗
2) ∈ [0, vθ] × [a,∞] such that PI(d∗1, d∗2) = Pξ∗c ,ξ∗a,ξ∗b . The optimal contract is
I∗(x) = (x− d∗1)+− (x− d∗1− c+ vθ)+ + (x− c)+− (x− a)+ + (x− d∗2)+ because it satisfies
I∗(x) = ξ∗x for x = c, a, b and PI∗ = PI(d
∗
1, d
∗
2) = L3 ∨ h2(c− vθ) + c− vθ.
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Chapter 5
Future Studies
5.1 Joint perspective reinsurance model with AVaR
In Chapter 4, we consider the joint perspective of the insurer and the reinsurer in one
optimal reinsurance design problem. We assume both parties use VaR to measure their
own risk. It is natural to consider the cases when AVaR is used instead of VaR.
Assume that the insurer use AVaR at risk level 0 < α < SX(0) while the reinsurer use
AVaR at risk level 0 < β < SX(0). The linear combination of two parties’ interest with
weighting coefficient λ ∈ [0, 1] is
T (I) , λAVaRα(X − I(X) + PI) + (1− λ)AVaRβ(I(X)− PI), (5.1)
for any I ∈ I. Assume that the premium PI is determined by Wang’s premium principle
with distortion function gP , i.e.
PI =
∫ ∞
0
gP ◦ SX(t) dt.
Therefore, the optimal reinsurance problem without constraints is
min
I∈I
T (I). (5.2)
Note that, the value function T (I) can be simplified as follows.
T (I) = λ [AVaRα(X)− AVaRα(I(X)) + PI ] + (1− λ) [AVaRβ(I(X))− PI ]
= λAVaRα(X)− λAVaRα(I(X)) + (1− λ)AVaRβ(I(X)) + (2λ− 1)PI .
118
By definition, we have
AVaRα(I(X)) =
1
α
∫ ∞
a
I(x) dFX(x) =
∫ ∞
0
I(x) dFα(x)
where a = VaRα(X) and Fα(x) = (1− SX(x)/α) I[a,∞)(x), for x ≥ 0. Note that
Sα(x) = 1− Fα(x) =
{
1, 0 ≤ x < a,
1
α
SX(x), a ≤ x <∞,
can be viewed as a distorted survival function, that is Sα(x) = gα ◦ SX(x), where
gα(t) =
(
t
α
)
∨ 1 =
{
t
α
, 0 ≤ t < α,
1, α ≤ t ≤ 1
is a distortion function. Similarly, we can define the distortion function gβ(t) = (t/b) ∨ 1,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, where b = VaRβ(X), and the corresponding distorted survival function and
probability are Sβ(x) = gβ ◦ SX(x) and Fβ(x) = 1− Sβ(x), for all x ≥ 0. Then,
AVaRβ(I(X)) =
1
β
∫ ∞
b
I(x) dFX(x) =
∫ ∞
0
I(x) dFβ(x).
Meanwhile, let Fg(x) = 1−gP ◦SX(x), for x ≥ 0, then the premium is PI =
∫∞
0
I(x) dFg(x).
Therefore,
T (I) =λAVaRα(X)− λ
∫ ∞
0
I(x) dFα(x)
+ (1− λ)
∫ ∞
0
I(x) dFβ(x) + (2λ− 1)
∫ ∞
0
I(x) dFg(x)
=λAVaRα(X) +
∫ ∞
0
I(x) dG(x)
where
G(x) = −λFα(x) + (1− λ)Fβ(x) + (2λ− 1)Fg(x)
= λSα(x)− (1− λ)Sβ(x) + (1− 2λ)Sg(x), x ≥ 0,
= λgα ◦ SX(x)− (1− λ)gβ ◦ SX(x) + (1− 2λ)gP ◦ SX(x)
= (λgα − (1− λ)gβ + (1− 2λ)gP ) ◦ SX(x) , g ◦ SX(x).
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is a combination of three distorted survival functions. Since limx→∞ I(x)G(x) = 0, we get
T (I) = λAVaRα(X)−
∫ ∞
0
G(x)I ′(x) dx.
It follows that solving Problem (5.2) is equivalent to solving
max
I∈I
∫ ∞
0
G(x)I ′(x) dx. (5.3)
Denote G+ , {x ≥ 0 : G(x) > 0}, G− , {x ≥ 0 : G(x) < 0} and G0 , {x ≥ 0 : G(x) = 0}.
Theorem 5.1.1 The optimal reinsurance policy for Problem (5.2) has form
I∗(x) =
∫ x
0
I{G+}(t) + k(t)I{G0}(t) dt, x ≥ 0, (5.4)
where k(t) is an arbitrary function such that 0 ≤ k(t) ≤ 1.
Proof. For an arbitrary reinsurance policy I ∈ I, we know that its right derivative
I ′(x) ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose I∗ ∈ I has form (5.4), then∫ ∞
0
G(x)I ′(x) dx =
∫
G+
G(x)I ′(x) dx+
∫
G−∪G0
G(x)I ′(x) dx
≥
∫
G+
G(x) dx =
∫
G+
G(x) dx+
∫
G+0
k(x)G(x) dx
=
∫ ∞
0
G(x)(I∗)′(x) dx.
Therefore, the optimal reinsurance policy has form (5.4).
Corollary 5.1.2 There exists unique tλ ∈ (0, 1) such that g(tλ) = 0.
1. When 0 < λ < 1/2, we have tλ ∈ [0, tα ∧ tβ], G+ = [VaRtλ(X),∞) and the optimal
reinsurance policy is I∗(x) = (x− VaRtλ(X))+.
2. When 1/2 < λ < 1, we have tλ ∈ [tα∨ tβ, α∨β], G+ = [0,VaRtλ(X)] and the optimal
reinsurance policy is I∗(x) = x− (x− VaRtλ(X))+.
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Proof. Assume α < β and 1/2 < λ < 1. Then a > b, and
g(t) = λgα(t)− (1− λ)gβ(t) + (1− 2λ)gP (t)
=

λ
α
t− 1−λ
β
t+ (1− 2λ)gP (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ α,
1− 1−λ
β
t+ (1− 2λ)gP (t), α ≤ t ≤ β,
(1− 2λ)gP (t), β ≤ t ≤ 1.
Denote tα such that αgP (tα) = tα, and tβ such that βgP (tβ) = tβ. Then the function
t
α
∨1−gP (t) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ tα, and positive otherwise; while the function tβ ∨1−gP (t) ≤ 0
for 0 ≤ t ≤ tβ, and positive otherwise. It follows that
g(t) = λ
[(
t
α
)
∨ 1− gP (t)
]
− (1− λ)
[(
t
β
)
∨ 1− gP (t)
]
=

λ
(
t
α
− gP (t)
)− (1− λ)( t
β
− gP (t)
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ tα,
λ
(
t
α
∨ 1− gP (t)
)− (1− λ)( t
β
− gP (t)
)
, tα ≤ t ≤ β,
(2λ− 1) (1− gP (t)) , β ≤ t ≤ 1.
It is easy to check that g(t) is positive for tα ≤ t ≤ tβ and β ≤ t ≤ 1.
For t ∈ [tβ, β], it is known that g(tβ) = λ
(
tβ
α
∨ 1− gP (tβ)
)
> 0, g(β) = (2λ −
1) (1− gP (β)) > 0, and g′′(t) = −(2λ − 1)g′′P (t) ≥ 0. That is g(t) is convex on [tβ, β].
Since lim
t→β
g′(t) = −1−λ
β
+ (1− 2λ)g′P (β) < 0, it is easy to conclude that g(t) ≥ 0 on [tβ, β].
For t ∈ [0, tα], g is convex because g′′(t) = −(2λ − 1)g′′P (t) ≥ 0. Note that g(0) = 0,
g(tα) = −(1− λ) (bα/β − gP (tα) ≥ 0 and g′(t) = λα − 1−λβ + (1− 2λ)g′P (t). It follows that
lim
x↓0
g′(t) = −∞,
lim
x↑tα
g′(t) =
λ
α
− 1− λ
β
+ (1− 2λ)g′P (tα)
≥ λ
α
− 1− λ
β
+ (1− 2λ) 1
α
= (1− λ)
(
1
α
− 1
β
)
> 0,
where g′P (tα) ≤ gP (tα)/tα = (tα/α)/tα = 1/α. Thus, there exists unique tλ ∈ (0, tα) such
that g(t) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ tλ and g(t) ≥ 0 otherwise. By solving g(tλ) = 0, we get
gP (tλ)
tλ
=
λ/α− (1− λ)/β
2λ− 1 .
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In summary, g(t) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ tλ, and g(t) ≥ 0 otherwise. Therefore, G(x) =
g ◦ SX(x) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ VaRtλ(X), and G(x) ≤ 0 otherwise. Moreover, G+ =
{x ≥ 0 : G(x) ≥ 0} = [0,VaRtλ(X)] and the optimal reinsurance policy is I∗(x) = x −
(x− VaRtλ(X))+.
By using the same argument, we could prove the other three cases.
Remark 5.1.1 In Problem (5.2), Wang’s premium principle has the distortion form and
the AVaR is a special case of distortion risk measures. Thus, the transformation from
Problem (5.2) to Problem (5.3) is a promising technique to solve more general optimiza-
tion problems when both the risk measure of the insurer and the premium principle have
distortion expressions.
Problem (5.2) is a minimization problem without any constraints. However, as men-
tioned in the introduction section, the insurer and the reinsurer could add some require-
ments on the optimal reinsurance policy, such as the premium budget constraint, ruin
probability constraint. If the added constraints can be expressed in the distortion form, the
same technique could be applied.
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5.2 Policyholder’s Deficit
Motived by [Asimit et al., 2013], it is interesting to consider the reinsurance impact on the
policyholder’s welfare. They considered the Expected Policyholder Deficit (EPD) which is
the difference between nominal liabilities to policyholders and liabilities that will actually
be paid.
Definition 5.2.1 Given a random risk X and the available assets c, the Expected Policy-
holder Deficit is defined as follows:
EPD(X, c) , E
[
(X − c)+] ,
We make the same assumption that the insurer will set up an initial reserve according to
V aR-regulation. Under the consideration of default risk faced by the insurer, the nominal
liabilities to policyholders is
R˜(X) , X − I˜(X) = X − I(X) ∧ (V aRα(I(X)) + PI) ,
while the actually payment is R˜(x) ∧ V aRγ(R˜(X)), where α and γ are the risk levels for
the reinsurer and insurer, respectively. Thus, the optimization problem is
min
I∈I
EPD
(
R˜(X), V aRγ
(
R˜(X)
))
. (5.5)
Recall the definition for “Expected Shortfall”:
ESγ(X) ,
1
γ
∫ γ
0
V aRη(X)dη
= V aRγ(X) +
1
γ
E
[
(X − V aRγ(X))+
]
.
Thus, Problem 5.5 can be rewritten as
min
I∈I
γ
[
ESγ
(
R˜(X)
)
− V aRγ
(
R˜(X)
)]
.
Lemma 5.2.1 Denote a , V aRα(X) and c , V aRγ(X). For each feasible reinsurance
contract I ∈ I, there exists KI ∈ I satisfying
EPD
(
X − K˜I(X), V aRγ
(
X − K˜I(X)
))
≤ EPD
(
X − I˜(X), V aRγ
(
X − I˜(X)
))
123
and KI has form
KI(x) =x− (x− ξα ∧ ξγ)+ + (x− a ∧ c)+ (5.6)
− (x− (a ∧ c+ |ξα − ξγ|))+ + (x− a ∨ c)+,
for some (ξα, ξγ) ∈ R2+ satisfying ξα ≤ a and ξγ ≤ c.
Proof. Select an arbitrary contract I ∈ I and denote ξα = I(a) and ξγ = I(c). Note that
ESγ(X) = V aRγ(X) +
1
γ
E
[
(X − V aRγ(X))+
]
.
where
ESγ(X) ,
1
γ
∫ γ
0
V aRη(X)dη
is the “Expected Shortfall” of X at level γ. Thus,
EPD
(
R˜(X), V aRγ
(
R˜(X)
))
= γ
[
ESγ
(
R˜(X)
)
− V aRγ
(
R˜(X)
)]
.
It is easy to see that
V aRγ
(
R˜(X)
)
= R˜ (V aRγ(X))
= V aRγ(X)− I (V aRγ(X)) ∧ (I(V aRα(X) + PI)
= c− ξγ ∧ (ξα + PI) ,
and
ESγ
(
R˜(X)
)
=
1
γ
∫ γ
0
V aRη(R˜(X))dη
=
1
γ
∫ γ
0
R˜(V aRη(X))dη
=
1
γ
∫ γ
0
V aRη(X)dη − 1
γ
∫ γ
0
I˜(V aRη(X))dη
=
1
γ
∫ γ
0
V aRη(X)dη − 1
γ
∫ γ
0
I(V aRη(X)) ∧ (I(ξα) + PI) dη
=
1
γ
∫ γ
0
V aRη(X)dη − 1
γ
∫ ∞
c
I(t) ∧ (I(ξα) + PI) dFX(t).
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As a consequence,
EPD
(
X − I˜(X), V aRγ
(
X − I˜(X)
))
= γ
[
1
γ
∫ γ
0
V aRη(X)dη − c− 1
γ
∫ ∞
c
I(t) ∧ (I(ξα) + PI) dFX(t) + ξγ ∧ (ξα + PI)
]
,
and Problem 5.5 is equivalent to the following minimization problem:
min
I∈I
{
−1
γ
∫ ∞
c
I(t) ∧ (I(ξα) + PI) dFX(t) + ξγ ∧ (ξα + PI)
}
,
because γ and 1
γ
∫ γ
0
V aRη(X)dη − c are both constants. For notation simplicity, for any
I ∈ I, denote
H(I) , −1
γ
∫ ∞
c
I(t) ∧ (ξα + PI) dFX(t) + ξγ ∧ (ξα + PI)
We are going to construct KI ∈ I such that KI(c) = ξγ and KI(a) = ξα.
Case 1. Suppose γ ≥ α (or equivalently V aRγ(X) ≤ V aRα(X)). Then ξγ ≤ ξα <
ξα+PI∧PKI . It is easy to see that KI defined by the expression (5.6) satisfies KI(t) ≥ I(t)
for all t ≥ 0 and PKI ≥ PI . It implies that
H(I)−H(KI) =
[
−1
γ
∫ ∞
c
I(t) ∧ (ξα + PI) dFX(t) + ξγ
]
−
[
−1
γ
∫ ∞
c
KI(t) ∧ (ξα + PKI ) dFX(t) + ξγ
]
=
1
γ
∫ ∞
c
KI(t) ∧ (ξα + PKI )− I(t) ∧ (ξα + PI) dFX(t)
≥ 0.
The last inequality is due to the fact that for all t ≥ 0,
KI(t) ∧ (ξα + PKI ) ≥ I(t) ∧ (ξα + PI) .
Case 2. Suppose γ ≤ α (or equivalently V aRγ(X) ≥ V aRα(X)). Then ξγ ≥ ξα.
Consider contract KI ∈ I given by the expression (5.6). We have KI(t) ≥ I(t) for all t ≥ 0
and PKI ≥ PI .
If ξγ ≤ ξα ≤ ξα + PI , then ξα ≤ ξγ + PI ∧ PKI and
H(I)−H(KI) = 1
γ
∫ ∞
c
KI(t) ∧ (ξα + PKI )− I(t) ∧ (ξα + PI) dFX(t)
≥ 0.
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If ξα < ξα + PI < ξγ, for any x ≥ c, we have I(x) ≥ ξγ > ξα + PI ,
H(I) = −1
γ
∫ ∞
c
I(t) ∧ (ξα + PI) dFX(t) + ξα + PI
= −1
γ
∫ ∞
c
(ξα + PI) dFX(t) + ξα + (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
I(t)dFX(t)
= −1
γ
(ξα + PI)SX(c) + ξα + PI
= 0.
Meanwhile
H(KI) = −1
γ
∫ ∞
c
KI(t) ∧ (ξα + PKI ) dFX(t) + ξγ ∧ (ξα + PKI )
=
{ − 1
γ
(ξα + PKI )γ + (ξα + PKI ), if ξγ ≥ ξα + PKI ;
− 1
γ
∫∞
c
KI(t) ∧ (ξα + PKI ) dFX(t) + ξγ, if ξγ ≤ ξα + PKI ;
=
{
0, if ξγ ≥ ξα + PKI ;
1
γ
∫∞
c
ξγ −KI(t) ∧ (ξα + PKI ) dFX(t), if ξγ ≤ ξα + PKI ;
≤ 0.
Thus, H(KI) ≤ H(I) still holds when γ ≤ α. Combining Case 1 and Case 2, we get the
result as desired
Remark 5.2.1 Lemma 5.2.1 allows us to search the optimal solution among all contracts
of the form (5.6) and thus Problem 5.5 can be reduced to a finite dimension minimization
problem. In our future work, we plan to determine the optimal values for ξα and ξγ in the
expression (5.6) and this will lead us to the optimal reinsurance contract.
Another possible setting is assuming the maximal available assets for underlying loss X
is V aRγ(X−I˜(X)+(1+θ1)E[X], where (1+θ1)E[X] is the premium paid by the policyholder
to the insurer. In this case, from the policyholder’s point of view, the optimization problem
becomes
min
I∈I
EPD
(
R˜(X), V aRγ
(
R˜(X)
)
+ (1 + θ1)E[X]
)
.
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Meanwhile, from the insurer’s point of view, the probability of default for the insurer is
worth to be investigated, i.e.
min
I∈I
P
(
R˜(X) > V aRγ
(
R˜(X)
)
+ (1 + θ1)E[X]
)
.
We could adopt the same construction method for Problem 5.5 to the above two optimiza-
tion problems.
5.3 Multiple Reinsurers with Counterparty Default
Risk
In Section 3.2, we assume there are two available reinsurers in the market which is a more
general framework than the classical one reinsurer model. As mentioned in Remark 3.2.1,
the insurer could reduce the premium by buying a portfolio of reinsurance contracts from
multiple reinsurers. However, multiple reinsurers can lead to multiple counterparty default
risks. Suppose there are two reinsurers in the market. In this case, the insurer may face
counterparty default risks from both reinsurers. We make the same V aR-regulated initial
reserves assumption as in Chapter 2 for each reinsurer, that is, for reinsurance contract Ii,
i = 1, 2, Reinsurer i sets up an initial reserve ωi , V aRαi(Ii(X)) and charges premium
Pi,Ii from the insurer. Thus the actual indemnity paid by the Reinsurer i, i = 1, 2 under
the consideration of its default risk is
I˜i(x) , Ii(x) ∧ (V aRαi(Ii(X)) + Pi,Ii) , for i = 1, 2.
Note that, two reinsurers may have different risk attitudes, which are reflected by risk level
αi for i = 1, 2, to set up his own initial reserve ωi. In this case, the insurer’s total risk
becomes
X − I˜1(X)− I˜2(X) + P1,I1 + P2,I2 ,
and we consider the following minimization problem
min
(I1,I2)∈D
ρ
(
X − I˜1(X)− I˜2(X)) + P1,I1 + P2,I2
)
,
such that Pi,Ii , (1 + θi)
∫ ∞
0
gi ◦ SIi(X)(x)dx, i = 1, 2,
where D is the set of all feasible pair of reinsurance contract, ρ(·) is a risk measure, θi ≥ 0
is the risk loading for Reinsurer i and gi is the distortion for Reinsurer i, i = 1, 2. We plan
to investigate the cases when ρ(·) = V aRβ(·) and ρ(·) = AV aRβ(·) where β is the risk
level chosen by the insurer.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we proposed three new optimal reinsurance models to reflect different re-
quirements from both the insurer and the reinsurer.
In Chapter 2, we consider the default risk faced by the insurer due to the possibility
that the reinsurer fails to pay the entire indemnity when it exceeds the reinsurer’s maximal
payment ability. The maximal amount that can be paid from the reinsurer, for each feasible
contract I, is equal to the premium PI plus the initial reserve ωI based on V aR-regulation.
Under the assumption that the default risk exists, we solved a utility-based maximization
problem and a V aR-based minimization problem. In the utility-based model, the optimal
contract may have two deductible layers in order to reduce the default risk while keeping
the premium unchanged. In the V aR-based model, the optimal contract is a limited stop-
loss but it requires a lower deductible when the insurer is more conservative than the
reinsurer.
In Chapter 3, the insurer is assumed to minimize his total risk exposure under convex risk
measure while the premium is determined by the Wang’s premium principle. This is a
much more general framework than the classical model. We provide a necessary condition
for the expression of the optimal solution and in two particular cases, optimal solutions
are given in closed form. We also consider the case when there are two reinsurers in the
reinsurance market, and show that this case can be reduced to an equivalent one-reinsurer
problem.
In Chapter 4, we describe feasible reinsurance contracts that are acceptable to both an
insurer and a reinsurer and explore optimal reinsurance contracts which take into account
both an insurer’s aims and a reinsurer’s goals. The models and problems proposed in this
paper are interesting in theory and applications. As showed in this chapter, solving the
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proposed problems and finding the optimal reinsurance contracts from the perspective of
both an insurer and a reinsurer are challenging jobs. The optimal reinsurance contracts
from the perspectives of both an insurer and a reinsurer are more complicated than the
optimal reinsurance contracts from one party’s point of view only. The models and prob-
lems proposed in this chapter can be explored further in different ways such as replacing
the VaR by other risk measures and accommodating other demands of an insurer and a
reinsurer in the study of optimal reinsurance designs.
129
Bibliography
[Acerbi and Tasche, 2002] Acerbi, C. and Tasche, D. (2002). On the coherence of expected
shortfall. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(7):1487–1503.
[Arrow, 1963] Arrow, K. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care.
American Economic Review, 53:941–973.
[Arrow, 1971] Arrow, K. (1971). Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Markham, Chicago.
[Artzner et al., 1997] Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J., and Heath, D. (1997). Thinking
coherent. RISK, 10:68–71.
[Artzner et al., 1999] Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J., and Heath, D. (1999). Coherent
measures of risk. Mathematical Finance, 9(3):203–228.
[Asimit et al., 2013] Asimit, A., Badescu, A., and Cheung, K. (2013). Optimal reinsurance
in the presence of counterparty default risk. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,
53(3):690–697.
[Bernard and Ludkovski, 2012] Bernard, C. and Ludkovski, M. (2012). Impact of counter-
party risk on the reinsurance market. North American Actuarial Journal, 16(1):87–111.
[Biffis and Millossovich, 2012] Biffis, E. and Millossovich, P. (2012). Optimal reinsurance
with counterparty default risk. Working Paper.
[Billingsley, 1995] Billingsley, P. (1995). Probability and Measure, Third Edition. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY.
[Borch, 1960] Borch, K. (1960). An attempt to determine the optimum amount of stop loss
reinsurance. Transactions of the 16th International Congress of Actuaries, I:597–610.
130
[Bowers et al., 1997] Bowers, N., Gerber, H., Hickman, J., Jones, D., and Nesbitt, C.
(1997). Actuarial Mathematic. Second Edition. The Society of Actuaries, Schaumburg.
[Cai et al., 2013] Cai, J., Fang, Y., and Willmot, G. (2013). Optimal reciprocal reinsurance
treaties under the joint survival probability and the joint profitable probability. Journal
of Risk and Insurance, 80(1):145–168.
[Cai et al., 2014] Cai, J., Lemieux, C., and Liu, F. (2014). Optimal reinsurance with
regulatory initial capital and default risk. Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 57:13–
24.
[Cai and Tan, 2007] Cai, J. and Tan, K. (2007). Optimal retention for a stop-loss reinsur-
ance under the V@R and CTE risk measures. ASTIN Bulletin, 37(1):93–112.
[Cai et al., 2008] Cai, J., Tan, K., Weng, C., and Zhang, Y. (2008). Optimal reinsurance
under var and cte risk measures. Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 43(1):185–196.
[Cheung, 2010] Cheung, K. (2010). Optimal reinsurance revisited - geometric approach.
ASTIN Bulletin, 40(1):221–239.
[Cheung et al., 2014] Cheung, K., Sung, K., Yam, S., and Yung, K. (2014). Optimal
reinsurance under general law-invariant risk measures. Scandinavian Actuarial Journal,
1:72–91.
[Chi and Tan, 2013] Chi, Y. and Tan, K. (2013). Optimal reinsurance with general pre-
mium principles. Iinsurance: Mathematics and Economics, 52(2):180–189.
[Cummins and Danzon, 1997] Cummins, J. and Danzon, P. (1997). Price, financial quality,
and capital flows in insurance markets. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6:3–38.
[Cummins et al., 2002] Cummins, J., Doherty, N., and Lo, A. (2002). Can insurers pay for
the big one? Measuring the capacity of the insurance market to respond to catastrophic
losses. Journal of Risk and Finanace, 26:557–583.
[Delbaen, 2000] Delbaen, F. (2000). Coherent risk measures. Scuola Normale Superiore di
Pisa, Cattedra Galileiana.
[Deprez and Gerber, 1985] Deprez, O. and Gerber, H. (1985). On convex principles of
premium calculation. Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 4(3):179–189.
[Fan, 1953] Fan, K. (1953). Minimax theorems. Proc. Acad. Sci, USA, 39(1):42–47.
131
[Fang and Qu, 2014] Fang, Y. and Qu, Z. (2014). Optimal combination of quota-share
and stop-loss reinsurance treaties under the joint survival probability. IMA Journal of
Management Mathematics, 25:89–103.
[Feirrwlli and Rosazza Gianin, 2005] Feirrwlli, M. and Rosazza Gianin, E. (2005). Law
invariant convex risk measures. Advances in Mathematical Economics, 7:33–46.
[Follmer and Schied, 2002] Follmer, H. and Schied, A. (2002). Convex measures of risk
and trading constraints. Finance and Stochastics, 6(4):429–447.
[Follmer and Schied, 2004] Follmer, H. and Schied, A. (2004). Stochastic Finance: An
Introduction in Discrete Time. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
[Gajek and Zagrodny, 2000] Gajek, L. and Zagrodny, D. (2000). Insurer’s optimal reinsur-
ance strategies. Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 27(1):105–112.
[Gerber, 1979] Gerber, H. (1979). An Introduction to Mathematical Risk Theory, volume 8.
S.S.Huebner Foundation Monograph, Wharton School, University or Pennsylvania, Phli-
adelphia.
[Huber, 1981] Huber, P. (1981). Robust Statistics. Wiley and Sons, Incorporated, John,
New York.
[Hu¨rlimann, 2011] Hu¨rlimann, W. (2011). Optimal reinsurance revisited-point of view of
cedent and reinsurer. ASTIN Bulletin, 41(2):547–574.
[Jouini et al., 2006] Jouini, E., Schachermayer, W., and Touzi, N. (2006). Law invariant
risk measures have the fatou property. Advances in Mathematical Economics, 9:49–71.
[Kaas et al., 2001] Kaas, R., Goovaerts, M., Dhaene, J., and Denuit, M. (2001). Modern
Actuarial Risk Theory. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Kaluszka, 2004] Kaluszka, M. (2004). Mean-variance optimal reinsurance arrangements.
Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 1:28–41.
[Kaluszka, 2005] Kaluszka, M. (2005). Optimal reinsurance under convex principles of
premium calculation. Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 36(3):375–398.
[Kusuoka, 2001] Kusuoka, S. (2001). On law invariant coherent risk measures. Advances
in Mathematical Economics, 3:83–95.
132
[Malamud et al., 2012] Malamud, S., Rui, H., and Whinston, A. (2012). Optimal risk
sharing with limited liability. Working Paper.
[Ohlin, 1969] Ohlin, J. (1969). On a class of measures of dispersion with application to
optimal reinsurance. ASTIN Bulletin, 5:249–266.
[Raviv, 1979] Raviv, A. (1979). The design of an optimal insurance policy. The American
Economic Review, 69:84–96.
[Wang, 1996] Wang, S. (1996). Premium calculation by transforming the layer premium
density. ASTIN Bulletin, 26:71–92.
[Wang et al., 1997] Wang, S., Young, V., and Panjer, H. (1997). Axiomatic characteriza-
tion of insurance prices. Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 21(2):173–183.
[Yaari, 1987] Yaari, M. (1987). The dual theory of choice under risk. Econometrica, 55:95–
115.
[Young, 1999] Young, V. (1999). Optimal insurance under wang’s premium principle. In-
surance: Mathematics & Economics, 25(2):109–122.
133
